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Abstract 
 
It is commonly recognised that commercial security, in its different forms, has become 
an important element in societies as a provider of private and public security. The 
reasons for this development are manifold but can be seen to well from the changes in 
individual societies and their governance structures. Because of the growth of the 
security industry, many regulatory regimes have considered some form of industry 
regulation to be necessary.  
Some private security research has been carried out during the last 40 years. Most of the 
published texts have handled the situation in individual countries. The published studies 
are in most cases theoretical and based on existing documentary sources. In this study 
local interviews in six regulatory regimes; Belgium, Estonia, New York, Queensland, 
South Africa and Sweden, as well as transnational sources are used to make 
comparisons of different regulation solutions. There is, however, a basic problem with 
definitions, vocabulary and statistics concerning private and commercial security. A 
common platform is missing, which means that in this study some basic elements have 
been defined in order to be able to make structured analyses. 
The existing situation and interview comments concerning private security regulation 
have been used to analyse the industry, its challenges and its future development. The 
thesis tries to answer the questions why, what/who and how to regulate in general and 
more specifically in the six chosen regulatory regimes. Many of the industry’s 
challenges and trends can be understood through an examination of existing systems of 
private security regulation: legal apparatus that reveals how commercial security is 
positioned in different societies. 
The findings of this thesis confirm that private as well as commercial security regulation 
is very much a ‘command and control’ and ‘top-down’ procedure, bound to the general 
situation in each individual regulatory regime, and reflecting the cultures of the 
societies. The regulation texts as such may look quite similar, but the actual reasons for 
and practical implementations of them are locally specific and related to individual 
states’ overall governance practices and administrative maturity.  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
From my extensive professional experience of working in a variety of roles in the 
commercial security industry and as a postgraduate at Leicester University, I became 
increasingly conscious that commercial security regulation was an under-researched 
subject. This is surprising because, as I will argue in this thesis, regulation is central to 
the organisational legitimacy of the industry. What did exist, sometimes gave an 
inaccurate picture of the industry primarily because researchers were using outdated or 
inadequate, mostly second-hand industry data. Remarkably few studies had been 
undertaken by researchers with professional experience or knowledge of commercial 
security regulation. In many cases, the issues highlighted in the existing literature were 
of relatively minor importance, either from the public or the commercial security 
industry’s point of view. In these texts there was an over-focus on the public policing 
tasks, even though these tasks constitute a minor proportion of the activities performed 
by the industry. Not surprisingly even the terminology and definitions used were/are 
often confusing.  
The major local and transnational changes in the commercial security industry, which I 
observed from the inside of one of the multinationals that went global during the 1990s, 
have not been researched, especially from the industry’s perspective. In addition, new 
federalisation and harmonisation pressures on commercial security regulation connected 
to the constantly changing and growing demands for new security solutions in societies 
have been barely looked at. Also, the creation of innovative solutions to meet the 
general requirements for improved national and transnational security, at a time when 
public resources are diminishing, have received surprisingly little attention from the 
academic researchers. 
Commercial security activities are similar transnationally covering private or contract 
security companies who offer an array of security services and products to a variety of 
customers. By contrast, corporate security relates to the security activities that exist 
within businesses or corporations. As a result of participating in the political decision 
making and drafting processes of private security legislation in Finland, I concluded that 
private security regulation is an embodiment of the national political attitudes, existing 
constitutions and other legislation, international treaties, administrative and business 
cultures, and the relative strength of interest groups. Thus, ‘regulation’ is one of the few 
issues that offer a firm basis for making comparisons of national private and 
commercial security systems and structures transnationally. I previously used 
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‘regulation’ as the basis for my master’s dissertation comparing private security systems 
in the Nordic countries. 
This thesis is inspired by the desire to take advantage of a unique possibility to conduct 
transnational comparative research to identify the concerns of commercial security 
practitioners, and to test some of the ‘truths’ that have traditionally been ascribed to the 
industry. Transnational research is important as there is on-going political deliberation, 
for example, in the EU concerning the future role of the security industry, in Australia 
and the USA concerning homeland security and commercial security’s interstate role in 
its future realisation. In these cases, the commercial security industry and its regulation 
have a special role in the planned arrangements, though for different reasons. In these 
policy making and legislative processes, the lack of reliable data and multi-dimensional 
analysis related to commercial security activities is a serious hindrance for rational 
discussion, planning and decision making. 
To ensure a coherent empirical focus, my research has been limited to examining the 
traditional primary segment of manned commercial security services – guarding. This 
involves uniformed and clearly identifiable security officers performing a variety of 
duties, often in routine contact with the public as guards, door supervisors or stewards. 
My focus is also supported by the fact that these services are, in relation to size, public 
interest and regulation, the largest and most important commercial manned security 
segments. In-house security activities performed by a company’s own personnel, and 
which is not a part of commercial security, are largely excluded from the focus of this 
study.  
My working assumptions (acquired from my professional experience and the existing 
research literature) when I started this research were that within commercial security 
jurisdictions: (1) the technical- legal configurations and base-line contents of the 
regulations would turn out to be quite similar; (2) the actual reasons for regulations and 
their implementation would, on the contrary, be dissimilar and reflect on local 
circumstances; and (3) that the transnational harmonisation of commercial security 
regulations would be in present circumstances unachievable. 
The actual research was conducted in two stages: a general examination of private 
security regulation structures, and comparative analysis of the most important elements 
of these regulations in six regulatory regimes. The purpose was to (a) identify general 
patterns and models in private security regulation and its implementation, and (b) 
establish how these models functioned in practice in the chosen regimes. The latter, 
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empirical element of the study also addresses the need to understand the similarities and 
differences of the regulatory regimes under study as well as between the actual 
regulations and their practical implementation, and to identify the main problems and 
future needs in legal control of the commercial security industry. 
My research was planned around three main questions: 
 Why regulate manned commercial security activities? 
 What and who to regulate within the scope of manned commercial security 
activities? 
 How to implement manned commercial security regulations in practice? 
This thesis can be defined as a comparative transnational case study of particular 
aspects of commercial security regulation and its implementation. It is based on 
transnational documentary analyses and on transnational interviews of commercial 
security interest groups and stakeholders. It is focused on six different regulatory 
regimes: Belgium, Estonia, New York, Queensland, South Africa and Sweden. A wide 
range of interviews with handpicked key experts, official data and documents and 
articles in the trade media form the bulk of the sources used for my analysis.  
Methodologically, the most challenging parts of this study were creating suitable 
samples and managing a credible enough data platform suitable for the commercial 
security environment. As a consequence of the limited research base, there was and is a 
lack of structured descriptions and tested models concerning the collection of security 
industry data, including its regulation. Obtaining reliable and comparable enough data 
for structured transnational analyses meant finding methods and techniques that could 
be modified for use in this particular commercial security environment. Throughout the 
research, the diverse languages and the vocabulary concerning commercial security in 
the different regimes were an extra handicap.   
The thesis is divided into twelve chapters. The analysis starts from Chapter 2, which 
addresses some basic questions in order to explain how these core matters have been 
interpreted and defined in this work. It provides a ‘family tree’ of commercial security 
activities, looks at the existing literature, discusses general trends in the development of 
the industry, examines current directions in the profession, and defines commercial 
security regulation. Chapter 3 introduces the methodologies and research structure for 
the documentary analyses and the case studies. 
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My research findings are presented in two parts. Part I (Chapters 4-6) includes a general 
(transnational) presentation of existing private security regulation. It is based on a 
literature review of numerous documents and studies related to commercial security 
industry regulation, and address the research questions concerning why, what/who and 
how to regulate. The reasons (‘why’) to regulate are summarised in chapter 4 to give a 
platform for the whole thesis. In chapter 5 a general picture, based much on a 
preliminary study, is presented regarding the main subjects and objects (‘what’/’who’) 
included in private security regulation. Chapter 6 includes the main models (‘how’) for 
the practical execution of regulation.  
Part II (Chapters 7-11) presents the six case studies of the regulatory regimes drawn 
from the empirical research, again structured around the research questions. Chapter 7 
provides general descriptions and comparisons of the basic features of these regimes. In 
chapters 8-11 core features of the regulatory structures are explored through the eyes of 
the local interviewees and compared to the situations and opinions in the other 
regulatory regimes under study. 
Chapter 12 provides a summary of the results, a reflection on the implications of the 
findings and an assessment of how widely the findings of the thesis can be generalised. 
It also includes recommendations for further research and how to reconcile the 
professional needs of the industry with the research interests of academics. 
The findings presented in this thesis are intended to provide a grounded understanding 
of the organisational and governmental significance of commercial security regulation. 
Hopefully it will also promote further academic consideration of what effects regulation 
development both nationally and transnationally. This thesis is original in that it widens 
our ability to research private security in four ways. First, I have developed and tested a 
model of the regulatory process that can be re-used by other researchers. Second, I have 
generated data from under-researched jurisdictions which strengthens our understanding 
of private security. Third, I provide a comparative framework for analysing why and 
how regulation becomes a live policy issue, with an emphasis on the operational 
logistics of ‘what and how’ rather than the well-rehearsed ‘why’ issue. Finally, 
throughout I demonstrate the urgent need to foreground researching the empirical 
realities of the rapidly developing commercial security industry rather than encouraging 
the over-theorisation of ‘private security’.  
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW: WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT 
   THE COMMERCIAL SECURITY INDUSTRY? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The commercial security industry encompasses a rapidly developing set of activities, 
most notably traditional protection services, military operations (Johnston 1999; 
Krahman 2002; Holmqvist 2005; USA Today 2006; Bryden 2006), auxiliary and 
comprehensive police services (Jones and Newburn 1998; Button 2005a), and 
correctional services (Ligazette 1992; Costain Construction 1998; Group4Falck 2000). 
During the last fifteen years, commercial security has changed from a relatively small or 
middle-sized and primarily localised business into a major globalised enterprise 
(Securitas 2005a; Group4Securicor 2005; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
2010:5). There is also a common understanding in the literature that as a part of this 
development, the industry, commonly called ‘private security’, has gradually started to 
take over tasks that have previously been considered to belong exclusively to the state 
and public authorities, especially the police. This has happened partly in a planned way, 
controlled by the authorities, but mostly as a change steered by market demand without 
state intervention. Deviation from the conventional division of labour in providing 
security has forced governments to rethink the need and models of regulation and 
control.  
There are various reasons behind these developments: new business models, alternative 
governance models based on privatisation, sub-contracting of public duties, and 
restrictions in public finances (Johnston 1992, 2000; Johnston and Shearing 2003; 
Button 2005b; Bryden 2006; South 1982:15-27; Jones and Newburn 1998; Johnston 
1999; Cukier, et al 2003). In both the private and public environments, the general trend 
to outsource non-core activities, including security, has become globally accepted 
(Steeds 1998:35-36; Berglund 1999; Lippert and O’Connor 2003; Cowan 2006:28-32). 
This change in thinking has been the single main element boosting the growth of 
manned commercial security in the private sphere (de Waard, 1999; Cortese 2001).  
Particular factors have helped to make the growing commercialisation (privatisation) of 
security acceptable, both politically and in the eyes of the public. Amongst these factors 
are citizens’ growing feeling of insecurity (Flynn 1997; de Waard 1999), which is, in 
part, not necessarily based on reality but, for example, on the ways that crime is 
reported in the media (Cortese 2001; Smolej 2005; Heber 2005; Gounev 2006), and the 
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failure of governments to respond to the security needs of citizens (US Government 
1893:xv; Swedish Government 1974:16; United Kingdom Government 1979:Ch 
III/31,35; Garland 1996; de Waard 1999; Finnish Government 2001; Gyarmati 2004:30-
32; Austin 2006:9; Hiscock 2006:139). On the other hand, there has been an increase in 
the professional capability of commercial security entrepreneurs (United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime 2010:5) to meet rising business and public expectations with 
flexible and competitive manned services supported by new technologies. As Bayley 
and Shearing (2001:12) have argued: “The government’s monopoly on policing has 
been eroded because it has not provided the sort of affective consumer-responsive 
security that private auspices and suppliers have proved capable of giving.” For 
McLaughlin (2007a:113) it has become abundantly clear that: “...there is no reason why 
a society’s need for social order requires the establishment and/or maintenance of a 
public police force. ‘Policing’ is a socially necessary function but a state structured 
police bureaucracy is not”. 
Although the security industry has become a more visible and comprehensive provider 
of private and even public security, government measures to regulate, and especially to 
steer this business in practice, have been slow and disparate. For example, 13 out of the 
27 EU countries regulated their industry for the first time after 1990, and two have still 
not done it at all. The existing legislation is fragmented, and effective control of 
compliance is in many regulatory regimes poorly organised (Hakala 2007).
 
Also, 
research has been limited, resulting only in a small amount of reliable data (Johnston 
1992; de Waard 1999). Transnational research on the possible future roles of 
commercial security activities within new governance models is virtually non-existent. 
Also academic studies that address in any wider perspective the basic questions why, 
when and how private security activities should be (and are now) regulated are rare. The 
same lack of comparative studies can also be found in the area of how states have 
handled and are planning to handle the control of the security industry by regulation and 
other administrative measures. No-one has been interested in researching how existing 
private security regulation fits into the frame of general regulation models, theories and 
practices.  
2.2 Definitional issues: what is the commercial security industry?
1
 
There is considerable confusion in basic understandings and facts related to traditional 
commercial security activities (guarding). The concept ‘private security’ has been 
extended to include a diverse number of activities that are so differentiated that 
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bunching them together creates more confusion than lucidity. It is customary, especially 
in the academic literature, to include under the ‘private security’ heading, commercially 
performed traditional manned guarding services, private detective activities, electronic 
surveillance, transport of valuables, production and installation of electronic and 
mechanical security products, security consultancy, building and running of prisons, fire 
and ambulance services, military-like operations and so on. The problem is that in many 
academic texts, all of these are bundled together without any real sorting or definition 
(Morgan and Newburn 1998:68-70; Johnston 2006:36). No-one has tried to construct a 
comprehensive model of commercial (private) security activities. This makes it 
impossible to have a clear picture of the security industry or any part of it, especially 
concerning its size and regulation. To avoid misunderstandings here, a summary has 
been made, using professional knowledge and the existing literature (Cunningham, et al 
1990:127-132; Kennedy 1995:101-102; George and Button 1997b:18, 2000:11; Michael 
2002:37-39; Pillay 2006; Prenzler and Sarre 2008; Sarre and Prenzler 2011), to clarify 
which parts of the 'private security' industry will be included in this thesis. The activities 
included in the ‘family tree’ (Appendix 1) are defined as commercial security segments 
belonging to the private security. 
This summary model, based on existing literature and other available information, 
shows how the different activities can be divided in today's security industry (and its 
regulation). This division is changing constantly, as the industry faces new challenges, 
opportunities, reorganisations and statutory regulations. It is important to emphasise that 
‘guarding’ activities are the focus of this thesis, as well as some aspects from private 
investigation, crowd management
2
 and electronic security, so far as they are relevant to 
support the analysis of the main topic. Examples of the overlapping of different areas 
are the monitoring, alarm receiving and response execution, which are operationally 
impossible to define as belonging to the guarding, electronic or cash in transit (CIT) 
security segments (CoESS 2009). Some of the businesses often incorporated in 
commercial security activities, such as correctional services, including transport of 
inmates, and fire/ambulance/road services, have not been included in this ‘family tree’ 
table as they are services with a defined character of their own.  
As a consequence of not having any generally accepted definition on what is actually 
included in commercial security activities, it is also difficult to provide reliable or 
comparable figures on its manpower (Michael 2002:52-53) or of the business turnover. 
The ‘family tree’ is an attempt to categorise what could be considered to be commercial 
18 
 
security. It is a prerequisite to defining services or to constructing any reliable statistics 
of the industry. Even with a categorisation of the industry’s segments, there are 
significant problems when trying to collate and compare figures in this context.
3
 
Existing transnational research on the industry’s figures and regulation have mainly 
focused on its size and on making limited comparisons of the basic elements in private 
security legislation.
4
  
Because of the difficulties in data collection (Weber 2002a:2; Wakefield 2003:63-65; 
Sarre and Prenzler 2005:22; Morré 2006:30; INHES & CoESS 2008:20-21; Button 
2008:5-6; Prenzler, et al 2009:1), many studies and reports are partly based on 
incomparable official statistics, incomparable secondary sources and incomparable 
loosely structured open question surveys. This means that in the existing literature these 
kinds of data and comparisons can, in many cases, only be treated as illustrative of the 
existing situation (Stenning 1992:146-147; de Waard 1999:147; Button 2005a:6; Singh 
2005:158-159; Prenzler 2005b:61-62; Wakefield 2006:385; van Steden and Sarre 
2010:4-5; Kerttula 2010b:51-54). Jones and Newburn (1995:231) have noted: 
 “First, many of them [data] appear not to be based on any evidence at all. They 
appear to be best efforts at guessing the likely size of the industry based on the 
little that is currently known. Second, those that do provide some reference to 
source material are often based on rather inadequate data. Finally, the available 
estimates vary according to the definition of ‘private security’ upon which they 
are based.” 
The challenges in collecting transnational data have been described appositely by Morre 
(2006:30), stating: “Collecting data has not been easy. The topic is not self-explanatory 
and the survey required ‘expert’ knowledge. Furthermore, the language barrier has 
proven to be a major challenge and has sometimes led to interesting interpretations.” 
The uncritical, repetitive use in private security literature of outdated, inadequate or 
incomplete data has seriously affected the quality of the analyses and public 
understanding of the industry.  
The main shortcomings of existing data are as follows.  
(a) most of the statistics are both unreliable and incomparable, and do not give the 
possibility to make valid analysis of manned commercial security for the purposes of 
decision making or research, especially at the transnational level.  
(b) rigorous methodologies have not been deployed to produce ‘quality’ statistics. The 
information is based on a diversified mix of sources – from official state and industry's 
statistics to individual ‘best guesses’.  
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(c) the collation of information has been un-coordinated. There has not been a 
professional evaluation of what core figures (and knowledge) are primarily needed for 
analysis and decision making.  
(d) the importance of producing reliable data has not been recognised by researchers or 
the industry.  
Consequently, the data published in academic and other reports has been misleading 
when presenting, for example, comparisons of the number of public police and 
commercial security personnel.
5
 These figures are used to emphasise the industry’s 
growth and the threat that commercial security activity supposedly poses to liberal 
democratic societies. As Stenning (1992:147-148) has noted: “By far the brightest star 
in this mythological constellation – and one which is conjured up like a rabbit from a 
hat whenever this subject of private policing is raised  - is the myth that private police 
outnumber public police.” He explains his role in creating this myth by saying: “This 
myth is a particularly embarrassing one for me and my colleagues at the University of 
Toronto, since there is little doubt that we (along with the Rand Corporation and the 
Hallcrest crowd) bear a lot of the responsibility for its propagation.” The situation fulfils 
the qualities of a ‘mental prison’ which is commented generally by Hoogenboom 
(2010:2) when talking about police related things: “...the ideas or explanations, though 
widely held, are unexamined and, hence, may be re-evaluated upon further examination 
or as events unfold.”  
Because of definitional problems and unreliable figures, no comparisons of commercial 
security industry, based on (exact) numbers, are presented in this thesis. A draft model, 
in Appendix 2, shows what might be included in the gathering of more reliable and 
comparable information concerning the most basic figures related to the personnel of 
traditional guarding activities.  
2.3 Researching the commercial security industry  
Researching the commercial security industry as a stand-alone phenomenon 
There has been surprisingly little doctoral research on the commercial security industry. 
Those that have been written address issues related to the core questions of commercial 
security regulation and its implementation. They are, however, in most cases 
researching the topic in one country or one regulatory regime. A sample of this kind of 
theses
6
, of which some have been published as books, is presented below in Table 1.  
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Table 1 Examples of earlier theses on private security 
Author Main topics Comments 
Draper (1978)  
UK 
 
Amongst the key topics (challenges) in 
private policing are the public police 
resources, distinguishing private guards 
and police officers, powers available, the 
need for (better) training, possession of 
firearms on duty and use of dogs. 
The control of the industry by ‘The 
toothless watchdogs’ is commented to 
support a statutory regulation system. 
The security and detective world is a 
controversial area with a clash of 
theories and ideas amongst its 
practitioners.  
The author has described and 
analysed the totality of private police 
in the United Kingdom, revealing 
that almost all the issues which are 
today problematic within the 
commercial security industry and its 
regulation were already present in 
the late seventies.  
The author is commenting on the 
long history of mistrust between 
private and public security actors. 
South (1985) 
UK 
The growth of commercial security 
activities has created problems related to 
public accountability, civil liberties and 
public policing. 
Accountability of commercial security 
providers could be achieved by public 
right of inspection on training, 
information collection on operational 
activities, and so on.  
The author is criticizing the social 
science research which tends to 
conclude that more research is 
needed before useful and informal 
action can be taken. 
Pesonen
7
 (1993) 
FI 
The security needs of a company are 
actually a risk management matter which 
can be handled using theories and 
approaches related to it. 
The security arrangements are a part of a 
company’s profit making activities and 
as such a part of managerial functions. 
A model is available to optimise the 
financial investments in different 
environments and sectors of the security 
functions. 
The author has presented practical 
examples concerning commercial, 
industrial and civil liability 
companies to show which 
investments in security are most 
profitable.  
Flynn (1997) 
UK 
There is a need for security guards to be 
regulated and controlled. 
Empirical results show that a majority of 
police and public at large do not have 
confidence in the security industry. 
Empirical results also shows that only 
ten percent of the industry’s personnel 
thought that their work filled a gap 
caused by decreased police resources, as 
out of the public and private security’s 
top management 75 % saw the police 
failures being the main factors affecting 
the growth of the industry. 
The author saw that the Government 
will not interfere with the steering of 
commercial security activities before 
they encroaches too far into areas 
presently the responsibility of public 
police i.e. street patrols, or there are 
a series of devastating scandals 
which rock the industry. 
Siebrits (2001) 
ZA 
An industry with a semi-public 
‘apartheid’ history has special challenges 
to position itself anew in a transition 
society with new rulers. 
Even if the private security 
environment is as such very different 
from a stabilised country, many of 
the basic challenges in regulation 
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There is a need to have a strong 
government involvement in the 
regulation and control of the private 
security industry. 
work are quite similar. 
Michael (2002) 
UK 
The guards feel overwhelmingly 
accountable to the client and the security 
company employing them – not towards 
the public or the criminal justice system. 
The guards place the needs of the client 
above those of the employer security 
company. 
The guards are very much oriented on 
their private role, not representing the 
‘wannabe cops’ attitudes. 
Because of self-preservation and 
common concerns of liability the guards 
are not enthusiastic about using their 
powers or carrying a weapon. 
The author’s conclusion that private 
security guards are not ‘private 
police’ in their own minds, nor are 
they ‘wannabe cops’, is one 
empirical result on the contradictory 
myth of a private group trying to 
present themselves as sub-police.  
Wakefield (2003) 
UK 
The security organisations and the guards 
have a multi-role in a shopping mall 
environment, be they in-house or 
contracted. 
The guards are not in this kind of 
environment a reactive ‘police’ force but 
have a wider role in preventing unwanted 
incidents and supporting the business, 
especially through covering surveillance. 
The author makes an interesting 
(theory) statement in her conclusions 
when emphasising (ibid. 233): “It is 
important, however, to note that the 
functions and operating styles of 
policing agencies, both public and 
private, are determined in large part 
by those who make policies and 
legislation in relation to the 
territories which the policing takes 
place – part of a broader design and 
management strategies in the case of 
mass private property environment.”  
van Steden (2008) 
NL 
The thesis looks at six often mentioned 
factors to be related to private security 
growth: rising crime, growth of mass 
private property, economic rationalities, 
government policies of ‘privatisation’, 
overburdened police force and 
professionalization of private security. 
The results of the study reveal that only 
two of the above mentioned factors; 
economic rationalities and government 
policy had an uncontested influence in 
creating growth. 
Outside the primarily researched factors, 
change in working laws seemed to have 
added remarkably to the use of private 
security services. 
The author shows in this study that, 
at least in the Netherlands, the 
explanations used for private security 
growth are to some extent ‘myths’ 
which are not based on empirical 
research. 
Button (2008) 
UK 
Different guards performing different 
tasks in different kinds of environment 
require different legal tools. 
There is a ‘tool box’ with a lot of 
different powers which are based not 
only in laws and regulations but also on 
appearance and behaviour as well as the 
cultural obedience of rules. 
The author emphasise that there is no 
actual need according to this study to 
provide security officers in their 
present duties with statutory extra 
powers. 
Concerning other ‘selected’ extra 
tools, the acceptance of them varied 
according to the requirements of the 
22 
 
A clear majority of the interviewed 
officers (guards) did not desire for 
special powers or non-lethal weapons, 
opposing both. 
organisation and the work tasks 
performed. 
Kerttula
8
 (2010a) 
FI 
The diminishing police resources have 
forced several times the parliament to 
reconsider constitutional interpretations 
of giving extra powers to commercial 
security guards.  
There are various (universal) problems of 
finding legally acceptable, and in 
practice flexible enough arrangements in 
granting extra powers to guards working 
in public, semi-public and private 
spheres.   
The author argues that the ‘basic 
rights’ of citizens are very seldom 
jeopardised by the private security as 
the matter is constantly perceived by 
the media and the public.  
 
In this sample of ten studies, all but one touched directly on the structure of the 
commercial security industry and its regulation. Six of them included interviews with 
stakeholders - providers of services, buyers of services and/or the controllers of them. 
Two of the theses were clearly multi-disciplinary ones showing that the research of 
private security should not be only a criminological matter. All of the authors expressed 
their concern about a lack of private security research and identified specific areas 
which were a priority from their point of view. 
Explaining the significance of the commercial security industry: from private security 
to nodal governance 
It remains the case that the most prominent academic research on private security during 
the last thirty years has been produced and disseminated by a few scholars, most notably 
Shearing, Stenning, Bayley and Johnston who have been focused much on the situation 
and development in certain Anglo-Saxon countries (AU, CA, UK, USA and ZA). 
Academic research on private security started in the 1970s when Shearing and Stenning, 
working with the members of Hallcrest Systems Inc (Cunningham 1978; Cunningham 
and Taylor 1985; Cunningham, et al 1990), published the first research on private 
security. In the mid-1970s Bilek (1976:Preface) identified the inevitable expansion of 
commercial security’s importance:  
“One massive resource, filled with significant number of personnel, armed with a 
wide array of technology, and directed by professionals who have spent their adult 
lifetimes learning how to prevent and reduce crime, has not been tapped by 
governments in the fight against criminality. The private security industry, with 
over one million workers, sophisticated alarm systems and perimeter safeguards, 
armoured trucks, sophisticated mini-computers, and thousands of highly skilled 
crime prevention experts, offers a potential for coping with crime that cannot be 
equalled by any other remedy or approach.”  
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Cunningham (1978:271) predicted at the same time that there would be a ‘boom’ in 
private security and in private security regulation:  
“Government, particularly at the state level, will increasingly regulate all aspects 
of private security by means of licensing security firms and by specifying 
minimum standards for personnel selection. In the future, private security will be 
recognised more widely as a major crime prevention resource. ...virtually every 
facet of private security will experience moderate growth in the next 20 years, 
thereby attracting new ventures, acquisitions, and capital to expand into a business 
opportunity.”  
Taking these conclusions on board, the original focus of the Shearing and Stenning 
research was the growth of private security in Canada and the consequences of this 
‘business’ phenomenon for both policing and society. At this stage they had recognised 
that ‘private security’ was a business, that is, is a set of activities performed for profit 
and governed by commercial principles. In addition, the provision of security was 
undergoing radical transformation because of the emergence of ‘mass private property’ 
and new solutions had to be found to manage this development (1981:237). The interest 
of these pioneering researchers shifted gradually from ‘private security’ to the broader 
subjects of ‘security’ and ‘policing’. Practical developments within or the steering of the 
commercial security work were not a main research interest. Much of this initial 
research also denigrated commercial security activities as a ‘tainted’ occupation.  
The main theoretical framework that emerged from this research is that of ‘nodal 
governance’. Examples of literature contributing to this theoretical framework up till 
year 2003 are listed and commented upon briefly in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2 Examples of main texts 1981-2003 on private security governance 
 
Author(s) Main topics Comments 
Shearing and 
Stenning (1981)
 
 
The growth and implications of private 
security in Canada (Ontario) and the 
consequences of this growing business 
phenomenon to policing in general. 
The opposing of the congruency of the 
notions of ‘private property’ and 
‘private place’ which give legal powers 
and responsibilities to owners which 
threaten, according to the authors, the 
liberty of an individual, especially in 
the new environment of mass private 
property.
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The authors move in this text from 
the idea of regulation (control) of 
private security to the need and theory 
of changing the rights of private prop-
erty owners in society, in order to 
have an effective control of these 
(security) activities. 
The authors call into question the 
handling of private security control 
only by licensing and other 
regulation. 
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Shearing and 
Stenning (1987) 
The suggestion that the word (private) 
policing should be used instead of 
private security to emphasise the 
coercive and top down police character 
of this kind of work performed by 
private actors.  
The authors admit that there is a 
commonsense challenge to 
understand and define what policing 
is and what public and private stand 
for within security.  
Johnston (1992) The argument that there has always 
through the ages been private policing, 
even if strong nation states emphasised 
public policing. 
The legal-formal criterion has an effect 
of barring the ‘private’ agencies from 
inclusion in the mainstream sociology 
of policing, even if their activities are 
in many ways similar to those 
undertaken by the public police.. 
The author points out that the 
conceptual distinction between public 
and private spheres is less absolute 
than it might first appear. 
The author also argues that, at the 
political level, the public-private 
dichotomy comprises a complex and 
changing strategic field.  
Shearing (1996) The notification that the growth of 
private policing means that the state 
police can no longer dictate the 
direction of policing or their role in it. 
The author uses the definition of 
‘state rule at a distance’ to point out 
that the individuals, not the 
communities are made responsible for 
policing. 
Bayley and 
Shearing (1996) 
The police are, while rethinking their 
standard strategies, helping to blur the 
line between governmental and 
nongovernmental policing. 
The pluralizing of policing means that 
not only has the government’s 
monopoly on policing been broken, but 
also the police monopoly on expertise 
within its own sphere of activity has 
ended.   
The authors emphasise that if 
governments and neighbourhoods 
cannot provide satisfactory public 
safety, market based private security 
will inevitably increase relatively to 
public policing. 
Johnston (1999) The act of governance (or rule) 
directed towards the promotion of 
security – it is not an exclusive 
function of the state. 
The explanations given for commercial 
policing expansion have all turned 
somewhat deficient. 
The traditional discourse of statutory 
private security control is no longer 
adequate. 
The author argues that a development 
of diverse police systems may give 
rise to a fragmented system which 
combines the worst of all worlds: 
ineffectiveness and injustice. 
Shearing and 
Kempa (2000) 
Shearing and Wood 
(2003) 
Security for sale means that those who 
cannot afford it cannot have it. 
Paid security agencies pursue the 
security priorities of their employees, 
the well to do, meaning that security 
ends up less a democratic right than a 
commodity monopolised by the 
powerful. 
The authors propose an approach 
based on the principles in the 
Northern Ireland Commission report 
(Independent Commission on 
Policing for Northern Ireland 1999; 
Ingram 2000; Shaw 2000), but do not 
come up with any recommendations 
or comments on how to handle 
private elements within the national 
security system. 
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Stenning (2000) The changes in providing security have 
been so drastic that it is now almost 
impossible to identify any functions or 
responsibility of the public police 
which is not somehow assumed and 
performed by private police in 
democratic societies. 
The unfortunate reality is that we have 
little reliable evidence of the 
effectiveness of accountability 
mechanisms either for the public police 
or for the private policing. 
The author points out that 
communities and societies generally 
do not derive the full advantage from 
private police potential. 
He also points out that because of 
inadequate understanding of the roles, 
powers and accountability of private 
police; it has evolved without 
sufficient scrutiny, discussion, 
oversight and control with respect to 
public interest consideration. 
Bayley and 
Shearing (2001) 
Control of different security agencies 
is needed because (ibid. 32-33): “if the 
public interests of justice equality of 
protection, and quality of service are to 
be safeguarded, governments must 
audit what security agencies provide 
and monitor what is going on in a 
systematic way.” 
It is not possible to give an opinion 
about the restructuring of policing 
because of the fragmented nature of 
current knowledge of it. 
The current restructuring involves 
more than ‘privatisation’, it involves 
the blurring of public and private. 
What is happening to policing today is 
a fundamental transformation in the 
way security is governed. 
The provision of policing will be 
globalized. 
This report to the US Department of 
Justice summarises the situation in 
the United States but also reflect on 
global trends. 
The authors emphasize that the 
explanations they give are largely 
hypothetical because empirical 
research is missing to test or confirm 
them.  
The authors are not either ready to 
give an opinion in their report on the 
role of regulatory regimes 
(governments) in the actual 
restructuring of policing as their 
opinions are mainly general and 
philosophical rather than pointed and 
programmatic. 
Johnston and Shearing (2003:138-160) introduced the model to integrate the governance 
of security and justice called nodal governance. The usually used definition of a node at 
that time was that it was a location of knowledge, capacity and resources that can be 
deployed to both authorise and provide governance. The nodal governance approach 
centres on the notion of a ‘node’, described in terms of its mentalities, institutional 
structures, technologies and resources (Johnston and Shearing 2003:21-30, 145-151; 
Burris 2004:341; Shearing 2006:26; Wood 2006:219). Button (2008:15) has expressed 
that a node can have a territorial basis, it can be a community, or it can also be a 
community in cyberspace. He also states that the question of security between each 
node is differently balanced.  Dupont (2006:86) described a node as an institutional 
actor whose structure, legal status, resources, mentality and technologies are highly 
variable. A more detailed definition by Burris, et al (2005:38) also includes a short 
description of the content of node qualities, describing a node as: 
 A way of thinking (mentalities) of the matters the node has emerged to govern;  
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 A set of methods (technologies) for exerting influence over the course of events 
at issue;  
 Resources to support the operation of the node and the exertion of influence; 
 A structure that enables the directed mobilization of resources, mentalities and 
technologies over time (institutions). 
Shearing and Wood (2003) widened the discussion by proposing new definitions 
concerning the basic state actors and spaces of action. Nodal governance is only 
marginally connected to commercial security activities. It is a more comprehensive 
model for widening the basic model of society because, as the authors argue (ibid. 401): 
“...our conceptions of governance and citizenship, and the world view such conceptions 
support, are lagging considerably behind our practice.” Their first proposal is a change 
to call the traditional state citizen a denizen to emphasise his connection to several 
nodes (ibid. 406-409): “Within this conceptualization, persons would have multiple 
denizenships, depending on the number of domains of governance through which their 
lives are regulated.” The second proposal is abandonment of the concept of ‘public 
space’ by replacing it by ‘communal space’. This is supported by the growth of ‘mass 
private property’ and the relentless blurring public/private distinction (ibid. 409-411): 
“In acknowledgement of the reality of ‘nodal governance’, we suggest that the 
notion of ‘denizen’ be utilized to capture the affiliations, rights, and expectations 
of those who are governed within and across multiple forms of ‘communal 
space’.”  
They are calling for the deepening of democracy by adapting the new concepts of nodal 
governance, denizens and communal spaces (ibid. 415-418). 
Burris, et al (2005:3) argue that: “Nodal governance is an elaboration of contemporary 
network theory that explains how a variety of actors operating within social systems 
interact along networks to govern the systems they inhabit.” The width of the area 
covered by this theory is well revealed in the two case studies in the article, one 
concerning global negotiations on intellectual property rights and the other the 
possibilities to reduce inequality in a very poor South African community (ibid. 11-19). 
The common concern is with the overall security equality of communities not hampered 
by traditional discussions of the role and functions of public policing and commercial 
security. 
Shearing (2006) has also stated his pessimism over the implementation of the concept of 
nodal governance, basing his argument partly on Drahos and Braitwaithe’s ideas 
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(2002:629). He accepts that “...the possibilities of responding to the fact that the 
sovereignty of big business over globalizing regulation [and indeed all governance] will 
continue to dominate and the weapons of the weak are so easily overwhelmed”. This 
kind of opinion demonstrates that ‘nodal governance’ is not just a research term to 
describe security governance but also a tool to express the lack of equality. Johnston has 
admitted when commenting on criticism of the nodal governance perspective (2006:46-
48): “That the ‘stick’ of nodal governance can be ‘bent’ in a variety of different 
normative directions.” In this context he is commenting at the same time on 
transnational commercial security organisations stating that: “In key areas of domestic 
and global policy transnational commercial security organisations now operate as 
governing nodes alongside other entities such as national governments, supranational 
authorities and NGOs.” Also here the aim is not only to research but to rein in the real 
or imagined ‘undemocratic’ security practitioners.  
Related to nodal governance, Button (2008:208-217) has come up with some interesting 
new ideas on achieving and steering private security, especially to fight the unfolding 
inequity in security provision. He has proposed a co-operative style approach where the 
creation of private security could be based on a bottom-up model. Localised security 
arrangements would allow people to have a stake in problem-solving by encouraging 
them to form ‘security unions’ which would also contribute to strengthening of 
democracy. He also touches on the critical factor of finances and proposes start-up 
funding from government. These new ideas of doing security mean also new thinking, 
and as he says (ibid. 216): “...this study has sought to set out how the foundations of 
security can be rebuilt to enhance effectiveness. The overall success of security requires 
action beyond the nodal level.”  
The practical applicability of the nodal governance theory has been questioned by 
several scholars. For example, Zedner (2009:162-163) has written of the topic:           
“... instead of being part of the solution, it can be argued that nodes in fact represent 
points of greatest difficulty in the new organization of security provision.” One of the 
questions asked by Zedner is: “Do Shearing and colleagues underplay the professional 
differences and conflicts of interest inherent in the intersection between public and 
private agencies, between national and local interests, or even within local 
communities?” Abrahamson and Williams (2011:85-86) have commented on the local 
nature of the theory, a characteristic they agree, limits its use in transnational research: 
“Reflecting its origins in criminology, the approach has been primarily concerned with 
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the domestic arena and with mapping and analyzing various nodal networks contained 
within the territorial state.” For Wood (2006:239-240):  
“...a nodal governance perspective provides a useful framework within which to 
engage in new interesting forms of research and innovation in the field of security. 
At present, however, established thinking on nodal governance – to which much 
of the work on plural policing contributes – must address its present theoretical 
and methodological limitations. Scholars within the emerging tradition must begin 
asking new kinds of questions surrounding the nature of nodes and nodal 
relations, and should engage more explicitly with the development of rich 
methodological approaches that combine quantitative and qualitative data 
gathering techniques ...As reflected in the efforts of scholars ...the time has now 
come for our research and innovation projects to grapple more explicitly and 
systematically with the ‘messy realm of practices and relations’.”10 
She is not alone when calling for empirical research to test nodal theory. Hoogenboom 
(2010:204-207), for example, argues that: “...if we really want to make the concept of 
‘nodes’ an empirical reality, there are many dozens of case studies begging to be carried 
out.”. And Abrahamson and Williams (2011:6) have argued: 
 “...this field has been wide open to speculative and impressionistic 
generalizations. Captured in a seemingly endless repetition of recycled, second-
hand evidence from a limited number of cases and with conclusions that often 
reflect a priori reasoning rather than sustained empirical research and theoretical 
reflection, the impact of commercial security, especially in the developing world, 
has frequently been subject to a combination of caricature and disregard.” 
Nodal governance is a controversial theory based on few empirical studies, discussed 
primarily by academics with little actual involvement with the ‘real world’ of private 
security activities.  The focus has changed from researching ‘private security’ to 
addressing universal problems of security (policing) arrangements in societies, locally 
and transnationally, and how to guarantee human rights and the democratic (security) 
equality of citizens. Thus it is very difficult, if not impossible, to use it as a platform for 
empirical analysis of the logics of the commercial security industry.  
It is possible that nodal governance theory could be used to analyse verticalisation 
trends within the security industry. For example, the more independent regulatory and 
operational entities, connected to certain kinds of customer groups, could be construed 
as ‘nodes’ of governance. Verticalisation is today, however, driven exclusively by 
business interests and does not include any considerations of democratic ‘goods’ or 
‘outcomes’. Taking into consideration present academic research and discussion on 
nodal governance, it is unlikely that scholars are interested in or capable of extending 
their work from community oriented studies and models to the market-driven world of 
commercial security activities. 
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Alternative perspectives in commercial security research 
Research on commercial security has traditionally been very much concentrated within 
the boundaries of criminology. However, certain academics argue that to understand 
‘security’ the scope must be widened to include other disciplines. For example Zedner 
(2009:3) argues: 
“In short, a range of disciplinary paradigm shifts, policy changes, economic 
factors, and world political events have combined to shift security to the forefront 
of the criminological agenda. Security remains, however, too big an idea to be 
constrained by the disciplinary strictures of criminology, or indeed any other 
single discipline. The scholar of security must range not only over the disciplines 
of international relations, public international law, and war studies that have 
dominated the security field historically but also over political theory, legal 
philosophy, and economics. In these latter disciplines lies the possibility of 
thinking critically about security as a public good, as a means to other goods, and, 
most disturbingly, as a tradable commodity subject to the vagaries of the growing 
security market.”  
The same observation has been made by Abrahamsen and Williams (2011:12-13) when 
commenting on research into global developments in commercial security:  
“...the study of contemporary global private security calls for a more 
interdisciplinary approach. The present-day globalization of private security 
activities cuts across conventional disciplinary boundaries ... new perspectives and 
methodologies are needed to capture the reconfigured security field within global 
security assemblages.”   
Within other disciplines, such as economics and business studies, commercial security 
related research has been carried out for many years. To illustrate the usefulness of a 
multi-disciplinary point of view, the globalisation of (security) businesses and research 
on retail security will be taken as examples.  
It is important to understand and explain how commercial security works as a rapidly 
developing business enterprise. The growth, including globalisation, of security 
companies is developing according to established business theories and practices 
concerning expansion to new areas in local markets and abroad, outside the 'home base'. 
Commercial security providers are in many cases going ‘global’ by following their 
customers into new markets (Kidd 2000:6-7; Kettler 2006; Buckles 2010:4). Held, et al 
(1999:255) have commented on this natural development already ten years back by 
writing: “As MNCs operate abroad they require the provision of services at a standard 
equivalent to that in their ‘home’ country.”  
Some examples of multidisciplinary commercial security related research texts are 
summarised in the following Table 3. 
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Table 3 Examples of new multi-disciplinary research on private security topics 
 
Author Main topics Comments 
Ghemawat (2007) 
Ligazette (2008a) 
The globalisation discussion has 
managed to attract significant attention 
by painting visions of ‘globalisation 
apocalypse’. 
This discussion is not based on 
researched fact but on emotional rather 
than cerebral appeals, reliance on 
prophecy, semiotic arousal, and 
emphasis on creating ‘new’ governance 
and perhaps above all, a clamour of 
attention. 
A globalisation (research) model based 
on four main (CAGE) factors; cultural, 
administrative, geographical and 
economic shows the useful synergies in 
global business. 
The question must be asked why the 
globalisation research (literature) focuses 
on the questions where and who but does 
not have much to say to answer the 
question why? 
The author says that the answers by 
business managers to the question 
why globalise, are often slogans like: 
‘bigger is better’, ‘eat or be eaten’, 
‘we have to take position now’, ‘our 
competitors are doing it’, and so on.  
It seems that the importance of 
knowing the real answer to this 
question has not been understood. 
The security industry is not different 
from other businesses and, according 
to the author, steers similarly its 
global business expansion. 
 
Beck (2010) The security function in shopping 
environments has congruent, special 
challenges transnationally (FI, UK, US). 
The duty assistants (guards) are not 
chosen primarily according to their 
security skills but as persons fitting into 
the totality of the consumer focused 
business. 
The owners of the malls have clearly 
identified safety and security as a key 
brand for their business and are acting 
accordingly. 
Many of the key security tasks are only 
possible to carry out by attendants 
(guards).  
The profile of a ‘bouncer’ is not accepted 
by the customers in retail environment. 
 
The author is emphasising that the 
role of traditional security officer is 
changing in shopping environments. 
The author also states that the change 
from old to modern nomenclature 
requires different skill sets and a 
different attitude (profile) of the 
security operators.  
The question is asked by Beck, could 
shopping centre security 
arrangements be taken as a model for 
the gradual privatisation of the 
traditional control of city centres? 
Karhunen and 
Kosonen (2010) 
In Russia (St Petersburg) one of the most 
important things for retail customers 
when visiting a shop is security. 
The presence of visible, uniformed, male 
guards in the shops and the parking lots 
is considered important by the 
customers. 
The customers’ opinion is that guards are 
more important than different kinds of 
security technology for the feeling of 
security. 
The authors express that in the 
Russian environment visible 
traditional manned guarding is in the 
minds of the customers the ‘real’ 
guarantee of good security.  
31 
 
Puustinen (2010) In Finland the guards are considered by 
the customers a permanent part of the 
retail environment. 
Not a single of the interviewed 
consumers called into question the 
importance of guard presence or its 
necessity in a shopping environment. 
As the security personnel are an essential 
part of the retail business it means that 
the profile of their work and them should 
and will be developed accordingly. 
The author emphasise the cooperation 
between the companies offering 
security as well as the challenge of 
improving and tailor-making the 
services in order to meet the 
expectations of the consumers. 
Järvinen  and 
Juvonen (2010) 
Interview based risk management 
research concerning shopping centre 
environments in Finland shows that out 
of the most crucial present and future 
risks, a half are such that their handling 
requires the use of manned guarding.  
The main risks for business are the 
threatening or irrational behaviour of 
customers (intimidation) and theft 
(shoplifting) 
The authors point out in their 
summary that the overall risk 
management has not been taken fully 
into consideration, if compared with 
the production industries. 
These researchers emphasise the 
importance of a comprehensive risk 
management approach that is: 
situational anticipation, good 
directives, guarding, and employee 
training. 
In these texts the discussion of manned security is very pragmatic analysing security 
just as one part of normal business activity, be it local or global. In retail environments, 
commercial security services are seen as a commodity bought to support the core 
business. The research carried out has in this context a strong risk management and 
business oriented focus (ASIS International 2010). Commercial security arrangements 
are seen as one of the, often outsourced, services needed to realise better customer 
satisfaction increased profitability.  
2.4 Critical issues in commercial security research: market changes and    
consolidation  
Because in the existing research, the business logics and dynamics of commercial 
security activities have not been much discussed, data and commentary from other 
sources have been presented here to help to understand this issue. In the sphere of the 
regulation of traditional commercial (guarding) security, the industry’s growth, in 
numbers and importance, has undoubtedly been one of the driving factors, but its 
globalisation has had less impact. This is the case because in most of the regulatory 
regimes, guarding has a history as a profession that has been regulated gradually, more 
and more tightly, solely by national and local governments (van Steden and Sarre 
2010:13). This development has occurred mainly over the last twenty five years.  
To be successful commercial security companies need to focus on main three factors; 
the growing demand for customized services, increased use of technology, and general 
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interest in security issues among senior business management. The importance of these 
three factors is estimated to constitute over 80% of the present customer demand 
(Securitas 2010a:28-29; Buckles 2010:11).
11
   
The growth, specialisation and globalisation of security companies as well as the many 
new business driven arrangements have changed the operational structures of the 
industry and especially transnational companies within it. This has created more 
specialised and more independent entities. To be successful, a commercial security 
company needs to be organised in a flexible way to fulfil the particular needs of all its 
customer segments. It must constantly acquire new specialist knowledge and skills to 
meet changing and increasingly specified market expectations, and at the same time to 
ensure profitability. This has led to more specialised and sometimes transnational 
organisations that have an extra challenge in both meeting local regulatory requirements 
and in achieving co-operation with local authorities. The challenges of the traditional 
guarding industry welling from specialisation and globalisation are organisational. How 
to structure the industry to meet the new and different challenges in the best way? The 
development of the sector over the last twenty years has generally moved from ‘broad 
but shallow in knowledge’ to ‘narrow but deep in knowledge’.  
To be successful in the market and to meet expectations, companies have to organise 
their businesses vertically according to the customer segments in order to acquire and 
maintain the needed expertise. The days of ‘universal’ security providers are history. 
The focus on security and increasing specialisation has been the general business 
development trend, especially with large and multinational security (guarding) 
companies. There are in practice today (2012) only three companies which can be 
considered really multinational (global) in guarding; G4S, Securitas and Prosegur. Even 
if the steps taken cannot be precisely described, the general focusing of the security 
industry can be shown by Table 4 (Nilsen 2008). 
The regulation of guarding in a globalised world will be a challenge in the future for 
governments and transnational institutions. It is not a priority issue at the moment 
because the majority of countries have their own legislation concerning these traditional 
services. Multinational security companies act in accordance with local rules and they 
have a limited possibility or even interest to interfere with the local work on rules and 
regulations if these do not threaten their right to exist. According to current legal 
structures globally, almost all security companies need to have special local licences, 
both for their business and their guards.  
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Table 4  An industry in continual structural change   
Multi-service    Security step 1    Security step 2    Security step 3    Security step 4 
-1990       1990-               2000-                    2005-         2010- 
 
Security        Guards               Guards Guards 
Staffing       Alarms               Alarms Alarms          ?  ?  ? 
Corrections        Cash                Cash Cash 
Rescue       Corrections         Corrections  
Cash       Rescue               Rescue                              
Locks       Care                  
Cleaning            Staffing 
Maintenance      Locks     
Health  
Catering            Customer demand has driven focus and consolidation! 
Parcel 
Etc.     
       
The actual ‘thinking’ of the local (and global) companies concerning the surrounding 
world and the interest groups affecting their activities is very businesslike: 
“The fact is that a great deal of what you are able to do is either helped or 
hindered by the forces around you. If you want to develop your business, it’s vital 
that you influence the factors that currently limit your opportunities – 
governments make laws for security companies, the police issue regulations, 
standards are set either by legislation or by the industry on both training and 
security issues, customer organizations develop their views and expectations, 
employees and their organisations have their opinions. By living close to our 
“partners” in the security environment we help to set the standard and create a 
working environment in which we can grow.” (Securitas 2000c:27; 2010b) 
The companies offering traditional commercial security services are growing (Securitas 
2010b:31) both organically
12
 and by acquiring existing companies at home and in new 
countries. It seems that this expansion is concentrated in a few traditional players in the 
market, companies that have taken this as a part of their business strategy. The ideas 
behind this expansion have been to apply tested management models and business 
products in new, less developed market areas. Globalisation has been used as one extra 
tool to gain the economical benefits of size. In the use of this kind of expansion 
strategy, commercial security providers of manned services have been very slow 
compared to other industries.    
Globalisation and the structural transformation of security businesses are special topics 
which have been addressed in different texts. The problem has been, however, that the 
analyses of the industry have not had any solid frame. Commercial security has been 
interpreted in different ways and the business-related numbers have not been explained 
in any structured way. As mentioned earlier, there has not been any common 
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understanding of the segments of activity to be included in commercial security or the 
figures describing its business performance. The globalized security companies have 
explained the rationales of merges and globalisation by emphasizing their importance to 
develop the businesses (Group 4 Falck 2002; 2004:6-8; Buckles 2010).  
In this thesis, the historical and present trends of globalisation and consolidation of 
traditional guarding are illustrated using a couple of tables available on these trends. For 
example, Johnston (1992:71-93; 2006:37) as well as Abrahamsen and Williams 
(2011:38-49) have briefly handled the expansion and development of some European 
companies, such as Securitas, Group4, Falck, Securicor and Prosegur. The view they 
present is, however, very general and does not include research-based understanding of 
the developments.
13
  
In the United States, commercial security services became a notable business in the 
second part of the 19th century. Names like Pinkerton, Brinks and Burns are closely 
connected to this development, but at that time they were domestic, however, with a 
federal activity that public law enforcement did not have (Hess and Wrobleski 1996:17-
21, 25; US Government 1993:39-31). The start of European commercial security 
services bore a strong German influence and already in the first decade of the 20th 
century, the business crossed borders. A German commercial security business model 
and even ownership of companies can be found in at least Belgium and Denmark. The 
original future-oriented business model was inherited from the United States. Other 
companies in Europe with an early start during the first decade of the twentieth century 
can be traced to the Netherlands, Austria, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden (Söderberg 
1979:58; Ottens, et al 1999:84). Already prior to the Second World War, the largest 
security companies viewed international relations and co-operation as essential to their 
business interests by establishing in 1934 the 'Ligue', which still today is the most 
important and influential global organisation of security companies, having members 
from all over the world. Over the years, this organisation has played a vital role in 
defining, establishing and maintaining the highest ethical and professional standards of 
the security industry as we know them worldwide (Ligue Internationale des 
Surveillance 2009:About us). The problem that this association has faced during the last 
decades stems from the fact that many of its original members have been bought out, 
mainly by Securitas or G4S, which means that the breadth of independent local 
companies has gradually diminished.  
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Globalisation of the traditional commercial security services (guarding) is now 
strategically pursued by a few security companies14 that have made it their strategy to 
expand transnationally. To expand, especially overseas means in practice costly local 
acquisitions which require a lot of financial and managerial resources, available only to 
a limited group of security companies. The consolidation (and globalisation) trend in the 
security industry (guarding) can be seen in the following Tables 5 and 6. They show the 
industry’s structural changes during the fifteen-year period from 1990 to 2005. The 
trend is clear, but after the first ‘crash’ of acquisitions around the year 2000, the speed 
of the change has slowed down in Europe and the US being focused today on other 
parts of the world
15
. 
Table 5 Security market consolidation in Europe (Main players)16 
                         1990 2005 
 Company Market 
share 
Company Market 
share 
Security     
 Securitas  Securitas  
 Group 4 Falck 
≈ 15 % 
Group 4 Falck 
   ≈  35% 
 Securitcor Prosegur 
 Prosegur    
Security conglomerates     
 ISS    
 ECCO  Rentokill  
 ADT                 
Conglomerates        ≥ 10 %           ≤ 10 % 
 Raab Karcher  Chubb  
 Mayne Nickless  Bosch  
 Williams  Siemens  
     
Others        ≤ 75 % Others       ≈ 55 % 
  
Table 6 Guarding market consolidation in the USA (Main players)
17
  
                                  1995 2005 
Company Market share Company Market share 
    
Burns  Securitas  
Pinkerton  Group4Securicor  
Wackenhut 
  ≈ 33 % 
Allied Barton           ≈ 44 % 
American Protective Services Guardsmark            
Allied Barton  US Security  
    
Other        ≈ 67 % Other         ≈ 56 % 
 
It is also important to note that in Europe, the market share has changed amongst the 
pure security companies, but has not affected the total portion of the business run by the 
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conglomerates. In the United States, there is no data available concerning the changes in 
the conglomerates’ (security) market share, only estimates about the changes related to 
the actual security (guarding) companies. Generally, it can be concluded that there is, 
for the time being, a trend of bigger companies getting bigger in volume and also slowly 
in the transnational market share.  
The increase in cross-border activities, globalisation and consolidation of some of the 
security companies and markets has, at least until now had only a marginal impact on 
local regulation work concerning the industry. There are, however, in several countries 
legal restrictions and concerns about foreign ownership of security companies. In 
contrast, the importance of the security industry’s transnational associations, such as the 
‘Ligue’ globally, ASIS in the USA and worldwide, CoESS in Europe, and ASIAL in 
Australia, has been increasing gradually. They act as the professional experts, 
mouthpieces and lobbyists of the industry generally and support their members and 
member associations, for example, in regulation discussions with the local governments. 
The verticalisation of the industry is seen also in this context. There are today several 
other (new) international associations representing different segments of the private 
security industry. 
As this thesis focuses on the statutory regulations and (official) steering of the 
commercial security industry, it is essential to make a separate comment on the 
globalisation of these matters. There have been attempts to harmonise private security 
regulation, for example in the EU, the USA, Canada and Australia, but it has turned out 
to be impossible for the time being, because of constitutional reasons. It is most unlikely 
that any harmonised regulation will be achieved for commercial security (guarding) in 
the near future. Globalisation of the business and companies does not actually require or 
push countries to have harmonised legislation because the local subsidiaries 
(companies) follow the local (national) rules, wherever their headquarters or whatever 
their ownership structure is. For security companies the structure and contents of the 
local regulations are important but usually not crucial in running the businesses.  
There are, however, some exceptions to the rule. In aviation and maritime security, 
terrorist acts and threats have forced the international community to set global uniform 
rules. For example, a minimum level of passenger and cargo screening in aviation are 
today mandatory if a country wants to be a part of the global air transport system. In the 
same way, certain arrangements on sea transport (and ports) have been set globally by 
international treaties for all actors. The arrangements also include directions as to how 
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security checks shall be carried out by security personnel. In practice, all countries in 
the world have joined these treaties and added them to their local legislation. These 
activities (and regulations) cover, however, only small, specialised segments of the 
security business (in some countries) and this transnational regulation does not affect 
the main control arrangements for the industry. The impact of the wider work by (UN) 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (2012) on this issue cannot yet 
be evaluated as its recommendations (proposals) have only lately been published. 
2.5 Conceptualising commercial security as a regulatory space
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This thesis is primarily a study of the practicalities of commercial security regulation. 
An adequate analysis of this regulation necessitates a multi-disciplinary approach and 
understanding of the basic general regulatory models (theories). As this thesis is not 
about the general principles of regulation but research primarily focused on existing 
commercial security governance by statutory rules, only two topics are looked at in this 
sub-section: first, the literature needed to define and position the extended public 
regulation related to the subject, second, the main private security literature touching in 
particular this topic. 
What is regulation? 
Clarke (2000:21) argues that regulation exists: “…in a political space between law and 
society, a space inhabited by state, private interest groups and regulatory agencies, some 
private, some public, some mixed.”  
There are various reasons for regulating different industries, businesses and professions, 
most of them economic. Some are general, some very specific and meant to steer certain 
activities or professions. The fragmented and contradictory functions of commercial 
security (guarding) make its regulatory environment somewhat blurred, depending on 
how the different aspects of it as functions are experienced and emphasised in an 
individual country or state (Adams 2002).  The actual act of writing laws for the 
security industry has, in general, not been a priority for governments. It is looked upon 
as a ‘necessary evil’ or a ‘needs must’ matter. This can be observed in many regulatory 
regimes where statutory regulations have been written without adequate background 
knowledge of the industry and without a thorough understanding of the theoretical 
positioning and practical consequences of such legislation. This means that the structure 
of private security regulations in most cases follows mainstream patterns of law making 
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in individual regulatory regimes without fully taking into consideration the industry’s 
distinctive characteristics and commercial requirements.  
Several theories have been created to explain why and how regulations in general are 
developed, decided upon and implemented in different environments and societies. The 
possibility of self-regulation
19
 is discussed later in this thesis.  To be able to understand 
and to compare commercial security activities’ legal control in this thesis, a short 
overview is needed to explain how regulation is understood here. 
Regulation is an authoritative rule dealing with details or procedure or a rule or order 
issued by an executive authority or regulatory agency of a government and often a rule 
or order having the force of law (Webster 2003:1049; Allen 2000:1178). Twining and 
Miers (1999:131) define a ‘rule’ (regulation) as: “A general norm mandating or guiding 
conduct or action in a given type of situation.” Conversely, Minoque (2001:3) states: 
“Regulation is based on rules which may give strict directives, or be broadly enabling in 
ways which permit further negotiation; rules may also be framed in ways which 
concede discretion over their detailed application.” Sparrow (2000:2) has approached 
the question from another angle by pointing out that: “The core of regulatory activity is 
a mission which involves the imposition of duties. Obligations are delivered, rather than 
services.”  
Tombs (2002:113) asks the simple question: What is regulation? He has noticed that 
this often-used term covers myriad actions and processes, overseen by international, 
national and local states and a vast array of private actors. Tombs also states:  
”Regulation raises a range of issues which go to the heart of debates about the 
distribution of economic and social goods (and ‘bads’), the role of law and 
corporations, and the very nature of contemporary economies, states and societies. 
Regulation invokes an inherently political set of considerations.” 
In the same way, Harlow and Rawlings (2009:6, 22-31), in their definition, view 
regulation as a kind of a two-way street by stating:  
“Regulation is also often thought as an activity restricting behaviour and 
preventing the occurrence of certain undesirable activities (a ‘red light’ concept) 
but the influence of regulation may also be enabling or facilitative (‘green light’) 
as for example frequencies controlled by the communication authorities to avoid 
chaos.”  
These definitions of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ and ‘red’ versus ‘green’ express well one 
quality expected from regulation – the requirement to set the boundary between 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. 
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Baldwin, et al (1998:3-4) define regulation in a more down-to-earth way by dividing it 
by content into three categories. At its simplest, regulation refers to the promulgation of 
an authoritative set of rules, accompanied by some mechanism, typically a public 
agency, for monitoring and promoting compliance with the rules. A second, broader, 
conception of regulation takes in all the efforts of state agencies to steer the economy. A 
third definition, broader still, considers all mechanisms of social control – including 
unintentional and non-state processes – to be forms or regulations. 
The authors also emphasise that there are differences amongst academics in their ways 
to approach regulation. They argue that lawyers and economists tend to work within the 
first two definitions, but the contribution of socio-legal research: “…has been to eschew 
any distinction between activities based on formal differences between state and non-
state activity or between rule-based oversight and other forms of social control.” Scott 
(2003:1) says very much the same by summarising:  
“…lawyers have tended towards a definition that emphasises sustained oversight 
by reference rules, whereas scholars in other disciplines have extended the set of 
activities covered by the term to include all interventions by government to steer 
the economy and, the broadest of definitions, all mechanisms of social control.”  
For Ogus (2002:1) economists tend to have a narrow vision of “regulation”, focusing 
almost exclusively on what can be referred to as “economic regulation” and that is 
applied to markets in respect of which there is inadequate competition. He thinks that 
economists tend to ignore “social regulation”, the justification for which arises from 
other forms of market failure.  
In general, there is a tendency to split regulation into two categories, social and 
economic, even if the distinction is somewhat fuzzy. Ogus (1994:2-5; 2001:5) argues 
that: “Social regulation deals with such matters as health and safety, environmental 
protection and consumer protection … economic regulation is invoked where there is 
insufficient competition.” In a module of international training material (SARI/Energy 
2003:2.1.D/1), the difference is explained by stating that governments commonly 
regulate price and quality of products in many industries, but: “Some of these 
interventions are not intended to constitute economic regulation, but only to ensure that 
those who enter are qualified on professional, scientific or technical grounds.” 
According to the same material, social regulations include, amongst other things, those 
statutes and rules that are intended to protect citizens’ or workers’ health and safety, and 
to promote civil and human right objectives.  
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The focus in the general regulation theory and practical everyday regulation work is in 
steering/controlling the economic environment and the running of businesses. The goal 
is to protect the consumer, steer competition, and to control the behaviour of firms and 
individuals in areas where there are wider economical public/consumer (protection) 
interests, as in pollution or public utility questions. This is usually referred to as 
economic regulation. In the shadow of these mainstream (economic) regulation 
interests, there are some business related activities such as health care, occupational 
health and safety or security where the society sees that it has a responsibility to 
implement regulation, especially if these activities are also carried out privately as 
businesses. This is usually referred to as social regulation, which includes often, in the 
name of public interest, the control of the background and minimum knowledge level of 
individuals and business actors carrying out these activities. However, in this context 
there is not a primary goal to regulate and steer the businesses as a financial activity. 
Scott’s (2001:331) definition of what he calls “legal regulation”, describes this kind of 
control activity well. He argues that this type of regulation can be thought of as: 
“…any process or set of processes by which norms are established, the behaviour 
of those subject to the norms monitored or fed back into the regime, and for which 
there are mechanisms for holding the behaviour or regulated actors within the 
acceptable limits of the regime (whether by enforcement action or by some other 
mechanism).” 
In principle, there are five main players in the private security regulatory space: the 
government, public and private institution(s), the public (citizens), the buyers (clients) 
of the services, and the commercial security providers (companies and individuals). All 
these groups affect or are affected by commercial security activities in different ways 
and can be referred to in these contexts as interest groups. The impact the regulation of 
the services has on these groups is, however, very different and so are the 
rights/interests of them to be protected. 
As can be seen even from the limited review there is no consensus in the use of the 
word regulation, not even amongst academics. The dilemma is mainly about the 
different interpretations of what kind of rules are included within the definition of 
regulation. Based on the different definitions and explanations presented here, as well as 
on existing legislation (worldwide), the following (minimal) summary description of 
commercial  security industry regulation is used as the basis in this thesis (Hakala 
2007:14):  
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“Regulation on commercial security is a (public and external) governmental set of 
statutory rules aiming to prevent the occurrence of certain undesirable activities in 
the security business and its operations. These rules are typically enforced by a 
public authority or a public agency in order to monitor and promote compliance. 
This is social regulation based primarily on the public interest to control the 
activity in order to protect the society and the citizens from malfeasance by 
organisations and individuals providing commercial security services.” 
The challenge to control commercial security provision has been and is in a way 
‘unique’ and without previous theoretical or practical definitions on its regulation 
model. Because of this, the regulations in most cases miss a solid (theoretical) platform 
of their own and are applications and mixtures of existing police and licensing laws. 
The most usual private security regulation models more closely resemble laws that 
define the requirements and ways of action for public authorities (police) than statutes 
that have been made to steer private businesses and markets. All this reflects the 
unsolved basic statutory and also practical dilemma: should commercial security 
activities be considered and handled in society primarily as a business or as semi-public 
law enforcement/policing function?  For the purposes of this thesis the commercial 
security industry is considered as a business that is subject to exceptional steering 
because of certain public interests. 
Existing research on commercial security regulation 
Very few scholars have focused on the methods used to steer commercial security 
activities in practice on a national or transnational level. George and Button as well as 
Prenzler and Sarre have focused on improving commercial security regulation, its 
implementation and its control. Away from the limelight of ‘nodal governance’ they 
have quietly conducted practical research on models which have helped and are helping 
the improvement of commercial security governance and regulation globally. 
George and Button have researched the commercial security regulation situation in the 
United Kingdom and have also made transnational evaluations and comparisons to 
support their opinions (2000).  The original goal of their work was to publish data and 
research in order to push, support and influence the private security regulation process 
in the United Kingdom. During a 23 year long period they have published together 
numerous articles and books handling different aspects of (private) security and policing 
(George 1984; George and Button 1996; 1997a; 1997b; 1999; 2000; Button and George 
2001; 2006). These texts are the most comprehensive research published on private 
security’s practical governance and regulation, revealing also some of the political 
(interest group) aspects related to these matters. The authors have been keen supporters 
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of comprehensive, wide and well controlled state regulation for commercial security 
activities. 
Parallel with this, but especially after the realising of a private security act in the United 
Kingdom (2001), Button has carried out research on security. He has handled the whole 
spectre of different actors and activities in private and public policing environments in 
the United Kingdom and abroad. (Button 1998a; 1998b; 2002; 2003; 2005; 2007a; 
2007b; 2008). He has also published co-authored articles on the Korean private security 
situation (Button, et al 2006; Button and Park 2009). His texts include significant and 
substantial analyses, knowledge, data and comments on the British, but also 
transnational situation and developments within this sector. Button has also lately 
participated as an expert consultant in a (research) process coordinated by United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice 2011c) which aims to clarify the positioning as well as oversight needs and 
models concerning civilian private security services globally. This process has evolved 
to a draft proposal of the principles to strengthen governments’ oversight on this private 
activity.
20
 The research texts of George and Button have been used as the main 
reference material in this thesis, especially in chapters which handle the existing 
situation in private and commercial security regulation.  
George and Button also created a model to compare the regulatory arrangements of 
different regulatory regimes. Their model is based on five models of regulation (George 
and Button 1997a:191-196; Button and George 2006:566-571) that are evaluated and 
ranked according to the width, depth and agent (responsible overseer). The model has 
been used by them to compare between countries the maturity of private security 
regulation and control. The authors have also improved the use of the ‘Berglund’ model 
(Berglund 1995; Nordberg 1996:2) which compares quality aspects of private security 
and its regulation (Button 2007a:119-122). Button and George (2006) synthesised a 
wide variety of principles and data on regulation from their previous studies, 
publications and experiences. It includes a discussion of the most basic obstacles 
concerning commercial security regulation and its implementation.   
In the Australian context, Prenzler and Sarre have published a wide range of articles, 
books and reports, separately or together with other scholars on commercial security 
provision and its control which have been utilised and quoted in this thesis (Prenzler 
1998; 2005a; 2005b; Prenzler, et al 1998a; 1998b; 2009; Prenzler and Sarre 1998; 2006; 
2008; Sarre 1992; 2002; Sarre and Prenzler 1999; 2000; 2005; 2011; van Steden and 
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Sarre 2010). They have created a detailed regulatory model focusing on and analysing 
existing real world problems and solutions (using also legal cases as examples). They 
have also proposed new and fresh legislative and organisational solutions to improve 
existing regulations as well as organisations and practices for control of commercial 
security activities.  
Sarre (2002) notes the fragmentation (in Australia) of public police organisations and 
the growing importance of different private ‘policing’ solutions (ibid. 10):  
“The upshot of this is a society in which policing is now conducted not just by 
those people commonly referred to as ‘the police’ but by a host of private and 
non-government operatives who use a range of empowerment tools and resources 
at their disposal, not just the criminal law.”  
Sarre and Prenzler (2005) consider the legal powers utilised by private security 
providers in Australia. The emphasis is on the ‘hard’ measures like apprehension, arrest 
and assault as well as on the protection of privacy and matters of liability connected to 
them. They also touch the commercial liabilities and the relationships between public 
and private security. In this text the authors have defined the term private policing in a 
clear way (ibid. 5):  
“Private police21 are those persons who are employed or sponsored by commercial 
enterprises on a contract or ‘in-house’ basis, using public or private funds to 
engage  in tasks (other than vigilante activity) where the principal component is a 
security or regulatory function.” 
 They also handle comprehensively, by using legal cases as examples, the 
interpretations of laws in cases applying to private security providers’ work. In their 
summary the authors leave open the question of extra powers and more intrusive state 
intervention in their control, arguing that these questions require urgent political 
consideration and legal policy development. They also reflect the shift in public 
thinking about privatised forms of policing, now increasingly accepted (ibid. 217). 
Prenzler and Sarre (2008) subsequently developed a risk profile based model regulatory 
system for the security industry. They devised this because in many countries, as they 
emphasise, the security industry is increasingly today controlled by the governments. 
They have wanted to provide a response to the diversity of practices and core principles: 
“...which arguably should apply in any location where security, especially private 
security, operates.” They also remind us that a model in this form has not been 
articulated and applied in detail at this level. According to them the model should: “...be 
of practical value to policy makers in government and industry associations.” The 
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authors (ibid. 264) also express that the ideas they present would help to streamline 
(structure) research, noting that their model: “...is designed to fill a gap in the academic 
literature, which often looks at private security in negative terms and deals with security 
industry regulation in a fairly abstract light.” Prenzler and Sarre (ibid. 265) have with 
this model an ambitious goal to make the interest groups speak a common language 
regarding one of the key elements in steering of (commercial) private security:  
“The model is, therefore, put forward as a reference point for this aspiration, and 
is proposed in prescriptive terms as a robust concept with long-term durability and 
cross-jurisdictional relevance. But it is also designed to encourage more informed 
and structured debate. Consideration of the model should, moreover, encourage 
further research that will lead to improvements to it, and its inter-relationships 
with a variety of regulatory strategies.”  
The authors have looked at the need for regulation by creating an industry specific risk 
profile. They point out (emphasise) three drivers which have caused governments to 
implement legal control of private security. These are: 
“...[first] a growing recognition of powers security providers hold on citizens. 
...[second] scandals over security providers’ misconduct and poor standards... 
These two factors have been greatly amplified by the third factor: the enormous 
growth of the industry.” (ibid. 265-266): 
Prenzler and Sarre have underscored the misconduct in security work as a (risks profile) 
reason for regulation by listing eleven topics from fraud to misuse of weapons. 
Concerning the ‘risk’ list, the authors (ibid. 266-269) confess that: “The breach and 
depth of the problems outlined above, however, are difficult to measure.”22  
A separate topic handled by Prenzler and Sarre (2008) is legal forms of regulation (ibid. 
269). They point out that there has been critique of the accountability or broad 
regulatory systems by themselves and other researchers (Sarre and Prenzler 1999; 
Stenning 2000; Zedner 2006). The authors analyse how effective and practical the 
different controls outside industry specific statutory regulation are - ‘tools’ as civil law, 
criminal law, market forces and self-regulation. The emphasis is, however, on special 
government regulation. The two main pillars of private security regulation forwarded in 
their text are (a) suitability tests (controls) and (b) a minimum pre-entry training 
requirement. On top of these baseline licensing requirements the authors list thirteen 
different topics (ibid. 269-273) to improve licensing. One of the biggest problems they 
see concerning special regulation is the lack of interest by governments. They are of the 
opinion that: “Almost all regulatory reform in security has been driven by crisis and 
scandal, not policy initiative informed by planning research.” They are also sceptical 
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about the implementation and compliance arrangements for industry specific security 
regulation.  
The authors (ibid. 274-276) have listed fifteen key principles of good security industry 
regulation which includes different aspects of licensing authority, licensing 
requirements, guards’ powers, use of technologies and licence fees. They also propose 
the way in which the regulatory agencies should approach their task, stating that they: 
“...should hold a mission for professionalization and continuous improvement with 
strong research units...” Referring to their list of key principles they conclude that 
having these in place along with a strong research based approach, all the parties 
(interest groups) have the possibility to achieve: 
 “...the highest possible standards in conduct and competency while at the same 
time providing a minimal cost-burden on security business and staff. An ideal 
regulatory approach must be able to accommodate not only strict enforcement 
methods ... but also supportive strategies of providing legal support and proactive 
assistance.”  
Sarre and Prenzler (2011) have also analysed the problems created by different 
governance models due to the states’ independence in making decisions on private 
security in the Commonwealth of Australia.  
The research and pragmatic advice on regulation published by the academics mentioned 
in this sub-section have provided the theoretical basis for this thesis and helped with the 
formulation of the research questions and the structure of the study. Although the ideas 
presented by Sarre and Prenzler on the regulation of private security and their report on 
the industry across Australia were published after the interviews of this work were 
finalised, the thesis succeeds in some of the core developing points they have raised. 
This literature on private security regulation, as well as its implementation and 
compliance arrangements give a solid and in parts a detailed platform on which to build 
in the analyses of this thesis. 
2.6 Analysis and discussion 
As exemplified by the nodal governance perspective, the majority of contemporary 
academic research on commercial security tends to be heavy on theory but light on 
empirically up-to-date and accurate data nationally, transnationally or globally. This has 
a series of consequences. First, definitions of the commercial security environment are 
blurred and cannot form a common platform for research. The figures presented are ad 
hoc and unreliable. Second, some of the basic cornerstones of commercial security 
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research, such as the importance of mass private property, the ratio of public police 
officers versus security guards, and globalisation development, have proved to be 
poorly interpreted and/or overvalued. Third, mainstream research on private security 
during the last ten years has been focused on sociological models, for example nodal 
governance. This has not supported the research concerning real world questions like 
steering and controlling of expanding commercial security. Fourth, in a significant 
number of studies there has been a tendency to blame the commercial security providers 
for societies’ inequity in security provision and human rights breaches and misconduct 
in their work without actual data or (comparable) research results to support these 
accusations. Fifth, most researchers have virtually no deeper contact with the people and 
associations who actually run and represent the business locally and globally.   
With the exception of the Sarre and Prenzler model, academic theories and discussion 
on private security do not provide a solid platform for the research on the regulation of 
commercial security. The basic structure presented in this thesis has been formed by 
comparing and joining together ideas from texts of different scholars. First, the texts of 
Button and George, Sarre and Prenzler, and partly Bayley have been the main sources 
affecting the results presented. Second, Zedner’s requirement of using an 
interdisciplinary approach, even in security studies, has been absorbed in order to enable 
handling of the variety of factors faced in this thesis. Third, a simple, question-led 
approach has been adopted to keep the study structurally under control. Fourth, a variety 
of different sources, texts and persons, mainly from outside the academic spectre, have 
been used to get real (empirical and firsthand) knowledge on the regulation of 
commercial security generally and especially in the six regulatory regimes under study. 
The actual thesis chapters include a great number of knowledge and ideas (quotations) 
from over 400 different authors and other sources, adding remarkably to the width and 
depth of this literature review.  
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CHAPTER 3:  RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA SOURCES: THE 
CHALLENGES OF DOING CROSS-NATIONAL 
COMPARATIVE RESEARCH ON COMMERICAL  
SECURITY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Comparative research or analysis is a broad term that includes both quantitative and 
qualitative comparisons of social entities. Social entities can be based on different lines, 
such as geographical or political ones (Mills, et al 2006). There is no easy and 
straightforward entry into cross-national comparative social research (Øyen 1992:1). 
There are persistent problems in carrying out this kind of work and the academic 
theories and opinions vary. Also in this thesis the main methodological challenges: 
defining samples, identifying suitable data gathering methods and developing a 
comparative model were compounded by having to work through cultural and social 
differences, language barriers, and geographical distances. It has been argued that 
because of the complexity of methodologies used, cross-national comparative studies 
are often based on countries with similar features and not on directly comparable data, 
and as a consequence findings can be biased, misleading or limited (Hantrais and 
Mangen 1999:91). The same problems were faced in this research. The easiest method 
would have been to choose countries with a similar legal and cultural background, the 
same national language and geographical proximity. This would, however, have 
diminished the representativeness of the results considerably. The question of data 
comparability was present throughout the research and influenced the techniques 
employed to gather it. Because this research project was driven by policy making 
concerns and because of the researcher’s professional background and personal 
contacts, the risk of bias needed to be recognised and minimised.  
In a cross-national comparative study, the question must be asked: is the aim to identify 
similarities or differences? This of course affects the selection of national cases. This 
was, in a way, a contradictory issue because similarities were the focus, but in as 
dissimilar as possible environments. Thus the choice of regulatory regimes for the 
cross-national comparison had to have a satisfactory scientific rationale for their 
selection and any divergent choices at the research design stage had to be evaluated and 
reported.   
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‘Doing’ cross-national comparative research was not easy and there was a constant 
feeling of being located in a methodological mine field. As was discussed in chapter 2, 
there are a limited number of studies on private security regulation and in practice, 
virtually no comparative research on a wider scale at the cross-national level. The lack 
of an established or standardised methodology to draw upon meant that part of the 
research had to be devoted to building a conceptual model. A practical challenge, during 
a pilot study and the interviews, was the communication with a large group of national 
experts whose mother tongue was not English. Half of the interviewees spoke English 
as their native language (NY, QLD and ZA), but not British English. It is important to 
note how differentiated the vocabulary on private security matters and personnel were 
on legal and practical levels within all the regulatory regimes under study. On top of 
this local slang expressions were widely used on some key matters.
23
 Even if the 
English language skills of all parties were in most cases on an acceptable level, there 
were factors that limited and hampered the communication when handling detailed 
expert information. Because of this, parts of the interviews were conducted in native 
languages, even if this meant the extra complication of translation.     
3.2 Research objectives, design and process 
Objectives 
The main goals of the research were to examine the following questions: what are the 
(general) core elements of the regulations, how do the main regulation processes work 
in practice, and what are the key differences and similarities between national 
regulations, as understood by different local interest group representatives? As a 
consequence of the limitations in the existing research and knowledge base, a secondary 
objective had to be included in this thesis. Basic information on private security 
regulation and its structure had to be collected and analysed. This was necessary in 
order to provide a structure for the case study and the interviews, as well as to have a 
general understanding of commercial security’s regulation cross-nationally.  
Design principles 
There was a need for flexibility throughout the research process, which is to be expected 
when crossing cultural boundaries in a cross-national comparative study (Mangen 
1999). Another main feature of this study was that the design of interviews was 
contingent on prior analyses of documentary material which strategy has been handled 
by Mason (1996), as one alternative. The actual research process consisted of (a) a 
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general literature review, (b) a documentary pre study on reasons to regulate, (c) a 
cross-national pilot study on existing private security regulation, and (d) the 
comparative case study of six chosen jurisdictions focusing on documentary analysis 
and interviews concerning the regulatory environments and models in place in these 
regulatory regimes. Three questions structured the research: 
 Why regulate manned commercial security? 
 What and who to regulate within the scope of manned commercial security? 
 How to implement manned commercial security regulation in practice?  
Throughout the study, the principle of using different methods and replication was 
observed at all stages, utilising archival records, published documents, surveys, and 
interviews, applying the general ideas of triangulation. Thus an acceptable level of 
reliability of the results could be achieved, for example, by following the principles of 
Singleton’s (1999:405-407) strengths and weaknesses summary table. The fundamental 
idea of triangulation, according to which the weaknesses of any method can be 
compensated for by the strengths of another method, was recognised. In a way, the idea 
of varying the ‘working universe’ to validate the results was also exploited in this 
research by choosing and using remarkably different objects of research. 
Pilot study 
It became apparent during the literature review and the documentary pre study that it 
was not possible to have a structured and reliable enough summary knowledge of cross-
national private security regulation from existing published sources. The fragmented 
data had to be confirmed in some way because the whole study would otherwise have 
been based partly on assumptions. In order to proceed, a pilot study was used to gather 
basic cross-national knowledge of the situation concerning commercial security 
regulation. 
The pilot study combined documentary survey and interview data from 40 regulatory 
regimes, including the EU member states.24 Ninety hand-picked national experts 
participated in this study. It covered the basic legal and administrative structures plus 
the regulated segments and subjects within commercial security regulation. The choice 
of topics to be included was based on previous studies in this area and on the personal 
experience of the participants. The findings have been presented in Fallon and Samuels 
(2006:43) and Hakala (2007). 
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Previous data from the literature review and the documentary pre-study (Hakala 2008) 
together with the survey findings sharpened and confirmed, in a structured manner, the 
cross-national understanding of private security regulation models. As a result, choosing 
the main topics for the case studies could be made with a high certainty that the most 
significant subjects were included. The core aspects of private and commercial security 
regulation chosen and handled throughout the study were: legal and administrative 
structures, licensing of companies and personnel, compulsory training, equipment, and 
weapons. The pilot study and the documentary pre study also supported the choice of 
the six case study regulatory regimes by showing that they all had regulation, although 
diverse, concerning the above mentioned core research topics and thus allowed a full-
scale comparison. 
Case studies  
It has been emphasised that the nature of case studies is essentially an analytical focus 
rather than a method per se, since they incorporate several approaches, a combination of 
interviews and documentary research being the most typical in cross-national research 
(Mangen 1999:115). This was the approach chosen in this study and the qualitative 
research relied on quantitative data to obtain a sensitive and multi-dimensional 
perspective of commercial security regulation in the regulatory regimes under study.  
The case studies of the six chosen regulatory regimes consisted of two main parts: a 
documentary analysis of existing private security regulation in order to have a 
comparison platform, and a qualitative, interview-based analysis of the opinions of the 
interest group representatives. The main research questions were extended for the case 
study interviews. In addition to the ‘why’, ‘what and who’ and ‘how’ questions the 
present situation in local regulation was explored during the interview sessions by 
asking: 
 Is the present local regulation model working well administratively from 
your perspective? 
 How could the licensing procedure and control of commercial security 
companies and employees be improved? 
 Is the compulsory training of different groups of commercial security 
personnel effective and sufficient? 
 Are all licence holders within the industry treated equally by the authorities? 
 Is there a working relationship between the different interest groups and the 
government/authorities? 
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 Are the regulations on ‘non-lethal’ weapons and fire-arm possession/use 
within the commercial security industry adequate? 
All the questions included a number of probing follow-up points to help the interview 
execution. The complete fact sheet used in support of the interviews is in Appendix 3.  
The sample of regulatory regimes 
In a cross-national comparative study, there is the risk of choosing countries that are too 
similar and to use in-comparable data. To avoid this, in the choice of regulatory regimes 
and interviewees for the case studies, a kind of purposive convenience sampling was 
used. The main reasons for this were the need to have as good as possible coverage of 
differences with a limited sample, and to gain access to the best expert 
respondents/interviewees. This kind of choice has been defended in one way by Bryman 
(2004:100), stating: “A context in which it may be at least fairly acceptable to use a 
convenience sample is when the chance presents itself to gather data from a 
convenience sample and it presents too good an opportunity to miss.” There are, 
however, other critical opinions concerning convenience sampling, for example by 
Patton (2002:244), arguing: “Do what is easy to save time, money, and effort. Poorest 
rationale. Lowest credibility. Yields information-poor case.” In this study, there were no 
questions of saving time, money, or effort; on the contrary, an exceptional opportunity 
to widen the horizons of commercial security research cross-nationally was exploited. In 
practice, to initiate and undertake this kind of structured research on commercial 
security with a global reach for the first time was, with the existing circumstances, not 
possible in any other way. 
The choice of regulatory case study was determined by the following criteria: 
 There should be an existing statutory commercial security regulation system. 
 Different types of government models (federal/centralised) should be included. 
 There should be a geographical spread, different sizes and different wealth 
represented. 
 There should be a clear difference, if possible, historically, culturally, politically 
and in the approach to commercial security matters. 
There were two exclusive preconditions concerning the chosen regulatory regimes. 
There should be some earlier personal knowledge of and contacts to the local 
commercial security industry, and the regulatory regimes should be linguistically such 
that the use of necessary documents and oral communication were possible without too 
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complicated arrangements or a need for translation/interpretation. The chosen 
jurisdictions: Belgium, Estonia, New York, Queensland, South Africa and Sweden 
filled these criteria. In chapter 7, there are comparison tables and general knowledge of 
different qualities describing the general dispersion of these societies.  
The sample of documents  
For the comparative documentary analysis, the sample in each regulatory regime under 
study included open archival or published statutory regulations on (commercial) private 
security, and selectively official committee reports, bills with explanatory notes, and 
parliament debates related to these bills. Access to these documents was possible 
through governmental official websites, by visiting the authorities responsible locally 
for licensing, and by working in the national archives/libraries in respective 
countries/states.  
To support the documentary analysis and to add to the environmental data in chapter 7, 
concerning the national commercial security spheres, secondary documents were used. 
These included country specific general information, local and international statistics, 
available research papers, and miscellaneous security industry information. The 
documentary analyses presented are based on a limited number of regulatory regimes. 
Similarly as in the research as a whole, the reason for their selection was language 
considerations, as the texts and documents used had to be in a language accessible to the 
researcher (in original or translation).25 In sum, only a limited sample of texts pertaining 
to fifty specific countries or regulatory regimes26 were utilised in the study. 
In addition, ten professional magazines published during the last ten years27 and related 
in some way to the regulatory regimes under study were used for articles and news on 
commercial security regulation. Also the possibility to take part in over thirty 
international commercial security related conferences and seminars during the years 
2003-2009,28 as a participant, sometimes as a lecturer and occasionally as an organiser, 
generated a considerable amount of additional knowledge and presentation material. 
The sample of interviewees 
For the interviews, a purposive convenience sample of experts and interest group 
representatives was chosen from the regulatory regimes under study. Access was gained 
by using international personal contacts within the security industry, many of whom had 
already participated in the pilot study. The ‘sample’ of fifty-one interviewees in the 
countries under study was chosen from different interest groups, as presented in Table 
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7. The public police as a group were intentionally left outside the sample if they did not 
have an official active role in the regulation work. The minimum number of interviews 
per country was six. They were chosen whilst keeping in mind the need to have as wide 
and comparable an opinion base as possible with the limited number of interviews. The 
interviewees were categorised into three groups: 
 Managers, including operational persons working within the industry. 
 Industry experts, including persons from regulatory authorities and commercial 
security related organisations and trade unions.  
 Experts, including persons who had expert knowledge of the industry but were 
not working within it (customers, academics and editors). 
However, many interviewees also had long professional experience (careers) in 
different other tasks within commercial security sphere and public policing. 
Table 7 Division of interviewees by commercial security background  
 
     BE      EE      NY     QLD      SE      ZA  Other
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  Total 
Manager      2        3        2        4        2        2       15 
Industry expert      3        2        2        3        2        3       3      18 
Expert      2        2        2        3        2        3       4      18 
Total      7        7        6       10        6        8       7      51 
 
3.3 Research methods 
Documentary analysis 
The documentary analysis part of the research consisted of a general analysis of the 
models and content of private security regulation internationally and a more detailed 
one, focused on the specific countries under study and the six main entities that were 
identified in the general review.  Tables and graphs were used to organise the data and 
to illustrate the basic core elements in the national regulations. The core summaries of 
the regulations of the six regulatory regimes under study were tabulated and presented 
alongside the interview results to compare, support and deepen the analyses of the 
comments provided. 
Interviews 
It has been said that qualitative interviewers listen to people as they attempt to describe 
their understanding of the life-worlds in which they live and work (Rubin and Rubin 
1995:3). It has also been stated by Mangen (1999:117) that semi-structured and 
‘measured’ free-format interview schedules are the most common mechanism employed 
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in cross-national survey research. In a cross-national study like this one, the whole idea 
was to gain an understanding of the insights that the individuals connected to the 
industry in different environments and cultures had on the industry’s regulation. 
Qualitative interviews were, in this research, a good way to achieve this goal. The 
research was carried out using expert interviews in which discussion topics and 
questions were based on the literature and documentary reviews. A semi-structured 
(focused) topical interview technique was used because the goal was to find out what 
opinions and general understanding the interviewees had, as representatives of different 
interest groups in commercial security, of the functioning and future challenges of the 
local regulation.  
Conducting the interviews 
Potential interviewees were approached at least one month before the planned meeting 
by personal e-mail and/or by a phone call to inform them of the research project and to 
request an interview. This procedure was partly prepared by advance notification of a 
coming interview request when meeting potential interviewees in different situations. 
Also, the pilot study survey helped because most of the chosen experts were familiar 
with it or had even participated in it as respondents. The general pre-information text 
sent to the interviewees is in Appendix 3. 
After agreeing on a date and time, the interview topics and questions, together with 
some information on practical details related to the meeting, were sent in advance to the 
interviewees (Appendix 3). The goal was to make the discussion such that they would 
feel free to discuss even sensitive/confidential topics and could make their own 
evaluation as to what to comment on. One hour semi-structured interviews were carried 
out face-to-face, mostly at the workplaces of the interviewees, or at international 
seminars. A tape-recorder was used for technical reasons, but also because taking notes 
would have disturbed the discussion and could have resulted in a loss of precious 
nuances. In addition to the recorded session, time was spent socialising with many 
interviewees informally discussing general and also sensitive local challenges facing the 
security industry. This was important for the interviewer to gain background knowledge 
of the local general circumstances as well as business culture and thinking.  
The interview process was dependent on existing contacts and knowledge of the 
research topic gained during early, informal discussions. The interviewer’s professional 
role and expertise on the subject and the business as a whole also helped. In practice, 
most of the interviewees had less detailed knowledge of the actual regulations than the 
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interviewer. It was a challenge to maintain one’s position as a listener, rather than as an 
active discussion partner. It had to be kept in mind that the priority was to get local 
knowledge of the opinions, plans and goals within the security industry interest groups. 
To be able to interview the experts and to have comprehensive interview results, twelve 
of the fifty-one interviews had to be carried out, at least partly, in using the Swedish, 
Estonian or Finnish language. This meant an extra obstacle: sections of these 12 
interviews had to be translated from the transcriptions into English. In this work the 
special security word lists used were the one of European Committee for 
Standardisation (2008) which included also definitions, and the plain internal word lists 
of Securitas (1994; 1998; 2000a). In three cases, an interpreter was employed during the 
interview. To conduct and write the analyses based on the interviews, the transcripts 
were sorted according to the topic and regulatory regime. They were then re-sorted and 
used together with the results of the documentary analyses on the regulations to produce 
country specific or summary analyses of the subjects studied.  
3.4 Ethical issues 
The general ethical practices for research set out by the British Sociological Association 
(2002) for research were followed in this work. This study could be considered as a 
policy-relevant applied social research project including certain ‘interested parties’ 
(Rose 2004:2). How to keep to key interest groups a distance and independence without 
dangering important information sources was a challenge. The interviewer’s role in this 
research was somewhat ambiguous. As the researcher had an active professional role in 
the security industry, there was a certain burden created in the form of his own opinions 
and ideas as to how the industry should be regulated. On the other hand, this potential 
partiality was compensated by having a cross-national net of professional connections, 
and an in-depth practical knowledge of the research area, including an understanding of 
the general values, ethics and thinking of the industry.  
In general, the ethical challenges in this research were related to public appearance and 
pride and to the individual professional ‘privacy’ of the interviewees. Issues of consent 
in this research were connected to the interview element. National sensitiveness applied 
in this kind of project, especially in the countries where things were not still totally 
under control or where there were obvious discrepancies between interest groups. 
Naturally, there were also some suspicions that as an employee of one of the 
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multinationals in the industry, the interviewer had business interests mixed in with the 
research.  
To tackle these ethical challenges, the interviewees were provided with comprehensive, 
accurate information about the nature of the research and the basic interview schedule 
well in advance and at the beginning of every interview. This also promoted the 
practical cooperation of the participants. Political matters, which could not be avoided 
totally, had to be handled on a case-by–case basis. Confidentiality issues were to be 
dealt with upfront as a part of the information and then on a case-by-case basis 
according to the needs of the interviewees. Generally, the approach was also planned to 
respect the ideas presented by the school of situational/ethical relativists.
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3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the research methods and data sources used in this thesis. The 
division of the thesis into twelve chapters that build on and support one other was very 
much a necessity that became apparent during the research. The lack of previous 
research and lack of reliable data required extra steps to be taken in order to collect 
basic cross-national information as a platform for the case studies.  
The combined comparative documentary and qualitative interview analyses, based on 
the results of the first part study, constitute the core of the research project. They were 
carried out using a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods that observed the tested 
principles of triangulation to give validity to the results. This methodological approach 
allowed me to generate an interesting and substantive data set. In spite of the 
compromises that needed to be made between the original ambitions and the available 
resources, especially with regard to the sample, reasonable results were achieved. Even 
if the number of countries and the interviewed experts was limited, the coverage was 
something that has not been achieved before on a cross-national level in commercial 
security research. 
 
57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I 
GENERAL THEORIES AND PRACTICES IN COMMERCIAL SECURITY 
REGULATION  
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CHAPTER 4:  WHY REGULATE MANNED COMMERCIAL SECURITY? 
 
Regulation has been supported with many different arguments through the times 
depending on the interests of the persons or groups expressing their opinion. At the end 
of the day, the basic reason for regulation is, however, quite simple. Tombs (2002:115) 
has spelled it out in the following way: 
“Most fundamentally, regulation exists because in its absence, as historical record 
demonstrates, the result is the wide scale production of death, injury and illness, 
destruction and despoliation, not to mention systematic cheating, lying and 
stealing.”   
A practical opinion on the justification for regulation in general is presented by Breyer 
(1998:59) when he explains the rationales in steering economic activities. He also 
emphasises the political nature of regulation, which sometimes overtakes the reasoned 
argument:  
“The justification for intervention arises out of an alleged inability of the market-
place to deal with particular structural problems. Of course, other rationales are 
mentioned in political debate, and details of any program often reflect political 
force, not reasoned argument. Yet thoughtful justification is still needed when 
programs are evaluated, whether in a political forum or elsewhere.”   
An industry specific comprehensive argument for the private security regulation, still 
valid today, was given by South (1985:182-183, 255), some twenty five years ago:  
“The private security sector is expanding and will continue to do so, in varying 
ways, to varying degrees, for the foreseeable future. As it does so, the need to 
ensure that it is strictly regulated grows even more. ... Legislatively empowered 
regulation and procedures for ensuring accountability are necessary because it 
must be recognised that private security are not simply private citizens. Their 
expected role and function makes them a special case requiring special public 
safeguards.” 
These three academic quotations apply to the security industry, and in reality most of 
the countries in the world have imposed some kind of national statutory regulation to 
define, steer and control the activities of security companies and their personnel. In 
regulation processes, the knowledge and understanding of the reasons for regulation 
should be a requirement. When there is a clear answer to the question ‘why regulate?’ 
there will also be an understanding of what interests and whose interests should be 
protected and supported by regulation. A rational assessment can then be made to 
determine whether these interests are important enough to require state intervention by 
legislation. At the same time, by answering this question carefully, a solid platform for 
the actual regulation work has been set. The understanding of the reasons to regulate 
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will later on also help to find and to decide the topics to be included in industry-specific 
regulation and to choose an administrative implementation and control model that fits in 
with the existing national or transnational governance structure.  
There is also the question of the need to have separate statutory regulation for 
commercial security functions. Could they not be steered and controlled by existing 
general legislation? Sarre and Prenzler, who have researched this matter, are very 
explicit in their opinion, stating (2005:213): “A reasonably competent and ethical 
security industry will depend very much on the right mix of different types of laws and 
their enforcement, but specific industry regulation is now clearly a basic requirement.” 
This chapter, as will the whole thesis, focuses on traditional and national commercial 
manned security services (guarding) and on the reasons for their statutory regulation. 
The various arguments against regulation, such as growing costs to customers (Cully 
1996:5; Ambrand Dot Com 2006; Kerr 2006:29; Centre for International Economics 
2007:26-27), the limitations of free competition (Forst and Manning 1999:37; Zedner 
2006:281), giving the industry legitimacy and authority it does not need or deserve 
(Button and George 2006:566), over-reaction of authorities (Cotterill 2006:4) and even 
opinions that statutory regulation  pose a substantial threat to the employment 
opportunities of people with criminal records (US Government: 2004:41-48; Emsellem 
2006:2) are not commented upon further in this context. 
Manned commercial security services are regulated in some way in the majority of 
countries. The pilot study (Hakala 2007:6) and other sources covering this subject 
(Access Control & Security Systems 2006; Private Security Regulation.Net 2008) show 
that over 90% of regulatory regimes have some kind of special legislation concerning 
the industry. This high figure implies that governments have had and still have a need to 
formally regulate commercial security activities. But, if one asks on a general or 
detailed level why this kind of statutory regulation was issued, no simple and 
straightforward exhaustive answer can be found today. This subject has been touched 
upon by some scholars as well as in various laws, bills, explanatory notes, government 
papers and committee reports. Most of these documents, however, handle the matter 
from a national perspective, taking up the special need for statutory regulation of one 
specific country or regulatory regime. Very little transnational research exists that deals 
explicitly with the similarities and patterns in national debates in support of this sort of 
regulation. Some of the fragmented knowledge has been collected and organised in this 
text with the aim of improving understanding of this many-faceted entity. The purpose 
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of the chapter is to bring to light whether there are any common denominators in the 
reasons for and goals of regulation and what are the officially expressed factors 
affecting legislation. This chapter also aims to show that there is a general rationale for 
commercial security regulation, which can be presented in a structured way and that 
certain factors are universal (dominant), irrespective of the regulatory regime and its 
historical, political, legal or cultural environment. This kind of information is thought to 
be helpful to all relevant interest groups when writing and debating the future of 
commercial security regulation.  
Some general answers to the question – why regulate private security? – have been 
presented, mostly during the last 30 years. They do not include theories or models that 
could be utilised as such in this study. Most explicit comments and information on this 
subject are to be found scattered in the documents of those countries and states where 
(commercial) private security has been regulated or at least the case of regulation has 
been debated. In this study, regulation has also been seen partly in terms of risk control. 
Risks related to private security are perceived here as creating a platform for the needed 
responses (Baldwin and Cave 1999:138-149; Baldwin, et al 2000; Lange 2003:412, 
417). 
This chapter comprises a structured summary presentation of the ‘reasons and goals’ 
argumentation used by different interest groups to support statutory regulation of 
commercial security services (guarding). The topic has been handled in two parts: first, 
the general arguments, and second, the more detailed industry specific arguments given 
on the need for commercial security regulation.  
4.1. General arguments given for regulation 
Over 30 years ago, Stenning and Shearing (1979:263) took up one basic question 
concerning private security regulation by stating: “If private security personnel are in 
reality no different from ordinary citizens, a law which treats them alike seems most 
appropriate. But if in reality they are not, and the law still treats them as they are, it 
becomes inappropriate.” The same scholars later gave their opinion on this matter 
stating (1981:235): “In treating private security personnel as if they are no different 
from ordinary citizens, the general law in all jurisdictions has failed to keep pace with 
the modern development of private security.” Even though the researchers focused on 
private security personnel here, their comments can be extended to cover security 
companies as well. The fundamental dilemma of both researchers and governments is 
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made very clear: can commercial security be ignored by society or is it, as Shearing and 
Stenning argue, a special profession and activity in society that needs to be regulated 
accordingly? When handling the same question again 20 years later, Stenning 
(2000:347) repeated the opinion that private security is a special case and must be 
regulated. This time he even summarised more explicitly that there is an unfortunate, 
inadequate understanding of the roles, powers and accountability of private police, and 
the legitimate concerns of such matters as liberty, privacy and equity, and sometimes 
even national and international security.  
In commenting on the need for regulation, South (1989:126) also touched upon this 
phenomenon: “Private security guards are not ‘the general public’, who after all do not 
as a rule guard pay-rolls, safe-deposits, night clubs or computer facilities; rather they are 
a very specific case.” Similar conclusions have been drawn by de Waard (1999:161), 
who insists that: “Governments will realise that security is not a commodity purely to be 
bought and sold, and therefore it needs good governance. Governments will 
increasingly regulate the development and operations of the private security industry.” 
Gyarmati (2004:32) has stated clearly that industry specific regulation is needed to 
legalize the private security companies but also to limit their rights to the tasks in hand. 
Button (2006:565) is one of the few researchers, if not the only one, who has really 
asked the question: Why do governments regulate the security sector? He even gives a 
summarised explanation ending with an emphasis on the police-like and other special 
functions performed by the industry, and the abuse of power by security officers. He 
adopts the reasoning of Shearing and Stenning (1981), noting that: “...to treat such 
[security] personnel as ordinary citizens would not seem appropriate. Advocates of 
regulation argue for mechanisms to control their activities to ensure appropriate 
structures of governance exist.” In the South African context, Irish (1999:18) listed her 
view of the crucial issues where regulation of private security is concerned. She focuses 
on the division of labour and co-operation between the industry and the police, the 
elimination of elements involved in illegal activities and practices, and protection of the 
private security operators who interact with the public. Gumedze (2007) made some 
general remarks when writing of the new threat that the private security sector presents 
at a national and regional level in the turbulent African environment. He asks whether 
they are creating a security problem or solving it. His conclusion is that the security 
situation is not getting any better despite the sector’s involvement and therefore 
effective regulation is needed. He argues: “The private security, per se, is not a threat, 
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but the absence of an effective regulatory mechanism for its operation presents many 
risks, which then make it a threat.”  
Greenwood (2007:11) looked at the matter from the industry’s point of view by writing: 
“Licensing therefore, represents recognition of the role played by the industry within the 
community and the importance of ensuring its integrity is protected.” Van Zonneveld 
(1996), as a representative of the EU Commission, before the Commission changed its 
opinion, was also very clear on the subject: “It is recognised that the industry will not 
develop successfully without a well defined regulatory framework.” The Council of 
Europe (1987:preamble), has recommended in the case of private security, that 
governments: “…enact, revise and if necessary, complete regulations governing initial 
authorisation, periodical licensing and regular inspection, by public authorities at the 
appropriate level, of security companies, or encourage the profession to adopt its own 
regulations.” The legislators Mega (1992:1) and Dugan (1992:1), two sponsors of the 
State of New York Security Guard Bill, emphasised that the increasing use of security 
guards as a means of protecting the public necessitates legislation to protect the public 
interest, and that current provisions do not adequately ensure public safety. Australian 
scholars (Prenzler, et al 1997:31; Sarre and Prenzler 2005:210) have summed up the 
situation by stating that there is a strong case for government engineered licensing, and 
there appears to be a keen industry demand for it according to North American and 
Australian research.  
The European security industry has made its position on licensing and regulation clear 
by a joint opinion of the Sectoral Social Partners (CoESS and Euor-fiet 1996:2) stating 
that: “…effective regulation based on legislation is a necessary pre-condition to 
achieving high levels of professionalism, good standards of service to the client and 
high quality employment.” In other joint texts (CoESS and Euro-fiet 1996:3; CoESS 
and UNI-Europa 2004:1; INHES and CoESS 2008:5, 11, 32-38; CoESS and Almega 
2009:37-40) the industry associations go on to argue that strict licensing and regulation 
of the security industry throughout the European Union are essential foundations to a 
high quality industry. The industry’s opinions have also been mapped out by an internal 
CoESS survey where 28 national associations from different European countries 
representing local security industries and members of CoESS all considered some sort 
of statutory regulation necessary and useful (De Clerck, et al 2007:17). The United 
States’ main commercial security employer federation NASCO, after noting that: 
“…citizens have expectations that security personnel in uniform are properly screened 
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and trained to help protect company assets and people”, continued that “NASCO 
believes that legislatures must create higher standards in all 50 states to ensure better 
training and institute background checks.” (Ricci 2006:39). This sample of statements 
from scholars and different interest groups worldwide supports the opinion that 
commercial security represents something special as a business, making its regulation 
indispensable.  
In his thesis on private security regulation in South Africa, Siebrits (2001:12531) 
approached the need to regulate from a different angle, proposing that instead of asking 
“Why regulate?” we should ask: “Is regulation for the protection of the industry or for 
the protection of the public?” He argues that when this is determined, all the subsequent 
steps will follow logically. This argument can be widened to another sort of ‘why’ 
question: is the need to regulate commercial security primarily based on public interest, 
interest group interest or institutional interest? This is a fundamental question because 
the answer to it will probably also reveal the respondent’s personal emphasis in this 
matter: should commercial security be considered pure business or a kind of semi-public 
law enforcement (police) related activity with industry specific regulation requirements?  
The debate on the European level of the role and need for regulation of commercial 
security is presently focused on clearing up this discrepancy. The European 
Commission’s (EC) original opinion (CoESS Newsletter 2002:1-2; The European 
Commission 2004; Born, et al 2006:8-9) that the industry is no different from any other 
service business and should have no special national or harmonised rules disrupting the 
free market has now been softened in the final Services Directive, from which manned 
private security services were excluded for a three-year period.32 The industry’s 
European Social Partners (CoESS and UNI-Europa 2004:2) and the authorities in many 
EU countries have all along taken the view that commercial security is a special activity 
needing (local) statutory regulation and control (Finnish Government 2004:6-12).   
From different cultures and different times, one can find examples that illustrate the 
general arguments of governments or governmental committees on statutory regulation. 
The United Kingdom Government (1999:Appendix 1 (4i)) has supported regulation by 
emphasising that there will be a reduction in offences by commercial security personnel 
and an overall increase in the quality of service provided, promoting confidence in the 
industry as a whole, as well as protecting the public. Thus the whole community would 
benefit, including members of the public and businesses. In their reports, a Danish law 
committee (Danish Government 1985:17, 19); and the Irish Consultative Group (Irish 
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Government 1997:7, 47, 64) both considered, amongst other things, that substantial 
benefits would flow from the regulation of the industry and from society’s point of 
view, it is not an unimportant industrial activity and this alone speaks for the regulation 
of private security. The groups’ views were also that development of a statutory 
regulation function for the industry would be in the public interest. In Norway 
(Norwegian Government 1987:3, 5), a similar committee expressed that because of 
public interest, it supports statutory regulation of security companies. In New York 
(New York Government 1992), state legislators argued that because of the large number 
of unregulated and unlicensed security guards lacking sufficient training and their nexus 
to the general public, uniform standards should be established for security guards and 
the industry. South African law-makers have defined the state’s reasons to regulate 
private security activities in a more comprehensive way. They emphasise the general 
social role of the industry and the introduction to the law text includes the following 
statement (South African Government 2002:1):  
“The protection of fundamental rights to life and security of the person as well as 
the right not to be deprived of property, is fundamental to the well being and so to 
the social and economic development of every person and the security service 
providers and the private security industry in general play an important role in 
protecting and safeguarding the aforesaid rights.” 
In this text, South African legislators have taken the argument one step further by 
making (commercial) private security officially a part of the general security and safety 
structure of the society, not just a private business activity needing regulation. This idea 
was supported on a more general (African) level, for example, by Bearpark and Schultz 
(2007:86) when they stated: “Most importantly, governments have to develop and 
enforce effective regulation for their national private security sector in order for the 
industry to contribute meaningfully to the creation of a secure and stable environment.” 
Also, the United Kingdom Security Industry Authority (United Kingdom Government 
2004:2) sees the future role of a regulated industry in a wider social perspective – as a 
supporter of a fundamental Government objective of reducing crime and the fear of 
crime. Australian academics Sarre and Prenzler (2005:199) have expressed the same 
opinion. These examples share the idea that private security has, in general, a special 
role to play in society and that there is an obvious public interest to steer it by having it 
regulated. 
There are others who have not started to theorise the reasons for regulation but have 
gone straight to the point by listing the, partly business related, problems to be solved. 
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For example, Jones and Newburn (1996:105) give their opinion that: “The major issues 
which underline calls for regulation concern low pay, levels of training in the industry, 
reliability of private security personnel, standards of service, and the protection of 
privacy.” Draper’s statement in the conclusions of her book ‘Private Police’, some 30 
years ago, logically and clearly summarised the reality and the future need for 
regulation that we actually face today. The research was about the United Kingdom 
situation but can be generalised when looking at the development of the industry. She 
wrote (1978:167):  
“One thing is beyond doubt. The intrusion of private security forces into the fabric 
of our modern society can no longer be ignored, and the consequences of this 
intrusion must no longer be swept under the carpet. Whether we like it or not, the 
reality of the situation is that the private sector occupies an increasing role in 
crime prevention. This must be recognised by the authorities, and they should act 
accordingly.” 
It is important to note that many of the general arguments in favour of statutory 
regulation emphasise the police-like work performed by private security as a major 
reason in favour of regulation. According to McLaughlin (2007b:1) this shows that 
there is some kind of blind spot, that is an “inadequate knowledge base of the scale, 
scope and nature” of private security and its major activities. Stenning (2000:347) and 
Minnaar (2007:131-132) have made similar comments in their texts. Police-like works 
is still a minor part of the whole business, and in most countries even a marginal part, if 
both personnel and revenue are concerned and thus it is doubtful whether it can be a 
rational starting point for demands for the statutory regulation of the whole industry.  
From a practical point of view, the question ‘why regulate?’ can be considered 
somewhat academic because in real life, most governments have regulated the security 
industry with or without any deeper analysis or explanation as to why it should be 
regulated. The fact that the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
(2012) within UN has emphasised the importance of, and a vast majority of countries 
and regulatory regimes in the world have implemented statutory private security 
regulation, proves in itself that there is a need and case for regulation (Hakala 2007:6).  
4.2 Specific arguments given for regulation 
In addition to the general arguments, more explicit reasons are needed to flesh out the 
answer to the question ‘why regulate?’ This information can be found in a variety of 
documents and other texts, which help to give a more structured picture of the specific 
needs for regulation. The following summaries are principally based on the results of a 
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preliminary study for this thesis (Hakala 2008). The more detailed reasons for 
regulation are presented here and are divided into three categories: 
 Constitutional and basic legal reasons to define and restrict commercial security 
activities, based primarily on public and institutional interests. 
 Public interest related reasons to control legally security companies and persons 
working within the industry, based primarily on the public interest. 
 Professional and commercial reasons to set industry-specific legal ‘rules’ in 
order to steer and control commercial security as a business activity, based on 
mixed public, institutional and interest group interests. 
Constitutional and other basic law bound requirements   
In every country there are certain principles followed regarding security activities, 
especially if they are thought to affect state security or the basic human rights of the 
common citizens. This means that in many cases even fundamental questions about 
constitutional law have to be considered during regulation processes. The most usual of 
such reasons given for (commercial) private security regulation in different regulatory 
regimes throughout the world are summarised in Table 8. 
Table 8 Constitutional and basic legal reasons to regulate 
 
WHY REGULATE? COMMENTS AND ARGUMENTS 
EXPLAINING THE NEEDS 
To define the constitutional and other legal 
boundaries and the powers of private security 
providers in their work in order to: 
 
Protect the inviolability and privacy 
(constitutional/human rights) of persons 
interacting with private security actors. 
Private security work includes tasks in the line of 
work – bodily searches, investigations, operating 
in areas involving confidential information – 
which may offend the confronted individuals or 
be a risk for companies or private persons. 
Electronic and other private security monitoring 
may threaten the privacy of the object of 
surveillance or a third party.  
Prevent private military or strong-arm activities 
connected with politics, strikes and 
demonstrations. 
There is a history of private security 
organisations being used for political bullying or 
to control strikes and demonstrations. 
Define the physical spheres and objects where 
private security is allowed to carry out its 
activities. 
The division between the public and private 
domains is important when defining the 
competencies of different security actors. 
The growth of private security has made it a 
visible and a principal security provider in 
society. 
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The new tasks performed by the industry make it 
a provider of security services in public places, 
often displacing the police. 
Privatisation and outsourcing of public 
institutions and other activities have necessitated 
new private security tasks, for example, the 
protection of CNI objects and functions. 
Define the roles, co-operation and division of 
labour between public authorities (police) and 
private security actors. 
The question of principle – whether private 
security is a business or a substitute for law 
enforcement activity complementing the police 
and other security authorities – is problematic. 
The participation of police departments or police 
officers holding an office in private security 
business as owners or operational personnel may 
create a conflict of interest. 
The control of unofficial co-operation of ex-
security personnel and authorities in office is 
needed.  
Enable the public to clearly identify and visually 
separate private security actors from public 
authorities (police). 
The public is entitled to be able to clearly 
identify the role and authority of different 
security providers. 
Accountability requires a personal ID 
number/card. 
The use of police or other clothing and badges 
resembling those used by public authorities 
needs to be controlled. 
Define and control the (extra) powers approved 
and used by private security actors. 
There is a history of private security actors 
exceeding their authority by abusing citizens or 
extra powers granted to them. 
There is a risk of unnecessary violence or 
malfeasance. 
Give extended legal protection to private security 
personnel in their work. 
Private security actors may face more violence in 
their work than other citizens. 
Private security actors may need to breach the 
inviolability or privacy of individuals in their 
work as a safety measure. 
Public interest related requirements 
As a consequence of recognising the authority of commercial security means that there 
is a public interest related need to control it and its personnel in some way to keep the 
criminal and unsuitable elements outside the industry. This means that some of the 
controls are such that they cannot be carried out without specific legislation which 
authorises them. The public interest bound reasons given for this kind of regulation in 
different regulatory regions throughout the world are summarised in Table 9. 
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Table 9 Public interest related reasons to regulate  
 
WHY REGULATE? COMMENTS AND ARGUMENTS 
EXPLAINING THE NEEDS 
To screen and control private security 
providers in the name of the public interest in 
order to: 
 
Exclude criminal and other unsuitable persons 
(with bad character) from acquiring ‘a position 
of trust’ as employees in the private security 
industry.  
 
 
Clients and the public need to be protected from 
malfeasance by private security companies and 
employees. 
Persons with a previous history of offences 
related to private security work form an obvious 
risk to the customers and the public if they are 
allowed to work within the industry. 
A private security company can provide a 
lucrative business disguise for organised crime. 
Guarantee the accountability of private security 
companies and employees. 
A model for handling complaints regarding 
private security functions is needed. 
Guarantee equal treatment of security providers 
and security officers. 
In some countries there is the challenge to 
guarantee even-handed treatment of security 
employees regardless of their ethnic, racial 
and/or gender background. 
Steer the possession and use of non-lethal 
weapons and firearms in private security work. 
Unnecessary possession of firearms by security 
personnel should be prevented. 
There is a need for heightened control of 
weapons use (as working tools) in the private 
security context. 
Weapons are a genuine extended risk to 
outsiders and security officers because of the 
nature of the work. 
Enable effective control of private security 
companies and private security officers by the 
authorities and the public. 
 
Criminal background checks and enforcement of 
rules are only possible by public authorities. 
Accountability, including the handling of 
complaints by clients and the public, requires an 
official structure.  
Compliance with rules is not possible without 
regular checks by authorities with adequate 
industry specific legal powers.  
Control multinational security companies. 
 
There is a need to protect national knowledge 
(espionage). 
Private security has been considered a part of 
law enforcement and a need has thus been 
perceived to keep it nationally controlled. 
 A need exists to protect local private security 
companies from global operators (competition). 
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Commercial and professional requirements 
The proficiency bound reasons given for regulation in different regulatory regions are a 
more varied range of issues. Even if all of these reasons are not legal matters as such, 
they are of public interest (training) and many of them crucial for the trustworthiness  
Table 10 Professional and commercial reasons to regulate 
 
WHY REGULATE? COMMENTS AND ARGUMENTS 
EXPLAINING THE NEEDS 
To set industry-specific requirements on the 
private security business in order to: 
 
Guarantee minimum training (knowledge level) of 
security officers and their supervisors. 
Private security officers need knowledge of their 
rights and responsibilities and skills to face 
enforcement situations so that they do not exceed 
their powers and do not jeopardise the objects of 
their actions or themselves. 
Training is one way to improve the quality of 
private security officers’ and their supervisors’ 
working skills. 
Standardised requirements and supervision by 
the authorities is required to guarantee the 
quality of training and trainers.  
Eliminate ’cowboy’ companies from the industry 
and the market. 
Preconditions need to be set to enable fair 
competition. 
Protection is needed for customers, especially in 
B to C situations. 
This is an expedient to prevent uncontrolled 
work (tax evasion). 
This is one of the prerequisites to guarantee 
(improve) security officers’ conditions of 
employment. 
Improve the status, image, overall credibility and 
standards of the industry and the security 
officers.  
Minimum ethical and quality standards are 
needed to guarantee the general quality of 
services. 
Standardised contractual terms are needed to 
protect the clients and private security companies 
in criminal cases concerning business 
discrepancies (poor service). 
Guarantees of security companies’ ability to 
compensate clients for losses in cases of liability 
and infidelity are especially important in the 
private security business. 
Set minimum terms of employment (and wages) 
for security officers. 
An important way to guarantee and improve the 
quality of personnel and services. 
Increase the government income through 
licensing fees. 
An extra tax on the industry. 
A way to finance licensing and controlling 
bureaucracy.  
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and image of the industry. In some countries they are strictly regulated, in some 
published as codes of conduct, and in some given out as the industry’s own 
recommendations. The most common professional and commercial requirements in 
existing regulations are summarised in Table 10. 
4.3 Analysis and discussion 
The findings and summaries in this chapter show that even if private security regulation 
is diversified and the practical execution of rules differs considerably from country to 
country, the main reasons for and goals of industry-specific statutory regulation are, to 
some extent, globally identical. Primarily, strong constitutional, public and institutional 
interests have been and still are presented as the driving forces behind this sort of 
legislation in societies.  
Two key sources on the general need for private security regulation capture the findings 
well and can be cited here as reflections of the core issues found as answers to the 
question: why regulate?  
“The private security industry should also be subject to a statutory regulatory 
system that applies to the wider industry, sets extensive standards and is 
administered and enforced by a truly independent body. This could address some 
of the many problems with the industry, raise standards and improve 
accountability. It might also improve the utilisation of private security in policing 
and crime prevention.” (Button 1998a:23)  
“Policy-makers must therefore learn to deal with the potentially serious 
implications of limited regulation and accountability of a market which continues 
to grow in both size and importance, and which is likely to be here to stay.” 
(Richards and Smith 2007:5) 
These statements by academics are underpinned by both theory and empirical evidence. 
The same message has also been given from the industry’s perspective and a good 
example of its opinion on this matter can be found in the opening address of the Second 
European Summit on Private Security. Even if it is a European comment, it can be 
generalised to reflect the feelings of the industry all over the world, emphasising the 
importance of clear decisions and rules from the governments’ side (Pissens 2009:4-5):  
“Private security services need the right and adapted regulation framework. Not 
only at national level, as this White Book [INHES and CoESS 2008] shows, but 
also at European level where we witness similar development. As the range of 
European politics and initiatives calling upon us to perform more and more 
security activities in the public field becomes wider and larger, the need for a 
clear, unique and transparent legal framework becomes essential. Without such a 
framework we are heading for confusion, overlapping of policies and conditions 
to fulfil and hence, a risk for quality and necessary guarantees of 
professionalism.” 
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The findings of this chapter have been summarised in Tables 8-10. The results show 
that throughout there is a wide consensus that the work commercial security companies 
and their personnel perform in societies differs from other business activities in a way 
that requires society’s intervention in the form of special statutory rules.  
Most governments and academics know and even admit today that (commercial) private 
security plays a vital part in the realisation of local and national security. There seems to 
be in general a mutual understanding that the work is partly carried out within a 
somewhat grey border zone between public and private that is hard to define and is 
constantly changing. It is a common wish of all the interest groups that the changes 
should be taken into consideration without delay by the regulators. 
Some of the commercial security work includes tasks that routinely breach the 
inviolability and privacy of common citizens. Private security officers frequently have a 
need to resort to citizens’ powers, and to extra powers possibly granted to them, in order 
to carry out some of their duties. Thus it is obvious that one part of the work overlaps 
with that of the authorities and a small but increasing number of the tasks performed can 
be considered ‘private policing’. This state of affairs definitely needs to be taken into 
consideration in regulation work. 
Traditional private security carried out in indisputably private areas and inside the 
‘factory gates’ seems to have seldom raised any special needs to regulate the industry. It 
is only now, when commercial security providers have started to perform visible duties 
in public or semi-public environments to a significant extent – tasks that may involve 
third parties – and when they have started to take over security and public order 
maintenance tasks previously carried out by public authorities (police), have 
governments and other interest groups woken up and started to see a need for regulation 
(Greenwood 2007:11).  
It seems that in real life, the wake-up calls triggering the writing of laws are, from time 
to time, single incidents like major robberies or severe acts of violence that make 
politicians take action. Sometimes, unfortunately, private security regulation is drafted 
and passed in the heat of crisis, with public opinion breathing down the necks of 
politicians (Abelson 2006:8). In these cases a more comprehensive analysis of the 
reasons to regulate may be bypassed. The actual law-making is, however, in many 
cases, a controlled and sometimes also a long, drawn-out process.  
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Most of the reasons given for the statutory regulation of commercial security activities 
and personnel are primarily connected to the public interest. There are also institutional 
and interest group interests in regulation but they seem, rarely strong enough on their 
own to make the legislators start writing industry-specific laws on (commercial) private 
security. The emphases in the reasons given are: 
 First, a general social need to control a business activity that is gradually taking 
over a growing part of visible public security tasks, and that is, to an ever-
increasing degree, using enforcement powers that may interfere with the 
inviolability and privacy of citizens. 
 Second, the increasingly pronounced position of trust the commercial security 
actors have in their new role, a trust requiring some kind of systematic assurance 
and control of the integrity and suitability of those holding this sort of position. 
 Third, a general obedience of the laws and a minimum guarantee of the 
commercial security companies’ service quality.  
The arguments and conclusions in the more general academic texts discussing the needs 
and reasons for regulation tally with the more explicit comments gathered in this text 
from other sources. It has to be noted, however, that there is a something of a gap 
between the ways that the needs are expressed by scholars, legislators/authorities and 
security industry representatives. The emphasis in the academic texts is somewhat 
estranged from real life issues and the rapidly developing and changing needs for 
commercial security regulation in different environments. A second observation is that 
there is a sort of challenge and discrepancy in a majority of regulatory regimes where 
the commercial security is seen by the legislators, authorities and academics as a ‘junior 
police’ function needing regulation. They do not fully understand and take into 
consideration the tasks primarily carried out by the commercial security providers and 
the independent character of this business activity.  
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CHAPTER 5:  WHAT AND WHO TO REGULATE IN COMMERCIAL 
SECURITY? 
 
The results from the previous chapter give a general idea of the subject matter of 
commercial security regulation. This theoretical framework may be used to address the 
question of what and who to regulate. This is, however, also a pragmatic question and 
decision-making will always be influenced by local factors such as the political realities, 
legal culture and the efficiency of public security providers (police) of individual 
regulatory regimes. A general problem is that the issues that trigger regulation have 
sometimes been so urgent and critical that the actual content and structuring of the 
legislation has received less consideration. Sarre and Prenzler (1998:6; 2005:213; 2008) 
have identified what should be included in a well-organized regulatory approach. Even 
if their model stems from the examination of the unique features of the Australian 
situation and its needs, their observations and recommendations can act as an analytical 
platform for this chapter.  
The research question – what and who to regulate – has been approached in this chapter, 
pragmatically from a policy-oriented perspective. The summary presented in the 
previous chapter on the reasons to regulate will be followed by the identification of the 
subjects and objects that should be considered to be included in regulation. This 
examination is based first and foremost on the existing situation in regulation and the 
opinions and data from the experts and associations representing the industry. The 
research data used is drawn from the pilot study (Hakala 2007), a CoESS report33 (De 
Clerck, et al 2007) and individual industry specific regulations. The issue of 
employment contracts and models has been excluded from this chapter. My discussion 
of the question what and who to regulate, has been divided into three parts: 
 The legal definitions and restrictions to be made by regulatory regimes on 
commercial security. 
 The industry specific regulations on commercial security companies and 
personnel.  
 The supportive regulations on commercial security service quality and 
contractual customer protection.  
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5.1 General legal definitions and restrictions  
After defining the needs of regulation, the next step is to analyse what exactly requires 
regulation.  This requires consideration of the following: 
 The basic definitions of commercial security activities, roles and tasks. 
 The division of labour between public and private actors. 
 The (extra) powers given to commercial security actors. 
 The possession of weapons in commercial security work. 
 The accountability controls and penalties as means of ‘steering’ commercial 
security actors and activities. 
 The governmental organisations responsible for commercial security matters 
(handled in sub-section 6.2). 
These matters are of critical importance because they reflect the state’s overreaching 
philosophy in addressing the security challenges of the society, its willingness to 
'outsource' some of its basic responsibilities and its readiness, in practice, to share its 
‘monopoly of violence’ with private actors. At this stage, legislators must also 
understand that by placing the regulation of commercial security on a statutory basis, it 
is effectively becoming a permanent part of a society's security arrangements in 
protecting its critical infrastructures, businesses and citizenry.  
What is commercial security? 
In practice there are to be found three basic approaches to establishing a definition of 
commercial security (De Clerck, et al 2007:8; Hakala 2007). First, commercial security 
is defined primarily as a subordinate and/or complementary activity to public policing. 
Second, the definition is created through listing products, services, customer groups, 
and activities considered to be in the ‘commercial security’ domain, and by describing 
the physical spheres in which it is allowed to work (public/private). Third, commercial 
security is defined as a business providing security services to its customers for 
payment. The (UN) Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (2012:3) 
has lately published a comprehensive proposal on the definition of civilian private 
security services to streamline the blurred situation. In many countries, there is a 
discrepancy between the legal definitions and the practical everyday boundaries 
followed up in actual discussions of commercial security work.  
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General definition of areas and tasks 
As a general rule, commercial security activities are limited to private areas. Work 
permitted to be performed in public areas is usually defined separately case by case. In 
most cases if commercial security providers are allowed to operate in public streets, in 
parks, on public transport and so on, this has to be enabled by specific regulation. The 
problem in this case is the interpretation of so-called semi-public areas (Svenska 
Stöldskyddsföreningen 2004:107-110) that are privately owned and controlled but to 
which the public has access, either by paying a fee or gratis. Examples of these are 
transportation terminals, shopping malls, supermarkets and outdoor events. In theory, 
the authority that commercial security providers hold in these areas should be defined 
separately. The boundaries are somewhat blurred here; for example, public transport can 
be organised by a private company and a private event can be organised in a public 
place. This is not solely a security provision problem, but a wider matter of the legal 
authority of the owners and generally of the definitions of ‘private’ and ‘public’. It must 
also be remembered that police presence in shopping malls, for example, is typically 
minimal or non-existent. This is logical and understandable, taking into consideration 
their ‘reactive’ role and present resources. This and similar cases can, will, or should not 
be decided on a legal level as a (commercial) private security matter, but as a general 
question of private/public jurisdiction and authority in society. 
The practical significance of this public/private sphere definition has been given very 
little consideration. In the CoESS survey, European commercial security industry 
associations were asked about this. The results show that a minority of the countries in 
the study had special restrictions concerning private security in public or semi-public 
areas. The importance of industry-specific regulation on services in these domains is, 
from the security providers' point of view, small in Europe. Less than a third of them 
believe that it is needed. In all, the public/private sphere question has been widely 
discussed on a general level by academics, but with limited attention to pragmatic 
concerns (De Clerck, et al 2007:8-10). It seems that this matter has today been settled in 
many countries, at least in Europe, satisfactorily and pragmatically.   
In-house guarding is not actually a commercial security (business) activity, but it still 
constitutes private security. A basic question related to it is whether regulation should 
be extended to in-house security whereby companies organise their own security with 
personnel employed directly by them. In many countries it is a general supposition that 
private companies can organise their support services, including security, in their 
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private sphere freely and without state intervention. In-house security has been 
regulated to some degree in a half of the regulatory regimes (Hakala 2007: 19) but there 
are strong opinions given by industry and academics that it should be regulated more 
comprehensively, much in the same way as contract guarding (Button 2005b:8; 
2007a:115-116; De Clerck, et al 2007:30). Parallel to this discussion is whether 
different state or state controlled organisations should be affected by private security 
legislation, whether their in-house operations should fall under this regulation, and also 
whether they should have the right to offer services in the marketplace to compete with 
commercial security providers. This is especially relevant to the questions of whether 
the right of police departments to sell their services straight to customers or through 
commercial security companies should be assessed and regulated. 
To guarantee the security of the critical national infrastructure (CNI), an assessment of 
the need for special regulation is often carried out by the governments. The objects are 
listed and legal powers given to the authorities to steer and control these security 
segments. States have privatised (and regulated), amongst other things, the guarding of 
national assemblies, embassies, power industry facilities, defence industry factories, 
telecommunication installations and even police stations. In Europe, a little over half of 
the countries have certain restrictions in place for using commercial security to protect 
these types of property and activities (De Clerck, et al 2007:11).  
The public/private division of labour 
The division of labour between public authorities and commercial security providers is 
in practice defined by setting restrictions concerning areas where the latter ones can 
operate, the sorts of tasks they can perform, and the possible (extra) powers conferred 
on them. Defining in more detail the appropriate roles and functions of the different 
actors is more complicated. It can be stated (Bayley and Shearing 2001:14-15) that 
private security is primarily a pro-active activity and only a minority part of it34 supports 
actual police work or can be considered to constitute policing. If there is a need to 
subordinate (commercial) private security, totally or partly, this is usually stated clearly 
by statutes. In the same way, if there is a need for formalised co-operation concerning 
information exchange or public/private partnerships, in practice this needs legal 
confirmation in order to establish and protect the rights of both parties. The need for 
new models in policing has been explored by scholars, such as Shearing (1996:89-93) 
but no significant new developments can be observed in practical security work to date. 
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The participation of individual police officers in commercial security work is a delicate 
question and is in most cases regulated in industry specific legislation if it has not been 
done in any other context. Clear rules have been established in what way(s) a police 
officer (or other civil servant) holding an office can be an owner, consultant, director or 
operational employee in a security company. According to the pilot study (Graph 3), a 
little over 50% of states have specific rules included in their private security statutes 
concerning this topic. There are also reasons to regulate in which way these personnel 
groups are allowed to join a security company after leaving public employment. This 
has been achieved in some regulatory regimes by including a certain qualifying period 
in the directives. 
In general, to differentiate guards from police officers and other authorities, their 
uniforms are regulated. In addition to the uniform to identify authority and identity 
more specifically, any visible markings (texts, badges) on the clothes (uniforms) and the 
form and use of a compulsory personal ID card and number are usually regulated. The 
more detailed requirements on the clothing and identification of guards are handled 
further on in sub-section 5.2. 
Extra powers and protection 
There is an increasing need for regulation of policing powers that grant security guards 
rights, for example, to detain, to expel, to search and to monitor citizens in certain 
specified situations as a part of their work. An assessment of the appropriate ways for 
granting of powers is needed. Should all personnel have the same authority, or should a 
model where commercial security employees have different powers (and extra training) 
depending on the tasks they perform be brought into use? For example, in Belgium, 
Estonia, Finland and Sweden they hold such powers (CoESS 2008). Sarre and Prenzler 
(2005:215) have presented one model setting out how this diversification of powers 
could be arranged: 
“If the law were to be reformed in this way, a three-tiered model of policing could 
emerge: sworn public police officers, licensed operators who hold a basic 
‘security’ license, and operators on a specialised level that fall between the two. 
These would be licensed operators who enjoyed greater legislative powers and 
immunities in return for heightened responsibility and greater accountability. The 
public and private co-operation might arise in line with [our] ‘combined forces’ 
and ‘regulated intersections’ models.” 
There is an evident enhanced risk of violence against security officers in certain 
segments of security work. To cope with this situation, some of the above mentioned 
additional powers could be justified on occupational health and safety grounds. The 
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possibility to give security guards equal legal status to authorities in the event they are 
attacked while on duty (extended legal protection) should also be given consideration. 
Possession of weapons 
If security guards need to possess weapons on duty, this should be regulated 
accordingly in industry specific regulations. Not only firearms, but also non-lethal 
weapons/equipment should be included in the regulation. As can be seen from Table 11, 
two-thirds of countries have banned or regulated the use of non-lethal 
weapons/equipment as commercial security working tools. In a fifth of regulatory 
regimes, there are also compulsory training requirements attached to them. It is 
important to have non-lethal weapons/equipment included in industry specific security 
regulation in order to establish the boundaries for their storage, carrying and use. 
Table 11 Regulation on weapon possession in commercial security work
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Is there special ‘non-lethal’ weapons regulation concerning private security?   Proportion % 
      No regulation           36% 
      Industry specific regulation           42% 
      Industry specific regulation including training           22% 
 
Is it possible in general for private security guards/security officers  
to possess firearms on duty?
 
 
   Proportion % 
      Banned           22% 
      Allowed according to the general firearm legislation           33% 
      Allowed with restrictions set up in private security regulations           45% 
Firearms are principally not a private security regulation matter, but a part of general 
small arms legislation. In the commercial security context, the need is to have industry 
specific regulations that reflect the national cultural attitudes to professional use of 
firearms within the industry. As can be observed from Table 11, one fifth of the 
countries/states have banned them totally, one third allow them according to general 
firearms legislation, and almost half of the regulatory regimes have additional rules for 
their possession, storage and use in private security work. With industry specific 
regulations, restrictions can be placed on the tasks for which firearms are allowed, the 
models of firearms permitted, and the requirements on basic as well as refresher 
training. Interestingly, some countries have decreed the possession of firearms 
compulsory in certain private security tasks, which means in practice abandonment of 
the idea of a state monopoly on violence.  
Security Industry Authorities 
Commercial security regulation necessitates the appointment or establishment of a 
specific state authority which is empowered with wide inspection rights (including 
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inspection topics and density), the capacity to process complaints and the option for 
license suspension, which topics are handled further on in sub-section 6.2. Effective 
accountability control also requires statutes that oblige security companies to keep 
standardised records and to produce detailed annual reports. These include, for example, 
data on personnel, training practices, contracts, operational procedures, firearms 
(including firearm storage procedures and firearm usage) and financial accounts. As 
well the production, maintenance and preservation of all incident reports for regulatory 
purposes can be required. These kinds of obligations and expectations are not very 
common. In the pilot study, it turned out that, for example, only one third of the 
regulatory regimes had requirements concerning on-duty reporting (Graph 3). Legal 
penalties and sanctions for non-compliance with regulations should also be included in 
commercial security legislation. The level and severity of sanctions are dependent on 
local legal systems. It is, however, usual that there is, even on an administrative level, 
an immediate possibility to cancel or suspend the licenses of companies and security 
officers in cases of non-compliance. This sort of practice guarantees swift execution of 
the law and works also as an effective preventive threat.  
5.2 Industry specific regulation of commercial security  
The second, industry specific set of elements to be regulated are, from a jurisdictional 
perspective more flexible and contingent on assessments of local imperatives for 
regulation. They are not as fundamental as those in the previous sub-section, but 
essential in defining and steering operational commercial security work. These include 
at least: 
 The segments of commercial security to regulate. 
 The control of companies and personnel.  
 The compulsory training.   
 The regulation of equipment and tools. 
Some aspects of most of these elements have to be regulated in some way if there is a 
commitment to ‘steer’ commercial security. In particular, the control of companies as 
well as personnel and their training is a must in this context. The questions as to what 
and who to regulate can be addressed with reference to data from countries with 
established regulatory regimes which indicate in general the importance of different 
matters in regulation work. The core elements to be taken into consideration are 
presented in three summary Graphs (1-3) which are based on the findings of the pilot 
study. 
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The sections of commercial security requiring regulation 
One of the key priorities is deciding what sections of commercial security activities 
require legislation based controls. There are notable differences between regulatory 
regimes, which have been commented on widely by George and Button (1996; 1997a; 
1999) and Button (1998a; 2005a; 2005b; 2007a) as well as by Prenzler and Sarre (2005; 
2006; 2008), who call for wider and more comprehensive regulation. Graph 1 shows to 
what extent different activities are regulated in practice and indirectly what the 
regulators (politicians) think should be regulated.  
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Graph 1: Examples of segments regulated (%)
The five most regulated activities, on average, in 90% of the regimes, are (a) cash in 
transit, (b) commercial manned guarding, (c) mobile alarm response, (d) crowd control, 
and (e) close protection services (body guards). The majority (90+ %) of personnel and 
revenue in the commercial manned security are associated with these services (G4S 
2005; Securitas 2005a). Among these, although limited in personnel and revenue, close 
protection services is widely regulated as a complicated activity including a high risk of 
violence. Other segments that are moderately controlled consist of private investigation, 
alarm monitoring, and security training (average 70%). Alarm monitoring is tightly 
connected to alarm response activities and it is interesting that there is a remarkable gap 
between them – 72% versus 92%. The importance of monitoring regulation is 
increasing because of the growing use of CCTV in general and the emerging remote 
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control security services made possible by new technologies. Security training 
organisers need regulation because training is imposed as a compulsory requirement for 
licensing and its quality control has become essential. These statistics demonstrate the 
core segments of private security widely seen as the priorities for regulation. The lowest 
ranking activities in these statistics, door supervision and cash processing, both with a 
figure a little over 40%, seem to have been of less interest to governments up until now. 
Yet in many countries, the control of door supervision has become an increasingly acute 
issue, mostly because of a growing number of incidents of violence in which security 
personnel have been involved.
36
 Cash processing is an additional service taken up by 
the cash-in-transit providers and should also be regulated. In many regulatory regimes, 
it is not considered an element of security service and thus it has tended to be neglected. 
Many of the special requirements for this service are set in directives of Central Banks, 
not in the industry specific legislation. 
The control of security companies and personnel 
Another core topic in regulation is the control of commercial security companies, 
institutions and personnel working within those segments that have been included in 
industry specific legislation. Such controls are achieved primarily by setting compulsory 
minimum requirements to be met within the industry. As seen in Graph 2, in a majority 
of regulatory regimes, companies and institutions (over 90%) are regulated in some 
way. For example, there are requirements to be able to demonstrate minimum capital, 
organisation, facilities, and management experience. Measures to regulate the 
trustworthiness of individual employees are based on certain statutory minimum 
requirements for personnel, such as minimum age, clean criminal record, financial and 
legal competency, suitability for security work and good health. In many regulatory 
regimes the basic requirements for individual good character and competency are higher 
than in most other professions or occupations.  
In regulating security officers, licenses can be individually granted or connected to 
employment with a specified firm. The former system provides the authorities and 
companies with greater possibility for real-time control, but limits the freedom of an 
individual employee to choose and change employment. The pilot study results 
presented in Graph 2 provide a synopsis of the existing situation concerning licensing of 
the most important security employee groups.   
From the different personnel groups, the most heavily licensed are operational security 
officers/guards (over 80%). In a majority of regulatory regimes, the personnel are 
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licensed under this title, even if they actually perform tasks within different segments. 
Usually, both companies and operational personnel are regulated but there are 
regulatory regimes in which only one or the other needs official approval. The other 
professional occupations widely regulated (over 50%) are operational management of 
companies, private investigators, and dogs/dog handlers. Dogs are not widely utilised in 
commercial security work today, but there are still certain traditional and new tasks 
where they are used (Clayton 1967:88-97; Imbusch 2007) and regulated (Hakala 
2007:9).  
A less regulated group is door supervisors (39%), which implies, as seen also in Graph 
1, that the significance and risks of this activity have not been understood in all 
regulatory regimes. It also reflects the challenge in categorising them - in many 
countries they are not considered to belong to the private security sphere. Other 
personnel, non-operational white-collar employees (28%) and blue-collar auxiliary staff 
(14%), have often fallen outside formal legal controls. Businesses (companies) and 
security officers/guards are overwhelmingly the main objects of regulation, other 
personnel groups seeming to be of less interest in the commercial security sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 are overwhelmingly the main objects for regulation, with other personnel  
Top management is to some extent licensed, but other staff only occasionally. This is 
interesting because the integrity of managerial/administrative staff is, in a wider 
perspective, at least as important as that of security officers/guards. Often this category 
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Graph 2: Examples of personnel groups regulated (%) 
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of personnel has more access to crucial and confidential information of customers, 
operations and internal security arrangements. 
The specific requirements set out for individual security employee (guard) applicants 
are basically very similar to any other businesses. Commercial security regulations 
usually include specific requirements that applicants have to fulfil in order to be eligible 
for security work in general. These are a certified identity, minimum age, reasonable 
language skills, acceptable nationality and sometimes minimum educational 
background. On top of this come industry specific requirements: non-criminal 
background, general ‘suitability’ for security work, passing of medical (and drug) tests 
and completion of security officers’ compulsory training and exams (ASIS 2004:11-14). 
Some of the elements mentioned here are not that easy to attain and monitor in practice, 
however. The actual implementation of these elements is looked at in chapter 6. 
The regulation of other elements related to commercial security 
There are several ancillary matters that should be taken into consideration when 
deciding what to regulate, relating to everyday work procedures and equipment, many 
of which are critical to the security industry’s credibility and control. Those considered 
the most important in this context are presented in Graph 3 which includes the rules  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
regarding the participation of on-duty police officers in commercial security, as well as 
the clothing, and ID cards/badges of guards. 
Guard uniforms are regulated in over 80% of regulatory regimes all over the world. 
Usually the design, fabrics and colours are included in these directives. Requirements 
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Graph 3: Examples of other topics regulated (%) 
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should also be set on protective special clothing, not just the basic uniforms. There are, 
however, circumstances when guards need to blend into the crowd by using civilian 
clothes, for example, store detectives and bodyguards. These cases should be included 
in regulations as permitted assumptions. In some regulatory regimes there are specific 
rules to control the distribution of guard uniforms to prevent their use by criminals.  
The type, size and colour of both compulsory and other text and badges on clothes are 
in many regulatory regimes specified by authorities. In this context, it is often required 
to have the security guard’s name on the uniform. The on-duty use of an ID card and 
personnel number are as well required in many regulatory regimes. It is important to 
regulate who will provide the personal ID (authority or company), what the size of it is, 
what minimum information it should contain (rank, name, personnel number, training, 
powers, gun permits, and so on). From the operative guards’ point of view, questions to 
be considered in regulation are: when must the ID be carried, should it be permanently 
visible, who can require it to be shown, and in what circumstances? To have the name 
visible is a topic to be carefully considered (as a safety matter), especially in the case of 
guards performing duties including keeping order in public and semi-public areas. The 
importance of ID is also reflected in present regulation, as over 80% of the regulatory 
regimes have imposed rules concerning it (De Clerck, et al 2007:32).    
Compulsory basic training 
Compulsory training is an important topic and one of the most discussed in actual 
political and academic regulation work when considering what to regulate. As there are 
a limited number of ways to affect the behaviour of security providers in a positive way, 
training is emphasised in almost all comprehensive presentations on commercial 
security. There are also several studies touching on the length and content of existing 
and recommended basic, special and refreshment training (Hess and Wrobleski 
1996:84-87, 152-153, 194, 687-691; CoESS and UNI-Europa 1999; 2004; 2006a; ASIS 
2004:15-18; Johnson 2005:168-195). It is accepted that security officers and other 
operational security staff should have compulsory and formalised basic training. 
However, this is not always the case even in some regulatory regimes that have other 
basic legislation concerning the industry in place (CoESS 2008). Compulsory training 
can be categorised into four different bands: 
 Basic training for entering the profession and to be eligible to be licensed and to 
start to work as a security guard/provider. 
 Special training of different segments of services and for different tasks.   
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 Special training to be eligible to use extra powers and to possess weapons or 
special equipment at work. 
 Basic and specialised refreshment training. 
It is necessary for all of these different groups of training to be included in regulation to 
ensure that the actors within the industry receive education on different things and 
maintain at least a minimum knowledge and understanding of their work. This should, 
at a minimum, consist of modules concerning their legal responsibilities, their legal 
rights, and the occupational health and safety risks in their work. Regulation should also 
define who is responsible for delivering the compulsory training, and what requirements 
are to be fulfilled by the companies and individuals providing this training. Oversight of 
training delivery should be formalised through its inclusion in legislation. 
In the pilot study related to this research (Hakala 2007:11), training requirements were 
charted to establish the existence, length and content of basic training to indicate what 
aspects are regulated. There is a consensus within the industry (CoESS and UNI-Europa 
1999) and among regulators with regards to the basic topics to be included in guard 
training. The never-ending discussion is: how long should adequate basic training be? 
The survey results (Table 12) showed that in most regulatory regimes, there is a 
compulsory basic training requirement. The instructions (regulations) regarding the 
length of the training and its division into ‘classroom’ and ‘on the job’ vary greatly. In 
this survey, only the total number of any compulsory training hours was recorded. Of 
the regulatory regimes included in the study, two out of three had compulsory training 
of more than thirty hours. It must be noted that in this study, only (unarmed) security 
officers’ basic training at the entry level and for the least qualified work was considered. 
The available data indicates that changes in basic compulsory training length, at least in 
Europe, have been very modest during the last fifteen years (Berglund 1995:7; Weber 
2002b; Morre 2004a; Hakala 2007:11; CoESS 2008). In some regulatory regimes, there 
are compulsory training and exams concerning specialised duties, supervisors and 
managers, even if obligatory basic training is missing.  
There are two other basic aspects of training requiring regulation: its timing and the 
follow-up. The question of training being received before guards can begin working is a 
double-edged sword (Cortese, et al 2003:16-17). For commercial security companies, a 
model where training is given flexibly within a certain period after employment is more 
convenient and profitable. However, this approach does not fulfil the generally accepted 
requirement for all operational security officers to have minimum training before 
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starting work. Furthermore, it provides more opportunities for malpractice. It is also 
detrimental to the industry’s image if it can be argued that anyone can put on a uniform 
and start working as a security provider without any training.  
According to the survey results, presented in Table 12, in most regulatory regimes with 
compulsory training (90%), the training had to be completed before it was possible to 
start working. Refresher training was not organised as thoroughly, and was compulsory 
in less than half of these regulatory regimes. Rapid developments within the industry 
have stimulated discussion of the importance of compulsory, continuous and systematic 
upgrading of the knowledge and skills of all personnel. The industry considers training 
to be important factor in creating quality in services (CoESS and UNI-Europa 2006b; 
Securitas 2011:33). There should not be any doubt that even minimal regulation should 
include specific rules on compulsory training and its organisation as well as control.  
Table 12 Compulsory basic training requirements 
How long is the total basic training required by private security regulation 
for unarmed security officers performing non-specialised duties? 
  Proportion  
          % 
   No training required         14% 
   01-29 hours         19%  
   30-89 hours         31% 
   Over 90 hours         36% 
 
Questions to those with compulsory basic training        NO        YES 
Can a private security officer start working temporarily without any 
basic compulsory training? 
       90%        10% 
 Is there compulsory follow-up training for security officers 
performing  non-specialised duties? 
       52%        48% 
Based on the regulations and experiences of the present arrangements within the 
industry (Swedish Government 2009:22-27), there are five elements which need to be 
present in the regulation on training: 
 The legal responsibility for training arrangements. 
 The timing of the compulsory training. 
 The length and the content of the compulsory training.  
 The requirements for training institutions and trainers.   
 The content and organisation of examinations.  
The challenges in regulating and executing these entities are discussed in chapter 6. 
5.3 Contractual protection of customers and quality assurance 
There are other matters, such as assignment contracts, liability insurance and on duty 
reports which are included in Graph 3, that are tools in carrying out commercial security 
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activities and in controlling the risks and quality of them
37
. These matters, primarily 
related to customer protection have received little attention in commercial security 
regulation.  There are regulation models that have formalised the content of customer 
contracts. A written contract as a compulsory requirement for starting a service is in the 
best interest of all parties – authorities, customers and security providers – and should 
be made compulsory. The main points in a contract – the description of the specified 
service, the area to be guarded, the number of security guards (and rounds), price, 
liability coverage and so on – are always important but especially if something goes 
wrong. This sort of regulation is not so common. In the pilot study it turned out that 
only some 20% of the regulatory regimes have included it in their industry specific 
legislation.  
In commercial security operations, liability and fidelity insurance coverage is an 
essential part of customer and business protection. (Calder and Sipes 2002; Ligazette 
2005:7; Tuohimaa 2007). This sort of regulation has a dual purpose as it is issued to 
protect the customers against losses caused by the security provider but also the 
providers by liability limitation. A little over 50% of the regulatory regimes have 
included clauses of some kind describing obligatory insurance policies in their private 
security regulation. It is important to have statutory rules for both the contracts and the 
liability insurance matters in all security business relations (Securitas 2010a:36-41). 
On-duty, customer related, incident reports and their filing are compulsory in 35% of 
the regulatory regimes under study. Without them it is difficult and sometimes even 
impossible for clients or authorities to perform on-going and decent follow-up or 
investigation of companies’ activities. There are good grounds to include directives on 
reporting into the statutory regulation texts. 
5.4 Analysis and discussion 
In this chapter, the data on the existing situation has been used to identify a core of the 
‘what and who’ subjects that are and should be included in statutory rules, regardless of 
the regime and environment. The basic challenge, addressed in the next chapter, is the 
decisions regarding the governance model and the choice of the responsible state 
authority. This political decision will steer very much the whole regulation process and 
also the construction of control models.  
There are regulatory regimes that have exceeded the public role in commercial security 
regulation beyond the special legal requirements that can be considered to be the sole 
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responsibility and in the interest of the state. The idea in more extensive forms of 
regulation is usually to protect customers from business risks and to guarantee a 
minimum quality of services. Actual quality is important but is more of a business 
matter between the provider and the customer (Mrozek 2006:195). The situation in 
practice is, however, such that most customers, especially within the public sector, 
make their decisions primarily based on price, not quality (UNI-Europa, et al 2008). 
Whether service quality as a commodity should be regulated is a double-edged sword. 
There is a risk of over-regulation and unnecessary interference with market competition. 
Commercial security regulation should primarily be prescribed to steer the industry in 
order to protect the interests of the state, its citizens and the individual clients, not to 
control it as an economic activity.  
On practical matters concerning the actual operational control of the industry, it is 
relatively easy to make conclusions about what and who to regulate when looking at the 
existing laws in use.  The basic entities can, parallel to the findings in chapter 4 (Why 
regulate?), be divided into three groups: 
 Setting of general legal preconditions for commercial security by defining it, its 
role and the governance model, and based on the fundamental decisions made on 
these topics: its sphere of operations, its relation to authorities, its division of 
labour with authorities, its physical appearance, its extra powers, its right to 
possess weapons and its control by authorities (including industry specific 
powers). 
 Setting of industry specific legal preconditions for commercial security 
(companies/personnel) by defining the segments of activity to be controlled, the 
basic compulsory requirements for companies and personnel, the minimum 
training, the equipment allowed, quality standards and the interplay between 
providers and customers.  
 Setting of business- and quality-related requirements, standards and codes of 
conduct to formalise business relations to protect customers and to guarantee a 
minimum quality of service. 
These points can form the basis of any commercial security regulation and all of these 
matters need to be at least evaluated when legislating. There is a more detailed 
minimum list, as Appendix 4, of the basic questions to be answered when working on 
the content of statutory commercial security regulation.  
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There are practical challenges with establishing common standards for commercial 
security legislation because so many different stakeholder interests have to be taken into 
consideration. There are also political considerations to take account of, especially 
concerning states’ commitment and willingness to acknowledge publicly society’s 
contemporary dependence on commercial security as a vital element of societal security. 
At the same time, there is generally hesitancy to provide the resources to implement this 
kind of legislation and to establish effective monitoring regimes.  
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CHAPTER 6:  HOW TO REGULATE COMMERCIAL SECURITY? 
 
After an acceptance of the requirement to regulate commercial security has been 
reached and the decision of what and who should be regulated has been made, 
consideration needs to be given to implementation and compliance. The core matters 
that need to be taken into consideration can be divided in three groups. First, whether to 
have: (a) statutory or self-regulation; (b) transnational, federal or local regulation; or (c) 
uniform or diversified regulation. Second, the identifying of effective and credible 
governance models to manage commercial security regulation matters. Third, how to 
organise and implement licensing and control? The administrative implementation of 
commercial security regulation has to work at two levels. First, there has to be a 
political authority that has responsibility for the preparation of regulation and its follow 
up to ensure that it is in the public’s best interest and in tune with the changing needs. 
Second, second layer of governance has to be created or appointed which has 
responsibility for the practical implementation of the regulation and compliance with it.  
6.1 Decisions regarding the regulation model 
Statutory or self-regulation? 
In the most comprehensive study on security so far, the Hallcrest Report II, the need for 
statutory regulation has been made very clear:   
“Allegations of poor personnel practice, little or no training, inadequate 
supervision, excessive turnover, abuses of authority, and increasing false alarms 
have surrounded the field of private security for at least two decades. Despite the 
expressed and obvious need, standards or controls for this industry have been 
slow to develop. Some standards exist, but little attention has been paid to them.” 
“…On the absence of uniform standards within the security industry, licensing 
and regulation remains the only tool to assure minimally acceptable private 
security services.” (Cunningham, et al 1990:150, 152). 
The need for statutory regulation has also been argued in a variety of texts during the 
years (Williams 1984:36-38; South 1985:72-79; Jones and Newburn 1996:113; Flynn 
1997:202-203; Irish Government 1997:47, 62; Button 1998a:20-21; United Kingdom 
Government 1999; 2000; Scottish Executive 2001; Queensland Government 2006d; 
Zedner 2006: 267, 274; Berg 2007:15-16).  
A majority of countries have followed this path. There are some scholars supporting 
self–regulation, partly mixing the needs of statutory control and commercial quality 
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control (Sarre and Prenzler 1999:20-21; 2005:208; Connors, et al 2004:152-153). There 
are no practical examples of successful models in this context; neither are there 
examples of negative licensing or de-regulation of private security in any regulatory 
regime (Queensland Government 2003:87-95). There are some mixed systems, for 
example in Estonia and Sweden, where industry associations are partners in licensing 
procedures, but the actual decision making remains a state monopoly even in these 
cases. The alternative voluntary code of conduct has been evaluated by Queensland 
Government (2003:86-87) authorities, but most of its impacts were considered negative. 
Self-regulation is used with varying success only in those regulatory regimes where 
specific legislation is lacking. One of the main problems with the industry's own rules is 
that sanctions are not working (de Waard 1999:170). Trends in commercial security 
development, which includes more and more sophisticated and especially public duties, 
are generating pressures to expand and deepen statutory regulation. 
Harmonised or local regulation? 
There are some segments of (commercial) security that are steered by transnational 
treaties or directives. These agreements are binding for the countries and must be 
followed nation-wide; regardless of the regulation model used or even if specific 
regulation does not exist. It is also highly improbable that the implementation of these 
treaties could be or would even be allowed to be executed using local self-regulation. 
For those countries with a decentralised federal governance model, the first question in 
commercial security regulation is whether it should be drafted by the central 
government or whether it should be the responsibility of the states. ‘Steering’ of 
commercial security has been left in most federations to the states (equivalent), as in 
Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.  
In countries with special autonomous areas38 guarding is often left to their local rule. 
Even in the EU, where principally business is free across the borders of the states, 
(commercial) private security is regulated solely by each member country. In most 
countries/states that have these 'split' regulation models, there have been pressures to 
develop cross-border uniformity in legislation, which in practice is a step towards 
federalisation. The practical problems arising from local regulation models are: 
 A need for separate company or individual license when moving from one 
regulatory regime to another.  
 Different firearm laws. 
 Organising work when crossing state borders (especially CIT). 
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 Different requirements on individual suitability and training. 
 Inadequate possibilities for background screening. 
Discrepancies arise primarily from the fact that in actual federations as well as in free 
market areas, the companies and individuals are, in principle, free to move and trade or 
work across the borders, but not in commercial security. The regulation models and 
practices have not been brought up on the same level with the development of the 
security industry’s activities. It will be hard to improve the situation because of basic 
political realities, that is, state and autonomous regional independence. Even if the 
benefits of a centralised regulation model are recognised in the commercial security 
context, there is hesitancy to make this industry an exception, fearing that it will 
become a precedent for federalising other legislation too (US Government 2006a; 
2006b). There are, however, some exceptions, such as the decision by the Scottish 
Executive (2001; 2004) to join the UK legislation and the COAG work in Australia to 
move ahead in this question (The Council of Australian Governments 2008; Davitt 
2010; Sarre and Prenzler 2011:81). Within the bulk of the industry, there is genuine 
willingness, mainly for business reasons, to have streamlined cross-border regulation 
(De Clerck, et al 2007:28-29). 
The question has also been on the table in the EU and it seems that the authorities have 
a willingness to solve this matter. During the French presidency (2008), a white paper 
was published. The introduction of the paper stated that (INHES and CoESS 2008:5): 
“Taking into account the culture and laws of the different Member States, the goal 
is to harmonise labour regimes and dialogue in order to coproduce public-private 
security solutions. The private sector must constructively strengthen its ties with 
the European Commission. Existing needs will force us to define common rules, 
and make harmonisation of national laws and European-wide legislation of private 
security indispensable. …All players in the security industry must strive to 
organise the sector, to promote its economic expansion, and to harmonize 
European laws. These objectives have to be shared by all European partners if we 
are to assure ever more security for our citizens”. (Nicolas Sarcozy) 
Harmonisation, which is very much connected to the general governance, will not be 
solved in the near future. This means that the possibilities to develop commercial 
security will be hindered by matters that are very much outside its sphere of influence. 
The sacred principle of state sovereignty will be hard to jeopardise because of 
commercial security needs.  
There are also pressures to harmonise regulation in Africa. The growing number of 
PMSCs has turned the whole industry a target of discussion. There are, mostly amongst 
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the academics and NGOs, ideas and models created to have harmonised regulation for 
the PMSCs throughout the continent. The problems are different from those faced in 
other regulatory regimes under study and do not actually touch on the traditional 
commercial security work or its regulation handled in this study. This question is, 
however, a future case for harmonisation, affecting strongly the whole industry 
(Gumedze 2008:18-23). 
Uniform or segment diversified regulation? 
There is also a more practical need, to decide if all commercial security activities should 
be regulated within the same legislation. There is already today a clear ‘verticalisation’ 
(De Clerck, et al 2007:20-24, 39) of the different segments within the commercial 
security industry. This trend is becoming stronger as the industry gets more 
sophisticated and professional while simultaneously entering new areas of activity
39
. 
The consequences of this development can already be seen everywhere because of 
transnational rules, for example in aviation security, and growing diversification in local 
commercial security activities. A specific aspect of this phenomenon has been present 
historically in some countries. Private security regulation has been divided technically, 
for example, in Belgium, Finland and Sweden according to the powers (and tasks) 
approved for different security providers.  
Diversification in legislation does not necessarily mean that the administrative 
responsibilities and control of the industry should be divided. This is, however, often an 
inevitable course in order to ensure the practical knowledge and professional touch of 
the responsible authority. It seems to be of great importance to find a way and to decide 
with care how commercial security activities, with all the inevitable structural changes, 
could and should be regulated and controlled in the future in a streamlined and most 
effective way by the authorities.   
6.2 All over administrative responsibilities in regulation governance 
Arranging total administrative responsibility concerning commercial security  
When planning comprehensive governance of commercial security activities in a 
regulatory regime, a fundamental decision has to be made about the state ministry or 
department that will have the leading role, powers and responsibilities in commercial 
security related matters. The obvious solution would be to have just one authority in 
charge, but the diversification and verticalisation of commercial security areas of 
activity as well as the internal power struggle between governmental departments makes 
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this difficult if not impossible. For example, in general the ministry of the interior wants 
to rule on policing related matters, the ministry of communications and transport on 
aviation, port and transport chain security, the ministry of finance on cash handling 
security, the ministry of justice on court security and private correctional services, and 
so on. This is the verticalisation trend phenomenon in terms of governments. In 
practice, there are today three alternatives for a coordination authority: the ministry or 
department in charge of law enforcement, the ministry or department in charge of trade 
and commerce, or the ministry or department in charge of licensing and fair trade.  
The decision on the division of labour is made in practice according to:  
 The local political assessment of what commercial security really is and what 
roles it is supposed to have in the society. 
 The history and tradition of handling the control of businesses subject to license. 
 The administrative structure of the government and the easiest and cheapest way 
to handle commercial security control. 
From the state’s standpoint, commercial security has often been viewed as such a small 
and marginal matter that usually just the most practical and convenient way has been 
chosen. However, as the commercial security industry has started to become a more 
important and more sophisticated provider of public security in societies this default 
position has shifted.  
In practice, a vast majority of the regulatory regimes (about 90%) has put private 
security under the ministry of the interior/security (equivalent) or justice (Hakala 
2007:6). This emphasises the present commonplace understanding that commercial 
security activities are some form of ‘policing’. The decision to have the administrative 
‘home’ of commercial security control within the ‘police family’ in the governance 
models is remarkable as it affects and steers the all-over development and practical 
solutions in regulation work and thus impacts its future development. It is obvious that 
the emphasis of the ministry responsible of security and/or police is different from the 
emphasis of the ministry of trade and commerce or the ministry responsible for general 
licensing in the society.  
When making the decision on the administrative home, consideration must be given to 
how dialogue with the different interest groups will be handled. For effective steering of 
the practices and development of the security industry, a permanent (regulated) advisory 
committee, run and chaired by the ‘security’ ministry and consisting of representatives 
from different interest groups, could be an adequate tool (Finnish Government 2003; 
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Sarre and Prenzler 2005:197-198). Experience shows that without this kind of co-
operation, authorities experience problems in following up the developments of the 
industry and the acute problems and needs affecting and pushing regulation 
development. On the other hand, the industry also needs to have streamlined and 
organised professional representation in this connection (Grabosky 1995; 1999; Sarre 
and Prenzler 2005:212-213) which is not always easy, taking into consideration the 
growing diversification and verticalisation trends within commercial security industry. 
The organisation of day-to-day administration of commercial security 
The matter of day-to-day administration and control of the industry is more a practical 
and economic (resource) question, and the solutions chosen are very much connected to 
the existing administrative models of the regulatory regimes and how they can be 
utilised in this context. The implementation part of regulation has usually been given 
less actual thought, and the consequences of insufficient solutions have not been fully 
understood. A regulation in itself has little impact if it is not rigorously applied. The 
reason for ‘light touch’ control is sometimes inadequate funding, which affects the work 
in several ways (Stenning 2000:340; Sarre and Prenzler 2005:210). As in the case of 
administration, the optional solution would be to have one ‘independent’ authority 
(executive) that handles all day-to-day matters related to commercial security regulation 
implementation. This is not possible in all regulatory regimes, mostly because of 
practicalities on the grass roots level. There are four main models to be found in this 
context: 
 An implementation structure based solely on police administration and control. 
 An ‘independent’ authority in charge of all commercial security regulation 
implementation. 
 A licensing authority taking care of commercial security regulation 
implementation as one part of its work. 
 A mixed system with two or more authorities being responsible for different 
aspects of commercial security regulation implementation. 
The pilot study (Table 13) showed that the administrative division of labour in the daily 
licensing and control of the industry and its personnel indicated a strong connection 
between private security and general law enforcement (police) activities. The police 
were the main body responsible for both the licensing and the control of private security 
officers in over 50% of the 36 regulatory regimes included fully in the pilot study. 
Departments and agencies connected to the ‘security’ ministries were the other main 
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actors in this field. These results indicate that the police in many regulatory regimes are 
in a pivotal position to steer the commercial security industry and the co-operation 
between public and commercial security actors. In this kind of set up, it is not easy to 
separate public, institutional and private interests in a decision-making situation. In 
accordance with Prenzler and Sarre’s (2005:73-74) conclusions, one can ask whether an 
active police presence guarantees the best division of labour and use of the private 
security resources in general. The administrative models are also very much connected 
to the legal systems and governance cultures of the regulatory regimes. An example of 
this is the role of provincial authorities as the main administrators in countries with a 
tradition of strong regional authority. Commercial security in the Anglo-American 
countries is least influenced by police, as those countries have the administrative 
tradition of ‘independent’ agencies for licensing and its control. Lately, however, a 
trend to have police more involved, even in these regulatory regimes, can be noticed. 
6.3 The reality in organising the core duties in regulation implementation  
The administrative model chosen for routine control crucially affects the effectiveness 
and professionalism of the execution of commercial security regulation. In practical 
regulation implementation, the core responsibilities to be organised or controlled by the 
authorities are: 
 Licensing procedures as a whole. 
 Background screening. 
 Compulsory training arrangements.  
 Submission of certificates and ID cards. 
 Follow-up and inspections on compliance with the regulations. 
All of these duties are such that it is almost impossible to delegate them to private actors 
if an adequate regulation system is the ultimate goal. 
Licensing procedure 
In the licensing procedure, the first question is how the granting of the licenses will be 
taken care of? Will there be one centralised authority with adequate subsidiaries, or will 
the licensing be handled in co-operation with local authorities that also have other 
administrative (licensing) and operational functions? There are at least three main 
models in use today: 
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 Centralised: all licenses are granted by one authority (e.g. BE, DK, NY and ZA). 
This model may work technically well if the authority is, for example, the 
police, with a centralised organisation.  
 Decentralised: licenses are granted by local (provincial) authorities in parallel 
with other duties (e.g. FR, IT and SE). In this model, there is a big risk for local 
interpretations and sometimes low administrative knowledge of the regulations.  
 Mixed: where, for example, company licenses are granted by one centralised 
authority but individual licenses by another with a nationally covering 
organisation (e.g. the police in EE and FI). 
The present organisational arrangements in granting licenses are presented in Table 13 
(Hakala 2007:7). As can be seen, over 90% of the regulatory regimes with private 
security legislation have an authority in charge of the approval process. The statistics 
also show that there is a clear difference in authorities responsible for granting licenses 
to companies and to individual security officers. Police administration grants over 50% 
of the individual permits but less than 40% of the security business licenses for 
companies. 
Table 13 Practical regulation implementation - license granting and control 
 
 
What authority/agency… 
Not licensed/  
regulated 
Ministerial 
department/   
agency 
   Police 
authorities 
Provincial 
authority 
  Other 
…is responsible for granting 
licenses to private security 
companies? 
 
        3% 
 
       47% 
 
      39% 
 
        8% 
 
      3% 
…is responsible for granting 
licenses to private security 
personnel? 
    
        6% 
 
       32% 
 
       53% 
 
         6% 
 
       3% 
…is legally responsible for 
 on-going control of security 
companies? 
 
         -- 
  
       44% 
 
       42% 
 
         8% 
 
       6% 
…is legally responsible for 
the on-going control of 
private security personnel? 
 
         3% 
 
       30% 
 
       58% 
 
         6% 
    
       3% 
Day-to-day handling of license applications should be made as smooth as possible for 
individual applicants. There should be systems that allow the ‘customers’ to make their 
application manually or electronically through the internet. For the applicant, the main 
need is to have adequate and simple information on how the procedure is run and what 
steps are required of him/her. It is also important to inform the applicant at the 
beginning of the process as to what factors will prevent the granting of a license. In 
commercial security context, the clean criminal record requirement excludes a relatively 
high percentage of the applicants automatically. In this situation, it is a waste of time for 
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both parties if a person with a certain kind of criminal background puts in an 
application. The application form and papers should not be complicated. This depends, 
however, mostly on the all-over administrative system and how different authorities 
have access to and can use governmental information and data bases.  
The licensing process of security companies differs naturally from that of individual 
security guards. The checks of individual trustworthiness of the applicant(s), however, 
should be at least on the same level for management as for the security officers. 
Usually, when starting a new commercial security company, the general business 
license for it is acquired first and after that an application is made to register it as an 
approved security provider. There is a difficulty in this process on how to exclude 
criminal elements from owning (controlling) a licensed security company when they are 
not included in the operational personnel which is usually more systematically 
controlled.   
With individual licenses, the ideal practice is that the applicant just fills in the basic 
personal data on a form and attaches a couple of photos, the certificate of passing the 
compulsory training (and a medical certificate). Unfortunately, in many cases the 
individual applicant is obliged to provide different other documents as appendages. This 
is partly an outcome of the free movement of work force, which means that there are 
applicants who are not citizens of the regulatory regime where they are applying for the 
license. The time that the handling of an application takes is crucial for the applicants 
but also for the companies and their businesses. The authorities (bureaucracy) and the 
licensees have a different approach to this matter. As there is, in most cases, a rule that a 
security guard cannot start to work before the license has been granted, the duration of 
the licensing process decides how long s/he has to wait for actual employment. Even 
with the best circumstances, it takes a couple of weeks to process a license, but in most 
cases, especially if several authorities are involved, it will take many weeks, even 
months. Commercial security as a business is totally dependent on flexible use of 
employment. If the licensing process does not live up to this requirement, there is a risk 
that employees who are not yet licensed will be put to work by the companies. The 
commercial security is a low-salary industry and it is obvious that if applicants have to 
wait a long time for their license, there is a risk that they will take another job if one is 
available.  
The present form of the issuance of the actual license has to be carefully assessed. Will 
the authority give the applicant a paper certificate or an ID-card? There is a big 
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difference in cost, credibility and usability between these two models. If the authority 
issues only a paper certificate, the possibility of future control is very much lost. On the 
other hand, if an official photo ID-card with all needed information is issued, there is 
the possibility to register it, to cancel it, to renew it, to put extra information of training, 
gun licenses, etc. on or in it. It also gives uniformity in control situations both for the 
authorities and citizens. Despite the indisputable benefits of this kind of certification, 
for different reasons it has not been implemented in all countries. For example, the 
issuance of ID cards/badges is with the companies in New York and Sweden and with 
the association of the security companies in Estonia. Administrative cost factors are 
often quoted in this context, but they can be taken care of by a licensing fee. 
Background and suitability screening 
A core element in the licensing process is the screening of the applicants, which in 
practice usually includes a criminal record check and in some countries also other police 
records. Access to this kind of information is restricted in all countries. Its use by other 
authorities outside the record ’owner’ includes often a lot of bureaucracy. To guarantee 
flexibility, there must be statutory regulations on access rights and procedures for 
information issuance. This means that in practice, swift application handling is 
impossible if special arrangements are not made. The process can be streamlined using 
the latest information technology. Another problem in this context is the coverage of the 
records. It is not acceptable that an applicant is checked only against the local (state) 
criminal records. The credibility of the system and the industry requires in many cases 
(aliens) a more comprehensive check. This means more delays in the handling process, 
if obtaining (trustworthy) information is even possible at all.   
Personal suitability screening, which is included into private security legislation in some 
regulatory regimes, for example in New York and Queensland, is, however, an 
extremely complicated matter to organise. First, it has to be defined how the relative 
individual assessments are made, by whom, what characteristics are included, and how 
the results are documented. Second, who knows the person in a way that he or she can 
give an opinion? For example, if the evaluator in a small town or in the countryside is 
the local police, there may be such knowledge of an applicant, but in a bigger city this is 
quite improbable. Guaranteeing equality and objectivity in this procedure is almost 
impossible. 
The organisation and execution of background and suitability screening shall be such 
that it guarantees a swift, simple, transparent and equal process that serves all the 
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parties: authorities, companies, security officers and the society. In practice this has 
turned out to be a tough challenge for regulators and authorities everywhere. 
Training arrangements 
In a majority of the regulatory regimes, the organisation of compulsory training is 
complicated. It is relatively ‘easy’ to set high compulsory training requirements in the 
regulation, but in many cases the actual content and execution of training has not been 
thought through (Irish Government 1997:7; Yoshida 1999:250-251). It is quite often left 
to the administrative authorities or even the training organisers to decide how it will be 
done. There are three main models for organising the compulsory training to be found 
today: 
 Organised by training companies/institutions connected to the national NVQ 
system, and training programme and trainer approvals are issued by the 
educational authorities (e.g. ZA and QLD). 
 Organised by commercial security companies themselves, by national branch 
associations or by special training companies that are accredited according to 
private security regulation (e.g. BE, EE and SE). 
 Organised and sponsored by the government or institutions controlled/approved 
by it (e.g. DK and FI). 
There are five questions to be considered by the legislators and authorities when 
planning how to organise the practical execution of compulsory training.  
First, should the training be carried out separately or should it be integrated somehow 
with the formal education system? If it is arranged as a part of or connected to the 
general NVQ system, it is easier to have an official status for the training and to arrange 
further education. The handicap can be that decisions regarding the execution will be 
made by authorities who do not have adequate knowledge of the needs and 
requirements of commercial security work.  
Second, who should plan and decide the content of compulsory training? In many 
regulatory regimes, this has been included in the statutory regulation. Often there are 
very detailed stipulations of the length, the subjects of instruction and the examination. 
A strict frame, especially concerning the content of the training may also become a 
handicap when the educational needs change. There should be a system to develop and 
amend the training to some extent without needing to rewrite the statutory regulations.  
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Third, who should be given the right to carry out actual basic training and examinations 
as well as are the security companies themselves considered eligible for this activity? 
Both the certification of the institutes and the trainers need to be organised. Without 
having a clear and controlled system on these matters, the goals set for compulsory 
training may not be reached. The existing models vary from no structure at all to a 
totally state organised education. Traditionally the police have had a bigger or smaller 
role in arranging training. The need and appropriateness for this should also be 
evaluated carefully. Whatever model of training is used, there is a need for a self-
sufficient examination to control the knowledge of the students and the quality of the 
training. 
Fourth, how are the trainers and the training itself certified and controlled? Today there 
are models where the general educational authorities or the ones in charge of all-over 
commercial security licensing approve the training providers and the trainers. An 
important detail is also to regulate who approves/signs the course certificates that are 
needed as a part of the license application. In many of the otherwise well-structured 
regulation models, there is a lack of on-going adequate control of these matters.  
Fifth, how to finance compulsory basic training? The division of costs between the 
state, companies and the applicants has to be carefully balanced. Today there are a 
variety of models where one of these parties carries the whole cost, or it is shared in 
different ways between them. Whoever is the payer; this is a remarkable cost factor, the 
division of which should not be left for the market or companies to decide. 
Control and inspections of commercial security providers 
Even the best possible regulation is compromised if its implementation and control has 
not been organised vigorously. There needs to be pro-active inspection work and robust 
complaint handling procedures. This requires a regulatory authority with adequate 
resources, powers and the co-operation possibilities with other branches of the state’s 
administration. The inspections have to be regular and apply to all companies working 
under the industry specific regulation. To be able to do this work properly, the 
controlling authority needs to have access to all premises and material connected to the 
operations of the licensed security firms. It is also of utmost importance that these rights 
include access to business (and taxation) data and that it is possible to require a firm to 
place any material at the authority’s disposal in advance. The authority need to have 
powers to enforce refractory companies, for example, by a conditional imposition of a 
fine or by cancelling the license. A protocol of the control visit, including the outcome 
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and remarks of the inspection, should be provided for the company with deadlines to 
correct the shortcomings. It is also important that there are resources to check that 
problems have been taken care of within the given time frame. 
Experience shows that a swift mechanism of handling public complaints concerning 
commercial security providers and their behaviour is needed to improve the credibility 
of the industry. Today, in societies where the industry is regulated, this has been often 
arranged with the possibility to make the complaints not only to the police, but to the 
authority responsible for the control of licensed commercial security activities. In some 
countries, complaints can be made even through the internet on the authority’s website 
(e.g. UK and ZA). Having the controlling body as the first point of call in handling 
complaints has turned out to be a working model guaranteeing a more professional and 
faster handling of suspected malpractice. This also helps the authority to have a first-
hand touch on the problems appearing in the licensed activities. Another, extremely 
delicate, question is how to handle whistle blowing reports concerning commercial 
security providers and their customers. This matter has become acute in some countries 
where guards have a regulated duty for reporting certain incidents and crimes, even 
concerning the customers (e.g. ES and SE). 
In the licensing and control of commercial security, there is, as in all activities, the 
question of how to finance the work. There are two practices in use: either the authority 
is funded through state budget, or the security companies pay a license and control fee, 
and the individual security officer’s license has also a price. In most regulatory regimes, 
this has been handled by setting an official price list for these services. 
6.4 Analysis and discussion 
It is in the implementation of regulation, when answering the how to regulate question, 
that authorities face the biggest challenges. This part of commercial security control is 
also predominantly a command and control as well as a top-down governance practice 
(Caparini 2006:263). It would be important that all matters related to the question of 
how to regulate are planned with care. There is a real risk that the emphasis is in the 
writing of the laws and regulations but the organisations and resources to implement 
them are forgotten or neglected. The basic principle should be here as in other 
legislation concerning the operators – trust but control! It is understandable that 
prevailing governance structures steer the legislation work and the control 
arrangements. It is not possible to delegate this to any other (private) party in the 
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society. Enough time and effort need to be used to understand the special features and 
the core matters in regulating commercial security. There are several pragmatic 
structural points to decide in order to be able to steer and develop the governance of the 
industry. It is inevitable that the existing structures will steer the chosen arrangements 
but even so, decision makers should be aware of the consequences that the chosen 
arrangements will bring with them. It is obvious that in all regulatory regimes, the 
structures of the government organisations are not able to adequately steer and control 
the industry’s daily activities and its future development.  
It is not possible within this thesis to handle all of the daily governance challenges 
concerning commercial security. The main issues to take into consideration in this 
context can be listed as follows: 
 A regular analysis has to be made to determine how to adapt the local regulation 
arrangements to the surrounding world as well as how do international 
commitments affect the work. 
 The model of regulation must be constantly considered. Would one piece of 
legislation cover the whole industry, or should it be divided according to the 
segments of activity? 
 The division of labour within the government concerning commercial security 
matters should be decided. Principally at least two layers of authority should be 
appointed:  
 The ministry or ministries responsible for the all-over administration of 
commercial security matters and legislation.   
 The governmental organisations (departments, agencies) being in practice 
responsible for the day to day administration, steering and control of the 
commercial security providers. 
 An all-over framework needs to be created for the practical day-to-day execution 
of commercial security control, including licensing and inspections.  
A directive list of the principal topics to be taken into consideration in the existing and 
future organisations steering commercial security activities is in Appendix 5. A well-
legislated security industry with a professionally organised and adequately resourced 
administrative authority is necessary not only for the commercial security providers but 
also for the society as a whole. Limited resources given to authorities to steer and 
control a dynamic and growing industry will sooner or later backfire.  
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PART II  
THE PRACTICES OF COMMERCIAL SECURITY REGULATION IN THE 
REGULATORY REGIMES UNDER STUDY  
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CHAPTER 7:  GENERAL FACTS OF THE REGULATORY REGIMES  
 
The six regulatory regimes under study have quite different governmental and law 
enforcement structures. They are also very different in geographical size, population, 
history, culture, administration, and wealth. It is difficult, if not impossible, to 
understand the local private and commercial security regulation models without some 
general knowledge of the different societies under study. In order to have basic 
background information to understand the results of the interviews, some general facts 
as well as comparable key figures and data have been collected, presented and 
commented in the following sub-sections.
40
   
7.1 Distinguishing characteristics of the regulatory regimes 
According to general data available
41
 on the six regulatory regimes under study they 
have different state models. Two of them are (constitutional) kingdoms (BE and SE), 
two republics (EE and ZA) and two states in a confederation (QLD and NY). The basic 
models within which their governance is carried out are centralised (EE, ZA and SE) or 
(partly) decentralised (BE, NY and QLD). There are also huge differences in the ‘age’ 
(tradition) of their ongoing governance models. The present state structures have been 
principally in force since
42
: Belgium 1980 (1830); Estonia 1990 (1920-1939); New 
York 1788: Queensland 1901 (1859): South Africa 1994 (1931) and Sweden 1521. 
Within this sample of regulatory regimes it is inevitable that the differences in the 
history and structure of governance models have affected the development of functions 
like law enforcement, commercial security and social dialogue. 
The basic statistical figures of the regulatory regimes in Table 14 illustrate the 
numerical differences between them and show the general sizes of the societies. They 
are important to take into consideration when evaluating some of the differences in 
commercial security arrangements, even if they, by far, do not explain the majority of 
them. If we look at the figures usually used to describe the size of a region, we can see 
their very different geographical sizes from Belgium’s 30.5 thousand square kilometres 
to Queensland’s 1.7 million. Concerning the population, from 1.3 million in Estonia to 
44.8 million in South Africa, and the population density from 2.4/km² in Queensland to 
137/km² in New York. 
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Table 14 National figures of the regulatory regimes under study
43
 
Subject      BE     EE     NY 44    QLD45      ZA      SE 
Surface area km²   30 520  45 100 141 09046 1 722 00047 1 221 037   449 964 
Population '000   10 296    1 370  19 29848    4 182   44 819    8 872 
Average annual change %   +0.4%  -0.4% +0.24%49    +2.350   +1.6%51   +0.3% 
Population density / km²      47    30      13752      2.4      38      20 
If comparing the size of the economies using GDP/GSP
53
 figures, available at the time 
of the interviews of the regulatory regimes under study (Table 15), it can be seen that 
the variations are huge. For example, the GSP of New York is alone bigger than in the 
five others combined. When comparing the figures per capita, the actual wealth of the 
society is revealed. The highest one, that of NY, over 58 000 dollars, is almost five 
times that of Estonia and eleven times that of South Africa.
54
 The number of people 
under the poverty line in the used index is quite indefinite, but gives an indication that 
South Africa has a poverty problem. In the same way there is a remarkable difference in 
life expectancy between South Africa and the other regimes under study.  
Table 15  Economic and social factors of the regulatory regimes under study 
Subject       BE        EE      NY55     QLD56        ZA       SE 
GDP/GSP 57 '000 000 (US$)     386.945      16.089   1.144.481    179.669    247.814   382.825 
GDP/GSP per capita (US$)       37.651      11.743      58.306       42.962        5.123    42.170 
Population below poverty line58 -   
% of all/(present index ranking)  15% /(110)    5%/(139)   12%/(121)         N/A   50%(23)       N/A 
CPI / (present index ranking)59     7.1/ (21)     6.6 / (27)     7.5 / (19)      8.7 / (8)     4.7 / (55)      9.2 / (3) 
Democracy index/(present 
ranking)60   81.89 / (10)  71.69 / (23)  78.22 / (16)   82.00 / (9)  55.52 / (50)   89.54 / (1) 
Life expectancy by birth61- 
ranking/years    33 / 79.07  118 /72.56   47 / 78.14    7 / 81.77  210 / 48.88   10 / 80.74 
Welfare state regime62           2            (3)           1            1          (3)           3 
 
If looking at the less scientific corruption perception index (CPI) and the democracy 
ranking figures, they indicate that Sweden is today among the world’s best in both 
statistics. Out of the six regulatory regimes compared, South Africa has the worst index 
points on both lists, with a ranking of 55 and 50 respectively. An interesting question is 
how does the positioning of the different regulatory regimes in the statistics affect the 
local commercial security activities? 
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7.2. Crime and law enforcement characteristics of the regulatory regimes 
Comparable and reliable crime related statistics and figures are hard, if not impossible, 
to find because of the different ways of collecting and presenting data country by 
country. Nevertheless, in order to gain some understanding about the situation within 
the regulatory regimes under study, some figures have been presented as examples. As 
can be seen in Table 16, there are big differences to be found. The prison population 
varies from the top figure of the United States, 715 inmates per 100 000 inhabitants, to 
75 in Sweden. The homicide rate has been taken here as a comparison indicator of crime 
as it is probably the offence that is defined globally somehow in the same way. It can be 
seen that South Africa has by far the worst situation and Sweden the best. The number 
of police officers per capita varies a lot, which indicates at least two things: the different 
public law enforcement structures of the regulatory regimes under study and their crime 
situation. The figures in all give a glimpse of the reality in the different regimes but it is, 
however, difficult, if not impossible, to draw straight conclusions based on this 
information.  
Table 16 Crime and public law enforcement comparison statistics / per capita63  
     BE       EE      NY64    QLD65      ZA      SE 
Prisoners66 - number of prisoners per  
100 000 inhabitants / (index ranking)   88 / (101)  339 / (18)    715 / (1)  116 / (73)  402 / (10)   75/(108) 
Murders67 - number of murders per        
100 000 inhabitants / (index ranking)    1,5 / (-)   10,7 / (7)     4,3 / (24)   1,5 / (43)    49,6 / (2)      0,9 / (-) 
Murders with guns68 - number of cases 
per 100 000 inhabitants / (index ranking) 
 
 
 
 
    N/A   1,6 / (13)    2,8 / (8)   0,3 / (27)  [72,0/(1)]69      N/A 
Police / Population ratio70 - Police / 
number of inhabitants    1 / 267   1 / 419    1 / 392    1 / 235     1 / 302    1 / 544 
 
Even if the presented figures are not fully comparable, their great variations emphasise 
the big differences these societies have in their geography, population, wealth, 
governance, and crime. When comparing the local commercial security arrangements 
with these, one aspect should be to find out if there are any societal factors that have a 
direct impact on the regulation of the industry.  
The development of commercial security is strongly connected to the structures of 
public law enforcement and policing. The present public police forces in the regulatory 
regimes under study have different ‘historical’ background and constitutional profiles, 
as do the commercial security organisations. To create a platform to understand the size 
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and structure of the security actors in different regulatory regimes under study, some 
(incomparable) information has been presented in the following Table 17.  
Table 17 Public police and commercial security activities in the regulatory regimes 
under study
71
 
Belgium
72
 Decentralised police. There are 196 local police organisations, including altogether 
some 28.500 sworn police officers. On top of this the Federal Police, including some 
12.000 sworn staff, is operating throughout the country.  
There are approximately 200 licensed private security companies with personnel of 
18.500. Over 80% of the security business activities are traditional and performed 
within private premises. 
Estonia
73
 Centralised police. The total police force is some 3.200 sworn police officers. 
The whole police organisation was reorganised (cleansed from Soviet time personnel 
and culture) in 1994. 
There are approximately 250 licensed private security companies with personnel of 
4.300.  
 
New York
74
 Decentralised police. There are some 180 independent local law enforcement 
organisations with approximately 77.000 sworn police officers within NY. On top of 
this there are the federal law enforcement actors operating within the state. 
The number of security companies is N/A. The number of guards is estimated to be a 
little over 100.000. 
Queensland
75
 Centralised police. There are approximately 10.000 sworn police officers in the QLD 
force. The force was totally reorganised in 1989 because of widespread corruption 
and mismanagement. On top of the QLD police the federal police (AFP) is operating 
within the state, including the APS
76
. 
The number of security companies is N/A. Employees can be estimated to be some 
7.500. 
South Africa
77
 Centralised police. The total police force is some 148.000 sworn police officers. The 
police was totally reorganised after the 1994 elections to reflect the new (post 
apartheid) state policies. There are problems with the efficiency and honesty of the 
force. 
There are 6.392 licensed security companies. The number of valid security officer 
licenses is approximately 375. 000. (On top of this there are some 940 000 inactive 
personal license holders.) 
Sweden
78
 Centralised police. The total police force is some 18.300 sworn police officers. 
There are approximately 250 licensed private security companies with 12.000 guards. 
 
7.3 Analysis and discussion 
In this chapter a minimal amount of security related general information and data on the 
regulatory regimes under study has been considered. The significant differences in the 
basic data indicate that they are very dissimilar with regard to the challenges in security. 
Therefore it is important to take into consideration whether and/or how these structural 
differences affect the commercial security and especially its regulation. One obvious 
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example concerns the degree of unionisation and the framework for social dialogue 
between the representatives of trade unions and employers' organisations. Societies with 
a high degree of unionisation as well as strong institutionalised culture of negotiation 
arrangements between the social partners seem to benefit from higher quality of 
commercial security services. It also affects positively the salaries of the guards and cuts 
down their turnover. As can be noticed from Table 18, the strength of unions and the 
cultures of social dialogue within commercial security vary a lot in the regulatory 
regimes under study. 
Table 18 Social dialogue cultures in the regulatory regimes under study 
Belgium
79
 Approximately 85% of the guards are members in three politically based trade unions. 
The private security employers have an association representing the whole industry. 
The collective agreement system is comprehensive (and bureaucratic) covering over 20 
different private security activities today. 
Estonia
80
 Guards are not unionised within any national syndicate. The private security employers 
have an organisation (ASA) representing the whole industry. There are no national 
collective agreements. 
New York
81
 Guards are poorly unionised (partly because of the existing legislation). Their main 
union is SEIU 32B. The employers are partly organised within the local NASCO 
branch but cannot carry on collective social dialogue because of the existing cartel 
legislation. 
Queensland
82
 Only a small part of the guards are unionised at least as guards. The main union 
representing them is LHMU. The main security companies are organised in ASIAL 
which presents the industry on a national level. Locally there are several small 
associations representing different security company groups. 
South 
Africa
83
 
Guards are relatively well organised, having some 15 different unions representing 
them. The most prominent of them is SATAWU which has close connections to the 
ruling party ANC. The employers have a central body SIA representing them in wage 
negotiations. There is a (state controlled) collective agreement procedure which is tried 
to be developed by the social dialogue parties. 
Sweden
84
 Approximately 85% of the guards are members in the STWU union. Over 90% of the 
security companies are members of ALMEGA employer association. The collective 
agreement system is comprehensive, covering all employment within the security 
industry. 
 
Based on the information, some fundamental questions have to be asked: 
 What are the distinctive local reasons for commercial security regulation? 
 Can the notable differences in the status and regulation of commercial security 
be explained by the defining characteristics of a given society? 
 How does the statutory regulation of commercial security reflect the governance 
culture of a given society? 
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 Is the construction of a transnational, cross-border regulatory regime for 
commercial security feasible? 
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CHAPTER 8:  INTERVIEWS - WHY REGULATE? 
 
For the majority of respondents, the question ‘why regulate?’ was an abstract one. Most 
had not given much thought to this matter, unless they had been a part of the actual 
regulation process. It also became obvious in this context that (commercial) private 
security regulation is very much a governmental, top-down, ‘command and control’ 
process. The reasons for regulation had not been discussed or debated widely, neither 
publicly nor within the industry. If dialogue occurred, it was when deciding to draft the 
legislation, not so much later on when amending and developing this legislation. The 
original reasons for regulation seemed to have been forgotten. The interviewees 
provided invaluable previously undisclosed information regarding what they viewed to 
be the real reasons for regulation, reasons different from those stated in the official 
documentation. What follows in this chapter can be considered primarily as a 
supporting part to the thesis as a whole, revealing knowledge that widens, strengthens 
and diversifies the understanding of (commercial) private security legislation processes 
in the different regulatory regimes. 
8.1 Situation in the regulatory regimes under study 
Belgium 
In Belgium, the history of private security regulation dates back to the 1930s, when 
special legislation was implemented to control the threat posed by private militias. This 
was also used later on to control private security companies (CoESS and APEG/BVBO 
2010:22). Three of the interviewees described the historical development very similarly:  
“It was a law, not made for the private security companies but to try to stop the 
fascist groups, military groups as they were in Germany and Italy. The Belgian 
Government was afraid of armed people in uniform working on the street. ...until 
the new law in 1990, every private security company had to show that it did not 
fall under that specific law on private militia.” (Manager)  
The same argument was used also by another expert: “…regulation was needed the 
moment we created the law because it [the control] was relying on a very old legislative 
system from out of the thirties and there the legislation was created especially against 
private militias.” (Expert) A third interviewee concurred but forwarded more general 
needs for industry specific regulation:  
“There was no regulation except the very old law on private militia ... but the 
authorities realised in the 1980s that this law was not enough to stop the enormous 
amount of the so-called guarding companies that were on the market. So that was 
the first reason – to protect the citizens and to build in legislation guarantees that 
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private security activities will not hamper the basic and fundamental rights of the 
citizens.” (Industry expert) 
Some of the interviewees emphasised the violent turbulence of the 1980s (Judt 2005; 
Reynebeau 2005) in Belgium as the main contemporary reason for statutory industry 
specific legislation. Terrorist violence enacted by both right-wing and left-wing militant 
groups threatened the existence of the state:  
“And especially the years of the 1980s were a black period for Belgium. That 
was a period, let us say, of pre-revolutionary movement. … And in this period 
we had a few armed attacks on military bases and on police barracks where high-
tech weapons were stolen and it was known that it was done by other military.” 
(Industry expert)  
Another interviewee commented on the same phenomenon, pointing out the political 
aspect of some of these incidents:  
“We had problems with private militias, especially right-wing private political 
militias due to political reasons related to Belgium. … So right-wing political 
militias were there and also in the ‘80s we were confronted with terrorism. It was 
the first time we had terrorism, political terrorism on our soil.” (Expert) 
The society was also hit during the same period by other acts of unacknowledged 
violence, carried out by clandestine groups: “And also in these days we had, still today 
unsolved, murder teams who killed altogether 29 people especially on Friday evenings 
in the big supermarkets, and also the bombings by a group, bombing especially 
American targets.” (Industry Expert) Another interviewee commented on this being 
pure criminality: “In the 1980s we were confronted with new crime phenomena. We had 
very tough under-world criminality, so there were some gangs that really killed people 
during shopping hours at shopping malls.” (Expert) Some politicians thought that the 
violence was connected to security companies:  
“The politicians in those days believed, and perhaps it is true and nobody knows 
exactly the truth, that there was a possibility that the ‘helping hands’ of all these 
troubles were perhaps people coming from security companies because they had 
some kind of military procedures and so on.” (Industry expert)85 
After the 1988 elections, the new central-left government coalition opted for a new 
criminal policy which included police reform. In addition to reorganising state security, 
the decision was made to regulate private security. The following comment illustrates 
the undercurrents that pushed things forward: “There were political reasons on one side, 
legal reasons because the old law on private militias did not work, and thirdly the 
economic reality of those days.” (Industry expert) On top of the out-of-date legislative 
situation, the more politically sensitive reason cited above was also mentioned by the 
same interviewee: “…there were also these 'put behind' groups discovered and we were 
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afraid that they could be helped by some of the workers or leading people of private 
security companies.” The birth of the new industry specific regulation needs to be 
placed within the all-over situation in Belgium before the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Perceived as vulnerable CNI objects were; for example, the NATO (SHAPE) HQ, some 
of the main EC institutions, the strategically important port of Antwerp, and strong 
American business interests.  
The private security regulation process was government initiated and executed. At that 
time there were no credible professional associations or bodies within commercial 
security in Belgium, representatives of which could have spoken on behalf of the 
industry:  
“There was no association at that moment or no serious association, there were no 
partners, no dialogue, and there were individuals. …the main attitude of the 
individual persons in the different companies was: we don’t want regulation, keep 
out of our business, we are against it.” (Manager)  
The politicians had, however, made up their mind and took a non-negotiable attitude 
towards regulation of the industry.  As described in another comment by the same 
interviewee: “…they said: we will go forward, straight forward and we will do it, if you 
don’t want to talk with us then we will set out our guidelines ourselves, and that was 
what happened.”   
Some of the security industry stakeholders, including the trade unions, did understand 
that strategically the proposed legislative changes could give a boost to the business and 
its personnel. The social partners emphasised the importance of keeping the industry 
‘clean’ and the competition fair: 
“Of course [a minor part of] the industry had another objective, the industry 
wanted really to clean up the markets. The industry wanted clear and strict rules 
for all the players to create a level playing field and the industry wanted in such a 
way to be officially recognised.” (Industry expert) 
“I don’t think we can live without regulation because this is a very difficult 
activity and we need companies and people that we can trust. …It is good that the 
government is looking after that the rules are respected, and they are the same to 
everyone.”  (Industry expert) 
Estonia  
In Estonia, the history of private security regulation goes back to the time the country 
was a part of the Soviet Union. The police had a special ‘guarding’ branch, 
Valvekoondis, which was regulated separately as a state function and headed by a high-
ranking intelligence (KGB) officer. When Estonia became independent, this 
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organisation continued as a state ‘owned’ security company. There was, however, no 
legislation to control security firms founded as private enterprises and this created 
problems: “There was a need to give all, not only the Valvekoondis the possibility to 
offer security services and the law was amended because of that.” (Industry expert) 
The first years of independence saw a number of 'western' styles security companies 
established to fill the vacuum of security services in a paralysed state. The problem was, 
however, that the police force was in turmoil and not trusted. Hence it was not in a 
position to control private security providers. This situation was described very clearly 
by an interviewee who had lived through this period:  
“Before [the new law] there were certain incidents where it was important for the 
private security firms to show their ’muscle’, to be as police. The police were then 
in the first transition phase from the Soviet time militia. The private security firms 
isolated themselves from the militia/police and their credibility was bigger than 
that of the militia/police… If someone had problems with criminals, they turned 
to the private security firms for help. Private security firms which had a 
paramilitary look were born, very impressive, and one was like a people’s defence 
organisation.” (Industry expert)  
This situation was untenable, and a law on private security was implemented. The 
feelings within the government was clear: it is not possible to live without industry 
specific legislation and government control: “I think that if we do not have regulations, 
we will have a lot of problems, a lot of conflicts and … we cannot imagine that there 
was no law and that everyone would work with no system in this thing.” (Industry 
expert) This interviewee further stated that the basic need for regulation was 
experienced in practice very clearly, and there were no alternatives: “It is absolutely 
needed that they [the security providers] do not use [extra] powers and all know where 
the authorities can work and were the private security.” The situation and the needs it 
had created were expressed as the same but in a more diplomatic way in another 
comment: “'There are probably two aspects to that: firstly that there was a public 
interest to regulate private security activities and secondly ... in 1993 here in Estonia, 
the situation then was a little different from the present one.” (Industry expert) The 
interviewee emphasised that security industry was very young and immature and 
obviously needed some control and steering: “The first private security firms had then 
operated only for two years and the whole market was in a stage of development, and 
the state felt that this activity should be regulated.” 
The basic rights of the citizens were, and are, a sensitive question in a former 
communist country where, for example, privacy had been jeopardised systematically by 
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the state organs for 50 years. Even if the times had changed, the behaviour of the state 
representatives and people in general did not change overnight. The society functioned 
very much like the 'wild west', the strongest and boldest as ‘top dogs’.86  
In the Estonian environment, a clear division of labour was emphasised as the powers 
and roles of the police and commercial security providers had become blurred during 
the first transition years: “It is needed that they [security companies] do not use extra 
powers they do not have and do know where the authorities can operate and where the 
private actors, where the domain of one starts and of the other ends.” (Industry expert) 
The need for clear boundaries was also emphasised by an operational industry 
representative, calling for a clearer division of labour: “I think that some kind of 'sand-
pit' needs to be defined by regulation. What belongs to the police and what to the private 
security?” (Manager) The security industry quickly recognised that state regulation 
would give it credibility and would also strengthen its business position:  
 “They [the industry] understood that regulation of the business environment helps 
their own business and forces out dubious persons. …control from the state 
convinces also the customers that those firms which were registered have some 
basic guarantees that one was not dealing with such dubious characters and there 
were no persons with a criminal background involved.”(Industry expert)  
New York 
In New York, the security industry was regulated for the first time in 1994 in the 
aftermath of the World Trade Center bombings of February 1993. This was preceded by 
Security Guard Act 1992 which focused on guard licensing and training. After 9/11 
terrorism has dominated the discussion of security in general and also the opinions 
expressed on the need to regulate more comprehensively non-governmental security 
providers. It is interesting to note in this connection that New York State did not see any 
need to rewrite its laws on private security after 9/11. That the Twin Tower catastrophe 
affects the local experts' thinking on private security can be noted from many of the 
interviewee comments.  
“I might point out that while 9/11 has made a difference that will always be there, 
I think the difference might be dissipating somehow at a phase that is hard to 
measure. No matter how many years there is away from 9/11 - that will always be 
a factor that changed the security industry or paddock of the security industry in a 
way that will never go back before 9/11.” (Industry expert)  
Security professionals were pragmatic on the need to renew the New York State private 
security regulation in the aftermath of the incident. They considered the matter to have 
been taken care of already eight years back after the previous (first) attack was made: 
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“The government of New York State did not do much because the security in New 
York City had been upgraded after the 1993 World Trade Center bombings. Most 
of the needed improvements had been made – not much more to be done.” 
(Expert)  
In the opinion of one industry manager the terrorist threat is actually having little 
regulatory or steering implications for the security industry: 
“We do not fight terrorism as an industry, but the politicians do not have the right 
picture of the division of labour. ...our industry with its needs is not at their top 
priority list. Terrorism is not driving the industry as a business. The economy is 
driving the speed of the industry growth, no doubt.” (Manager)  
Putting aside terrorism, regulation is accepted as a ‘necessary evil’ in order to have a 
structured and controlled industry:  
“Private security regulation is needed. Generally in the United States there is very 
little regulation. Nobody loves regulation in the United States. The number one 
reasons to regulate here are to keep out criminals from the industry and today also, 
after 9/11, to prevent infiltration of terrorists [sleepers] in private security 
organisations, those collecting information to be used in terrorist attacks.” 
(Industry expert) 
Regulation is not a priority concern for the industry’s different interest groups in the 
United States, In the New York context, from a trade union perspective, the strategy 
chosen on regulation is as follows:  
“I think that ideally this Union believes that making a convincing argument to the 
business world and having the standards raised in this century in the industry, it 
should happen on a voluntary basis without legislative requirements. This is a 
better way to go and this is the path that this union has pursued for the last few 
years.” (Industry expert) 
There is also support for statutory regulation and a wish for better control as can be seen 
from the following comment:  
“I think the regulation is needed ... we are leading the industry but as everybody 
of the smaller companies are fouling up, what should we do – we would like to be 
on the same level or the same playing field and be with the same advantage with 
everyone.” (Manager) 
As can be noted from this opinion, the regulation and the implementation of the rules 
are, at least in the eyes of some of the licensees, uneven. 
The reasons and actors triggering regulation in New York were not that clear. 
Commentaries on the actual problems were not forthcoming: “I think there were some 
high profile issues and situations with the security officers ... it was just the Wild West, 
Wild West. Absolutely no constancy with customers.” (Manager) In another comment 
by the same interviewee, one of the problems was described: “You had companies 
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where you literally could walk in, [they] hired a security officer off the street, maybe 
working a post in an hour.” It is not even that clear exactly who was pushing the 
legislation:  
“I believe it was political. That’s my understanding.... But I don’t believe the 
industry was sophisticated enough at that point from my recollection to be 
pushing it. The industry probably resisted it to some extent. I think it is now that 
we are more ready to increase regulation.” (Manager) 
The industry has not been proactive in pushing the legislation, so the initiatives have 
come from the State Legislature:  
“There are no specific groups who are active with the legislation. In the State 
Legislature it is very much up to single representatives to highlight private 
security, which was the case in 1994. Presently there does not seem to be anyone 
who is especially focusing on private security legislation.” (Industry expert)  
The New York interviewees did not have many comments on the need for regulation.  
In addition to the comments above, there were some other opinions that touched on 
regulation. One of them, from a customer, was very precise: “We do not want to have 
criminals within the industry. The clients would not be very happy about that.” (Expert) 
The same interviewee also commented on the regulation needs concerning 'bouncers' 
who are not regulated in New York State today. “There have been incidents when the 
bouncers87 have raped and killed their intoxicated patrons. This has got a lot of media 
publicity; the licensing of bouncers has been discussed.” The matter is, however, not 
considered primarily a private security or commercial security matter but more a public 
order question related to licensed venues that are within the domain of other legislation 
and the police:  
“Nothing has happened in reality, let us see. The police have been active in this 
area using the powers rising from other regulation [alcohol licenses]. The state as 
such has not been strict and has not used even the existing powers in full to affect 
the situation.” (Manager) 
Queensland 
In Queensland, the history of private security regulation dates back to the beginning of 
the 1990s. In Australia as a whole, private security as well as commercial security are 
considered and seen by the citizens as analogous to the police. This perspective 
naturally affects all the measures taken in the legislative work concerning the industry. 
In general, the basic thoughts of the industry experts on the need for regulation can be 
found in the following comment: “The need is there because the police themselves have 
to be regulated.” (Manager) 
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There is disproportionate public attention paid to crowd control enacted by security 
door staff or ‘bouncers’ as a part of the security activities in Queensland when 
compared to the other regulatory regimes (Sailer 2001; Prenzler 2005b:51-52; ASIAL 
2006; ABC Radio National 2006)88. The publicity given to both night-time public 
disorder and ‘bouncer’ violence has been the main trigger for private security 
regulation: 
“Our Act was passed by our parliament in 1993 and it was in response specifically 
to our problems that the community was finding with crowd controllers - 
bouncers. ... That area of the industry is most visible, bouncers in night clubs, 
bouncers in other liquor licensed premises. Because there is such a high 
interaction primarily with members of the public and there is alcohol involved, it 
will always attract the most attention.” (Industry expert) 
“The history of security, particularly the crowd controllers, particularly the 
bouncers was not very good. We had some violence, some criminal elements 
within the industry. …some security people actually acting as villains rather than 
security.” (Manager) 
“The incidents that prompted the government to act [were connected to] crowd 
controllers who had to deal with situations ending with a guy dropping dead. ...If 
there are no incidents occurring or the public is not out-crying the heavy-
handedness of bouncers, really everything else goes along smooth.” (Manager)  
The ‘bouncers’ working environment as such is not that different in Australia from 
other regulatory regimes. One of the expert interviewees, who had firsthand experience 
in door supervision, described the reasons for the violence of Australian night-time 
economy in the following way: 
“In 1978-1979 thereabouts was the first time in hotels, in pubs, in licensed venues 
that the publican, the owner of the venue actually hired someone in to deal with 
the drunken lads. Prior to that time the publican himself, the bar attendants were 
expected to deal with them. But the culture regard to drinking, the culture how 
hotels have changed dramatically in the last few years, the number of liquor 
outlets is probably fifty times over and therefore the number of people frequenting 
on this ground. In the seventies hotels were bound to close at 10pm, now they run 
24 hours. So it is a major change in culture in our society and it is also the same in 
the name of crowd controllers. This is meeting the society’s demands.” 
“With my experience in the early eighties there was some very hard men doing 
the job and society’s culture was also very hard on drinkers. But it was fair and 
just – someone did the wrong thing, he got thrown out and that was that. Then the 
light ideas in the early ‘90s [changed the situation], the crowd controllers and 
bouncers entered the industry thinking that this is a way to pick up girls, this is a 
way of getting a fraud and getting paid for it, this is a way to beat up drunks and 
having virtually no accountability.” 
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For this interviewee: 
“Who’s pushing this [regulation]? The media has a big say. ...It is in the media, in 
the newspapers, in the TV - again the government has to react. So I guess it is a 
combination of things. If you would say that the media represents society’s 
thoughts, then the push is coming from the society, and then of course if you said 
the government represents the society, they are putting in place society’s 
requirements.” 
Focusing on ‘bouncer’ violence was, however, considered unfair by the majority of the 
industry representatives: “I would say that I think in Australia and Queensland the 
crowd controllers and bouncers make about 20% of the industry but they carry about 
80% of the bad press, and it is almost all on assaults or neglect of patrons.” (Expert) 
In several comments, the diversification of the police was mentioned as a challenge and 
a reason for regulation. Especially in Queensland, out of the six regulatory regimes, it 
seemed that police and private security personnel were viewed in the same light as 
professional groups by the ordinary citizens. The dilemma was reflected in comments 
like: ''The difficulty in Australia with regulations, as private security industry goes, has 
been in the past and continues to be that it’s seen very much as a police oriented issue.” 
(Expert) Even a local academic saw the two different security organisations as being to 
some extent similar: “And I see security work as analogous to policing, public policing, 
and we do know after many enquiries and scandals that public policing is simply an 
occupation that is at high risk of corruption and misconduct.” (Expert) A third 
interviewee revealed that in the eyes of the public, all uniformed personnel was 
expected to act as police: “There was a big gap between what people’s perceptions are 
as far as someone in a uniform is concerned. So if someone is staying outside a building 
with a uniform on, people almost expect him to be as a police officer.” (Expert) 
There are widespread concerns expressed about the terrorist threat, especially on the 
governmental and expert level. How much of this feeling is based on real risk and how 
much is politically motivated, is difficult to say. However, this topic was presented by 
an interviewee as a reason to change official thinking about and the modus operandi of 
commercial security: “…there is another factor, bigger [than the bouncer] factor, you 
know, wider factor, which is terrorism”. (Expert) This interviewee recognised that that 
in order to handle the terrorism threat, the existing state capacities were not sufficient 
and new thinking and new co-operation models had to be found. “In Australia, 
including Queensland, since 9/11 there is a new rhetoric about public-private 
partnership, using private security in the front-line against terrorism.”  
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On top of the ‘bouncer’ problem and counter-terrorism, more traditional reasons to 
regulate were mentioned. The impact that the growth of the industry has had on the need 
for regulation was also pointed out in an answer to the question of whether we can live 
without regulation: “I don’t think we can because the security industry has now become 
that large and interacts with all various facets of community and commercial life. There 
needs to be some form of check and balance of this watchdog.” (Industry expert) The 
position of trust private and commercial security providers hold and the need for this to 
be guaranteed by statutory regulation and control of their suitability (integrity) was 
obvious. Two most pragmatic (universal) interview comments point out this:  
“If you are going to give the keys to somebody to look after your place, you want 
to make sure that they are honest. So I think the act does have a role to play in 
respect to trying to, at least to filter out some of the undesirables in respect to that 
certain position of trust.” (Expert)  
 “Absolutely we need it [regulation]… It is mainly the credibility of [private] 
security. Without regulation, there used to be cowboys, and anyone could do 
anything and to have any respect from the public it needs to be legislated so that 
you are recognised as respectable.” (Manager) 
South Africa 
Private security regulation started in South Africa in the 1980s in a self-regulation 
fashion, sponsored primarily by the industry itself. The situation changed completely in 
2001, when the South African Government implemented a new law that excluded the 
industry from the regulation function in a highly politicised situation. The background 
history to this regulation has many ‘colours’, from allegations of industry’s crimes 
during the apartheid struggle to its enormous growth based on insecurity created by all 
sorts, but especially levels of violent crime after the transition.  
However, the main reason for this was that the industry was ‘white’ dominated and a lot 
of ex-civil servants of the apartheid regime, connected to security, had transferred into 
the industry during the turbulent transition period. Consequently, in a post-apartheid 
context, the security industry was considered to be a potential national security threat. 
“Practice of the occupation in the state influences the national interests and then 
obviously as well the industry itself, that’s the primary reason why we are 
regulated – to ensure that they [the security providers] are acting in the national 
interest of the state and the public interest of the state today.” (Industry expert) 
“But I think the main thing that picked it up from where it was, self-regulated, to 
be seriously government regulated, was the political changes and that sections of 
the security industry are a serious threat to the national security and that’s what 
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changed it from being completely self-regulated to 100% government regulated. It 
was a political decision.” (Expert)  
“The government did become involved as well when we had a transition in our 
country and I think the government saw that they have to play a role, give 
perception because basically a lot of the so-called previous armed forces, previous 
intelligence operators, and previous police people found a new place in the 
security industry in South Africa” (Industry expert)  
The opinion that private security is considered a kind of a paramilitary force in South 
Africa was strengthened by a union interviewee: “If the sector is not correctly regulated, 
it may compromise state security.” (Industry expert) 
Also other, more general, reasons for regulation concerning the size of the industry and 
its impact on the society’s crime control were brought up by the interviewees:  
“There were more private security officers than police officials. This development 
started creating problems or created the fears about the industry. The [regulation] 
triggers were still highly political perceptions.” (Expert) 
 “I think here in South Africa there needs to be some sort of regulation. The 
industry has grown to an industry that in the current situation has more private 
security officers than police officers.” (Expert)  
On top of the growth factors, other reasons given for regulation in South Africa reflect 
those found in the other regimes under study. For example, comments were made on the 
protection of basic rights, self-regulation failure, the risk posed by criminal elements 
infiltrating the industry and inappropriate use of powers. The following simple 
comment on the protection of citizens is descriptive: “So I think it is an industry that 
cannot be without regulation and for the very reason that it affects every citizen's private 
rights.” (Expert) In the South African context the need of control to keep criminal 
elements out of the industry was seen as a strong argument supporting regulation: “The 
purpose of employing security is to protect your own interest, and basically not 
employing criminals that will damage your business. So that is basically the major 
reason for regulating this industry.” (Industry expert) This was also mentioned by a 
union representative as one basic reason for regulation: “So in the beginning it was 
more to regulate the criminal activities.” (Industry expert) The need to control the use of 
powers was also brought up: “Besides that I think the Act have the aspects to ensure 
that police powers are not extorted, to ensure the security officer is properly trained in 
the work they do, etc, etc.” (Industry expert)  
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Sweden 
In Sweden, private security legislation was implemented in 1951 as a result of intensive 
lobbying by the industry itself. A Royal decree provided the possibility for a security 
firm to be voluntarily approved and registered by the authorities. Even the present 
legislation, which came into being in 1974 and requires compulsory licensing of 
security providers, was written without any specific pressures or trigger incidents: 
“Why we actually chose to eliminate the voluntary system and go over to the 
compulsory one, I don’t know, I don’t think, and I have not heard that there were 
bad experiences that motivated it, but somehow the state considered that there was 
a reason to fully regulate this [industry].” (Industry expert) 
There was, however, a strong push from the industry to have security providers’ status 
strengthened and formalised by compulsory regulation. 
As there were no actual triggers pushing the original legislation, the reasons given for 
regulation by the interviewees were general in nature. Their comments also reflected the 
local welfarist culture of Sweden by emphasising the protection of the society, citizens 
and customers.  
“It can be said that there are two objects to be protected. The first and the 
important one is consumers. ...because of the reasons why they look for these 
services, they are in a vulnerable position. The second object is the society, the 
state, which wants to guarantee that this activity will not get such dimension that 
it can be compared with police work.” (Industry expert) 
 In another context, the same interviewee commented once more on the importance to 
differentiate commercial security activity from police work by saying:  
“The boundary between private security activity and police activity has to be 
clear, and it must be maintained. This was, as I see it, one of the important reasons 
that a total regulation was implemented, so that the society got control over 
guarding, and that it had not a policing character.” 
A union representative emphasised the need to control personnel: “Because it is the 
private firms that sell guarding, there shall be regulation which tells how to behave, and 
that the personnel of the firms are controlled regarding integrity and suitability. So I 
think absolutely that regulation is needed.” (Industry expert) The significance of the 
industry and its work was also brought up in this context: “Guarding companies perform 
work which is very important for the society. That is why it is also in the interest of the 
society to have this activity regulated.”  
A comment given in the Swedish context could be extended to all ‘why regulate?’ 
discussions: the risks to be without regulation on private security:  
124 
 
“I think a society without this regulation would face a risk of having a private 
police which is not under anyone’s direction or control. And I think that anyone 
can imagine the risks this would include, really. So I will argue that an 
unregulated situation opens a shocking perspective.” (Industry expert) 
 In 2007, the private security regulation that had been in intact for thirty years was 
amended drastically when a wave of extremely violent CIT robberies triggered an 
unprecedented crisis (Svenska Bevakningsföretag 2005) for the security companies.
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Comments from two interviewees describe the situation and their feelings about 
regulatory needs in this situation. The first interviewee talks about the process that made 
the authorities act:  
“I think if we look at the latest amendment [in private security regulation], it was 
those CIT robberies at the end of 2005, when the occupational health and safety 
ombudsmen intervened and stopped the activity, and the national occupational 
health and safety board was called in.” (Industry expert)90 
The other interviewee points out the peculiarity of this case: the Health and Safety 
Administration had to be called in by the guards’ labour union to persuade the 
politicians to act.  
The background and steps taken were well explained by an industry expert interviewee, 
who analysed the process and the reasons that forced the government to take action. It is 
a good example of real life governance complicity and how even well-prepared and 
reasoned proposals for private security regulation amendments often need some 
triggering incident(s) in orders to be taken seriously by the politicians: 
“It is often in the society so that a dramatic incident occurs which acts as an alarm 
clock. When we are talking of this regulation and this activity, we have the CIT 
robberies that occurred [in Sweden], especially since 2005 and after, as such 
alarm signal.” 
“The difference with the [earlier] wave of robberies was the violence. It was 
suddenly not only threatening of guards to take money from them. Heavy 
weaponry was used and roads were closed, vans were blown up to acquire the 
possession of valuables, and there was such an aggression in these robberies that it 
really scared the society and it scared the politicians. It was obvious, even on the 
political level that radical steps had to be taken.”  
“It ended actually to one of the fastest legislative procedures I have seen, [which 
was carried out] within less than six months. We feel that we [regulators] got 
much understanding for the old propositions we had made in the course of years.”  
“Yes, it woke up both the industry, it woke up the public, and awareness of this 
branch in general was generated amongst the political sector. At the same time, it 
was reasoned that here we have a law which in general had been unchanged since 
1974 [30 years]. The real life which was the base of that law was the one that 
prevailed in the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. That reality cannot be 
found any more, it is something radically different we have to face today. So it 
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became obvious to all who were involved in this law work that actually we would 
need a new regulation, we would need a comprehensive study which would 
oversee the whole activity and examine it, based on those circumstances we have 
today.” 
Sweden is in one sense different from the other regulatory regimes in this study because 
it has a tradition of granting extra powers to certain groups within the private security 
family. One of these groups is the crowd controllers, including licensed doormen 
(ordningsväktare), who have limited police powers. As the night-time economy, 
especially in the big cities, has changed, doormen (as in Queensland) have become a 
‘problem’ group needing a new kind of regulation and control. The situation is well 
described by a union representative who commented on the extra powers:  
“But absolutely the most important thing is that we actually have suitable guards. 
And doormen [crowd controllers] are regulated in another way, as they use 
independent discretion and that is actually police powers. They have to be 
absolutely regulated as they are a part of the monopoly of violence. The state has 
given them extra powers.” (Industry expert)  
There is a problem with restaurants serving alcohol. Other crimes that are often 
connected to door supervision are also a problem in Sweden: “The problem is that a 
restaurant branch is infiltrated by criminal activity in different forms, not least when 
considering taxation, and this goes also for the doormen who shall stay and be the 
extended arm of the police at restaurants.” A lot of thought has been given to solving 
the problems with doormen, but no practical solutions have been found up until now.91 
In the interviews there was also an emphasis on on-going evaluation and the updating of 
regulation to meet the requirements and challenges of a constantly changing security 
environment which the public police have problems to control with their present 
resources:  
“After that [regular risk evaluation] laws and equivalent should be opened up so 
that we can get regulated tasks which actually the authorities or the official sector 
sit on and don’t let them [private security] do. Otherwise there is no-one, no-one 
performing them. That is something I would like to improve.” (Industry expert) 
8.2 Analysis and discussion 
Why regulate? The six regulatory regimes analysed in these interviews have all some 
sort of commercial security regulation originating from different eras. The fundamental 
reasons for regulation were the same, regardless of the model of the society or the local 
stage of development. However, the specific reasons which had triggered statutory 
regulation processes were unique for each regulatory regime. The differences stemmed 
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from the emphasis they had according to their history, culture, political system, 
administrative model, present crime situation, and the role that commercial security 
services had gradually gained in the society.  
Amongst the models of regulation handled in this case study, there was little 
diversification between the interest group emphasis. They gave in general the same 
reasons for regulation and it was more the personal seniority, as well as experience and 
knowledge of the industry that affected the answers, not discrepancies concerning the 
fundamental goals of regulation. Those who had been involved in the process when the 
original laws were drafted and enacted had naturally an advantage in understanding the 
background. It seems that after the drafting and implementation of the (commercial) 
private security legislations, the reasons for regulation had not been discussed very 
much amongst the interest groups either. The present focus was clearly on the existing 
practical details and their adjustment. Only if there were needs to add new areas of 
activity into the laws, could there be some sort of “why regulate?” discussion 
concerning the specific amendments.  
One can ask whether it would be beneficial to have a regular evaluation, as in 
Queensland92 of all the reasons for regulation like in a risk management process 
(Baldwin and Cave 1999:138-149; Kidd 2000:9-10), where the risks and their control 
methods are re-evaluated regularly to ensure the right level of protection in constantly 
changing circumstances.  
All the reasons that originally triggered regulation work in the regulatory regimes under 
study, except Sweden, were some kind of local threats. The same phenomena could, 
however, be noticed later on even in Sweden. These threats were created by: the 
industry’s activities, public safety concerns or concerns about citizens’ human rights. 
The later (present) law development work could be generally considered as the 'fine 
tuning' of the existing statutes.  
None of the ‘trigger’ reasons that emerged during the interviews had a direct connection 
with new governance, mass private property, police versus private security personnel 
ratios, semi-public spaces, or social (in)equality as these factors are presented and 
emphasised in the academic literature. By summarising the knowledge gained from the 
interviews and the other data, the original and present-day reasons for commercial 
security regulations and their amendments in the regulatory regimes under study are 
summarised in Table 19. 
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Table 19 Real life reasons to start and go on with private security regulation 
processes 
Belgium Original: Internal threat to the society 
by, partly politically motivated and 
organised, strong arm and crime 
activities. 
Latest: A need to exclude unsuitable 
‘cowboy’ and criminal security 
providers. 
 
Estonia Original: Transition situation, which 
created a threat of private security 
extorting police powers. 
Latest: A need to sharpen the different 
roles and tasks of private security. 
New York Original: Terrorism threat after the first 
World Trade Center incident. 
Latest: A need to improve the status and 
role of private security providers. 
Queensland Original and latest: Uncontrolled violence by crowd controllers (bouncers). 
South Africa Original: Transition situation where 
private security, managed by a number 
of previous (white) police and army 
personnel, was considered a threat to 
society and national security. 
Latest: Pressures to develop guard 
training regulation and its 
implementation by different authorities 
and the industry. 
Sweden Original: Lobbying by the private 
security industry to get credibility 
through accreditation. 
Latest: Exceptionally violent attacks on 
CIT operations by organised crime. 
 
After the decision to regulate has been made, based on the original ‘trigger’ reasons, the 
law makers and other interest groups seem to use the situation to set other rules as such 
have not been important enough to commence a statutory regulation process. Thus the 
laws usually have other topics added to them to meet some of the various requirements 
presented in Tables 8-10. Also some of the interviewees brought up these requirements, 
if they were seen in their environment to be important to them or their interest groups.  
The following summary of arguments, based on the results of this chapter, can be 
presented for further discussion:   
 The reasons for regulation are looked at, evaluated and discussed when the first 
law on commercial security is written. Later on, the fundamental needs for 
regulation and its implementation structures are not usually re-assessed or 
discussed any more. 
 There seems always to be specific local reasons, related to the regulatory regime, 
that trigger a commercial security law writing process. No global or 
transnational model can be found; every case is local and unique in itself. 
 The local needs that trigger the regulation process stem from the local (political) 
situation, the type of society, and often from dramatic changes or incidents 
which are seen to require state intervention concerning commercial security 
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arrangements (Prenzler and Sarre 2008). Even revision of regulation is often 
triggered by a special incident or an accumulated problem. 
 Trends in governance are not a main driver in this context; the needs and reasons 
for commercial security regulation are specific and rise generally from basic 
human rights and constitutional requirements, and from the need to define the 
public-private division of labour in security related tasks in the society. 
 The growth and size of the industry, mass private property, utilisation of 
citizens’ powers, diminishing police resources, increasing crime rates, quality 
guarantees and other similar matters are just indirect catalysts for commercial 
security regulation. 
 Commercial security regulation is primarily a governmental command and 
control issue. For a majority of the active parties in the commercial security 
sphere, regulation is there to give a frame for the daily work, but it is not such a 
key issue on which they are ready or have time to waste too much energy. 
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CHAPTER 9:  INTERVIEWS - WHAT AND WHO TO REGULATE? 
 
Responses to the question - what and who to regulate? – should in practice be very 
much a technical exercise (Prenzler and Sarre 2008) where the activities, personnel and 
topics are chosen from a relatively predictable ‘menu’ list (Appendix 4). Common to all 
the statutory regulations discussed in this chapter is that they emphasise the sovereign 
authority of the state in security matters, and locally define the legal parameters of 
commercial security activities. Furthermore, unlicensed private security activities within 
areas covered by the industry-specific regulations were unambiguously prohibited. The 
scope and validity of the private security regulations under study were limited within 
the state borders, except in South Africa where the legislation is also applicable to its 
citizens extra-territorially (South African Government 2001:§39). There is an obvious 
reason for this; the different cross-border private security activities by South African 
security providers have affected the societies in Sub-Saharan Africa in different and 
sometimes hazardous ways (Taljaard 2008:1-5; Institute for Security Studies 2008:vii-
xi; Marits and Gumedze 2009:1-5). All these texts emphasise the general problem of 
differentiating PSC and PMC activities, at least in Africa.   
On the one hand, the general status and role of commercial security within national 
security systems and environments, in the regulatory regimes under study, had mostly 
been bypassed by governments in the existing regulations. Out of the six, only the South 
African legislators had defined in detail what the role of private security is from the 
state’s point of view in a national context (South African Government 2001: Preamble). 
On the other hand, when examined, it turned out that all the statutory regulations 
belonging to this study included some sort of definitions or at least a description of what 
private (commercial) security is and/or who is considered to be a private (commercial) 
security provider under their legislation. This is logical because in any legislation the 
objects and subjects of regulation should be defined. In the private (commercial) 
security context the main common nominators to be found somewhat defined and 
expressed were that this kind of security activity is; (a) privately organised and provided 
for a competitive fee, and (b) security service providers shall be licensed and controlled 
by a public authority.   
During more detailed analysis of the regulations, variations became apparent. The 
interviews concerning which subjects and objects should be regulated showed that these 
matters had not been given much thought by the majority of the interviewees. As the 
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core matters in the six regulatory regimes under study were included in the existing 
legislation, the present discussion focuses on contemporary topics and how to improve 
the situation. There were opinions on a general level on what to regulate, but the more 
detailed ‘thinking’ had been left to the regulators, security industry representatives and 
the trade union spokespersons who presented the most structured and far-reaching 
opinions in this context.  
The structure of this chapter is similar to chapter 5, following the model generally used 
in most of the existing private security regulations. Some extracts from the actual laws 
of the different topics handled have been presented in comparable tables as background 
for the interview comments. To be able to do this, and to make the comparisons 
readable in this context, the most common/important titles have been simplified and the 
ideas have been categorised, not necessarily following the legal texts to the letter.  
9.1 General comments on what and who to regulate 
In the general comments given by the interviewees, three main topics arose: what 
explicitly should be regulated, the risks of over-regulation, and a reserved opinion on 
the need for comprehensive regulation.  Mostly there is a general acceptance that the 
whole industry, or at least the key parts and players of it should be regulated. 
“I think the whole industry should be regulated.” (QLD Expert) 
“The companies and the personnel should be regulated.” (NY Manager);  
“I believe that any of the professions or the sectors which have a place in the 
whole package should be regulated. … Everybody who at a certain moment is in 
one way or another protecting for a client something that is of value for the client 
should be regulated.” (BE Industry expert) 
At the same time a majority of the interviewees were quite happy with the breadth of 
their own regulation.  
“I think we cover basically everyone. I cannot see there is any need at this stage, 
you know, to regulate initial categories.” (ZA Industry expert) 
“I have to think hard if I should find more areas to regulate, I think it has been 
handled quite well when looking at what should be regulated.” (SE Industry 
expert)  
There were opinions expressed about the risks of ‘over-regulation’. This seems to be a 
matter debated in some of the regulatory regimes under study. Some critique came from 
Belgium, Queensland and South Africa as the following comments indicate: 
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“…we have to see today that the legislation is becoming a too heavy burden, 
because it is much too detailed. It imposes on the private security companies an 
enormous amount of administrative workload.” (BE Industry expert).  
 “Some would argue we are over-regulated, but it is only small sectors of the 
industry who believe that to be the case. So, we would argue in this state that we 
are not over-regulated.” (QLD Industry expert)  
“I don’t think it is over-regulated, I don’t think so. I think the only problem is 
that it tries with one piece of legislation to cover too many things.” (ZA Expert)  
None of the interviewees advocated de-regulation but different aspects were 
emphasised in the legal approach.  
9.2 In-house security 
Even if in-house security is not actually a part of commercial security, it is indisputably 
private security. Because it overlaps both in a fundamental and a controversial way with 
the commercial security activities, the differences in steering it within the regulatory 
regimes should be pointed out. State control of in-house manned security reflects 
specific local needs and problems which have convinced the regulators to intervene with 
the widely accepted principle of private businesses’ right to organise their own internal 
services without external state interference. It seems that the triggering nominator for 
regulation in this case is the changing environments. It is no longer only a question of 
traditional guarding to maintain order inside a company’s ‘fences and gates’ but also to 
do it within new semi-public or public domains. As long as security officers only dealt 
with a company’s employees and people connected expressly to its actual core business 
activity there was no actual pressure for control. The situation acquired another 
dimension with the growing number of semi-public areas, like malls, event 
areas/facilities and recreation businesses, where persons/customers freely or by paying a 
fee can enter, and where the owners have an interest in and a responsibility to organise 
security. Another challenge is the increased private guarding/policing of public space, 
including government facilities, where security officers encounter citizens running their 
chores. When these kinds of activities are performed by in-house personnel, there could 
be a case for considering regulation. 
In-house security was included in private security regulation in four of the regulatory 
regimes under study: Belgium, Estonia, New York and South Africa. It is partly 
included in Queensland but is completely excluded in Sweden. In Belgium and South 
Africa the control is understandably taking into consideration the earlier mentioned 
country-specific reasons (Table19) for private security regulation. In the interviews, 
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difficulty in explaining the core rationale for in-house security regulation was obvious. 
The backgrounds were not crystallised and there was mostly no conscious awareness of 
the connection to basic principles of companies’ privacy, even if the practical 
challenges were mentioned. The answers of an experienced expert illustrate the 
simplified explanations generally used in support of in-house regulation: “The security 
service providers, the security officers performing as in-house security officers, act very 
much the same as the person that is in contract security, so we believe it is an artificial 
division between the two”. (ZA Industry expert) This statement was completed with a 
categorical question: “We would be setting minimum statutory requirements on contract 
security officers in the street, why should in-house security officers not fall in that as 
well?” At the same time, however, a further comment was made by the same 
interviewee about the complexity of the matter: “That is a complicated issue as far as 
regulation is concerned because now you got an employer who employs the security 
officer. It is a domestic ordinance within the industry that is not in the security 
industry.”  
Queensland has a dual system where only in-house guards are regulated but not the in-
house crowd controllers and other security providers, the attitudes seem mixed about the 
needed regulation coverage. The matter of in-house regulation was simplified by an 
industry insider stating:  “If it is a regime for security it should cover everybody.” (QLD 
Manager) An expert opinion with more sophistication noted that “There is a risk profile 
for in-house” (QLD Industry expert) and went on with the main argument “…they carry 
a risk profile for false arrest, invasion of privacy, they deal with the public, …there is 
still the third party the public who are at risk from these people, in some way or another, 
and need some protection”. Also presented in the same context was the idea of a 
‘lighter’ version of control for in-house security, as is actually the case in Estonia: “I do 
not think it should be heavy regulation but there should be some screening and control.” 
A generalisation can also be taken from a third view on in-house regulation, which was 
presented by a security manager who was running such an organisation.  
“Licensing or no - certainly if they [the security guards] step out in the 
environment and we provide services to somebody else, they should be. Then I am 
in the business, but I am not in the security business today. Security is part of our 
business but we are not in the security business.” (QLD Expert)  
Another kind of comment from a customer having in-house guards was given in support 
of regulation. He touched the problem frequently faced by security officers: the social 
dumping of personnel to a security department as a last resort.  
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“The result [of the law] was that the quality of the guards was going up. 
…because in a company, for example, before the law when there was somebody 
not good for other things any more, they put him in the guarding, but that is 
finished now because they need to be screened and they have to take the exam.” 
(BE Expert) 
The most common types of in-house control arrangements found from this sample of 
regulatory regimes were: (a) an identical model to the commercial security one; (b) a 
lighter one with only security personnel or/and management licensed; and (c) a non-
regulation one. At least within these regimes the decisions on this matter correlate with 
their basic reason(s) to regulate. The actual challenges faced in implementing in-house 
regulation, not touched on in the interviews, include: First, the basic principle of the 
freedom of private businesses to organise their own auxiliary in-house services; second, 
the difficulty to define what in-house work tasks and personnel are regarded in practice 
security; third, the affect on competition as regulated entities have significant extra 
expenses for fulfilling the statutory requirements; and fourth, the extra resources needed 
for the authorities to be able to license and control also the in-house security activities.  
9.3 Regulated commercial security (guarding) activities 
Most commonly the first step in defining the scope of regulation is to choose the 
commercial security services that would need legislation. It is not the regulation of the 
commercial security companies or individual security guards which should be in the 
centre of the discussion of the legislators or the industry representatives. The number 
one question should address which areas of activity should be covered.  
As can be seen from Table 20, the regulations quite comprehensively cover those 
activities which are traditionally considered commercial manned security. When 
comparing the coverage with the more general situation depicted in Appendix 1 (‘family 
tree’), it can be noticed that they match well. With this coverage all the regulatory  
Table 20 Regulated commercial manned private security services (areas)93 
 BE EE NY QLD ZA SE 
Static guarding    x    x    x    x    x    x 
Mobile patrolling    x    x    x    x    x    x 
Response / Call outs    x    x    x    x    x    x 
Event security (crowd control)    x    x    x    x    x    x 
Door supervision (crowd control)    x      x     x 
Private Investigation     o94    x    x    x  
Close protection (bodyguarding)    x    x95     x    x    x 
Monitoring96    x    x     x    x  
(Security training)    x    x    x    x    x    x 
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regimes under study would as well reach the wide and comprehensive status within the 
theoretical George and Button (2006:567-571) regulation classification model. 
The interviewees had very little to say in general on the segments which within manned 
(guarding) services should be regulated. This was the case probably because there was a 
mutual understanding that in principle all core segments should be included.  The 
following comment by an industry representative provides a good summary of the 
common tone in the interviews:  
“Obviously all segments need to be regulated. So we would say from the 
manpower side, that covers CIT, crowd control, event security, mobile patrol, 
concierges, so anything where there is a person, there needs to be regulation.” (BE 
Expert)  
The interviewees had more to say about other segments within private security which 
were not a part of this study and where the regulation coverage was not that broad, for 
instance in ICT security, protection of CNI, sales, installation and maintenance of 
security electronics, locksmiths activities, security consultation and so on. 
When the differences are looked at, it becomes apparent that out of the most common 
services within these regimes, the approach differs on door supervision, monitoring and 
private investigation. Door supervision is considered in regulation as a part of private 
security in three of the regulatory regimes. In the other three it is unregulated or 
regulated as a part of other businesses like; liquor selling, entertainment activities or 
gaming (casinos). Private investigation is not considered in Belgium and Sweden as a 
segment of commercial security activities and has thus been left out of private security 
regulation. In Estonia, private investigation is explicitly prohibited as a private function.  
In the following sub-sections there are comments made by interviewees on the 
complexity of the problems in two of the disputed service segments: Crowd 
management (event security and door supervision) and private investigation. This 
discussion reveals and clarifies some of the main sore spots concerning their regulation. 
Door supervision (crowd control) 
The opinions were divergent on the two main types of crowd control - event security 
and door supervision, depending on the cultural context. Both the existing regulations as 
well as the interviews showed that event security was basically considered as a special 
segment of commercial security services (guarding), but door supervision was perceived 
in different ways in different regulatory regimes. There was also confusion with the 
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terminology about who is actually considered a doorman, door supervisor, event 
security attendant or T-shirt security officer.  
In some regulatory regimes under study, door supervision was seen as an integral part of 
private security (guarding). This was the case in Belgium, Queensland and Sweden 
where it also had industry-specific regulation. In New York, South Africa and Estonia, 
door supervision was not considered to actually belong under the term private security 
and thus was not worthy to be regulated in relation to it. Nevertheless, according to the 
interviews, there seemed to be a general need to regulate door supervision even in those 
countries without this kind of legislation. The main problems experienced in this 
context were related to uncontrolled violence and participation in criminal activities 
connected to night life in general; that is, pimping, drug dealing, tax evasion, and 
money laundering (Bevakningsbranschens Yrkes- och Arbetsmiljönämd 2006:6-8, 12). 
However, the practical problems in regulation and its implementation in this 
environment kept many of the experts and regulators hesitant to interfere with it.   
Belgium was a good example of a country where door supervision was strictly 
regulated. The connections to organised crime had made it necessary to include 
‘bouncing’ in the industry-specific legislation. ”Even after having the law in place for 
eight years, the situation still seemed to be problematic:  Expert statements were very 
direct, like the following one:  
“…and sadly, but this is the truth, it is very often the Albanian Mafia that controls 
the bouncers in a certain area or another group of Mafia related people. …it is a 
very slow process of cleaning up that part of the market. Very regularly there is in 
the news and the press very bad stories about bouncers being really violent, 
bouncers being linked to Mafia.” (BE Industry expert) 
In New York State where private security legislation does not cover door supervision, 
part of the confusion arises from the traditions. There is the traditional profession of 
doormen which in a way overlaps with bouncing but is considered by the laws as a 
facility management service. The security status of these doormen has been discussed 
and the following comment describes the situation:   
“Also the highly unionised New York City doormen, who are not bouncers, were 
originally included in the mega-bill [on private security], but they were taken out 
of it in the State legislature. I think that it would have been a good thing to include 
them in it and define them as a part of the private security, now they are legally in 
a grey zone.” (NY Manager)  
Another industry representative summarised the common opinion and hesitancy 
concerning the bouncer regulation: “There has been talk about regulation, but I don’t 
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know who would be interested in it. My opinion is that they [the bouncers] should be 
regulated to some extent, but who is to do that work?” (NY Manager)  
Sweden is an example of a country with a long tradition of regulation of crowd 
management and door supervision. In Sweden, the problems are considered to be a big-
city phenomenon and are particularly connected to bouncers with a great number of part 
timers as in Queensland. In the actual work the three dimensional loyalty of a crowd 
manager is a problem which was articulated in the following way:   
“At the same time one is appointed by the police authorities to be a representative 
of them and nothing else. …His loyalty has to be fully for the police authorities, 
to represent them on the spot. But he has the one who pays his salary, and it is 
obvious that he listens to this quarter. He has the customer who is important for 
him to get his salary, the customer has to be kept in a good mood and happy with 
the service. This is the three dimensional conflict; it is not easy for the individual, 
and there is a risk, as it has been noticed, that door supervisors are at the end, in 
the first place loyal to the customer. One works there so long that one becomes a 
good friend with the customer, and starts to represent the customer’s interests. 
And sometimes the customer’s interests are in conflict with those of the police. 
This situation is not good, and it has been noticed, and there are propositions how 
to solve it, but at the same time the solution is extremely expensive. So, if it can 
be executed, I do not know.” (SE Industry expert)   
The door supervision and related services have traditionally been mostly in-house 
organised and only in the later years has the buying of these services from security 
companies gradually started to grow. In this context the interest to regulate and widen 
the regulation, especially of door supervision, have increased as problems covered in the 
media have become more frequent. New companies have been founded to provide 
especially these services. Even in those countries with existing legislation on door 
supervision, the control of the bouncer activity and the criminal activities connected to 
it have turned out to be extremely problematic and difficult when trying to execute 
control rationally. This is the regulators’ future challenge which is not made easier by 
the group of different authorities who have an interest in this environment. Even though 
there are very few exact statistics about the number of crowd management personnel, an 
educated guess would be that it is at least twice the amount of traditional guards. No 
wonder that regulators are hesitant in interfering with this subject.  
Private investigation 
In the case of private investigation regulation it is not primarily a question of violence 
and organised or individual crime involvement, but a question of the division of labour 
between public and private investigators, private justice practice and the risk of breaches 
of citizens’ constitutional rights, especially privacy.  As stated by an experienced 
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Australian interviewee, investigations are very much a reactive function and are thus 
also more related to police work than to other, basically proactive private security 
activities. “Private investigators are very often about reactive stage. They are doing 
something after the act ...  That is much closer to the police role and crumbling on things 
like criminal investigations what a security officer never would do.” (QLD Expert)  
Attitudes concerning private investigation are heavily anchored in the historical and 
cultural background of private policing. In the United States the long tradition and 
folklore of the private eyes, who were the forefathers of the federal and state police 
organisations, have made this activity psychologically a part of the United States history 
and society. In New York State legislation private investigation has its own chapter 
parallel with other private security regulation.  
In Estonia private detective activities are totally prohibited by the law. This had a clear 
connection to Estonia’s recent past as a Soviet State with its ways of internal 
governance, which is still mentally present in the society as was expressed in comments 
like: “The question is that we have come from another kind of society and it may be that 
we have a burden on us ... yes we had KGB, and now the detective function is in a way 
experienced as the same activity”. (EE Manager) Anyhow, even in Estonia an emerging 
need to have a modernised and more liberal regulation in this context was expressed by 
the security industry: “There is an obvious need for information gathering, concerning 
certain tasks which are not police functions, and police do not take them, for example, 
within the insurance branch.” (EE Industry expert) The same interviewee went on telling 
that incidents after the new independence had shown that the old culture was still 
prevailing and prevented a political approval of private investigation. “We have tried to 
approach The Parliament with a law proposal, and it has been there for a couple of times, 
but it has boomeranged.”  
In Sweden, private investigation activity existed, but it had been considered so small 
and without problems that it had been excluded from the law for the time being. In one 
of the interviews, the basic arguments for and against detective regulation were 
comprehensively covered; ”...[the activity] is not big, but it grows and there is a 
demand, a growing demand especially from the commercial and industrial life because 
the police resources don’t match.” (SE Industry expert) The same interviewee also 
pointed out that there are growing specific needs like the ‘preliminary’ internal 
investigations within businesses:  
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“We have seen the growth, we can say, of a semi-police like investigation activity 
which is connected to suspected crime, especially within the business 
environment. ...there is a need from the customer’s side to get evidence in order to 
be able to contact the police, preferably with the knowledge of who is the 
suspect.”  
The private investigation as such is not seen as a problem. The risk is that the private 
investigators step over the line and start to use powers belonging only to the police.  
There is a need to regulate this but the question is how to fulfil the different 
expectations in this case? 
“The problem appears when this investigation starts to overlap with police work; 
that is when there is a need to discuss with the suspected, performing an 
interrogation. Then it is over the edge, and we see that private security companies 
willingly take this kind of assignments, but because they are private security 
companies, they are not entitled to overstep the borderline of police activity. 
Unfortunately the case is that from the police side it is not possible to cope with 
all the duties they have, and this help is willingly received. Customers and internal 
controllers are directly recommended to talk also with these persons [private 
investigators]. And this is somehow a double message. On one hand the society 
thinks it is not good, on the other hand representatives of this society say: do it, 
come to us with the material when you are ready.” (SE Industry expert) 
The interview comments chosen here as examples include four of the main general 
worries concerning private investigation and its regulation: First, the obvious need for 
these services in today’s societies, second, the performance of private justice by using 
interrogation powers belonging [solely] to the authorities, third, the lack of police 
resources connected to the commonly accepted ‘real world’ procedures, and fourth, the 
increasingly active role also played by commercial security providers in this segment of 
activity. The question of what to regulate must be answered, and not only answered but 
also a decision should be made about the policy: “Here we see that there is an activity 
developing which should be kept under some control, an activity we would need to 
inspect in order to keep the boundary clear, or maybe let them pass the boundary, but 
how far in that case and in what forms?” (SE Industry expert) 
In South Africa, the coverage of the existing regulation on private investigation revealed 
one more aspect in support of more strict control. A local expert noting, “What it does 
not regulate, I think properly, is private investigators and private intelligence”, went on 
to emphasise the importance in tackling the threats on national security, “Because if you 
look at it from the national security point of view, those are the people who have access 
to information, those are the people [private investigators] that can be used by foreign 
intelligence services; they can be used for industrial espionage.”  
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In the interviews it turned out that private investigation is a part of private security and 
has been around for a long time. It was also an activity that had been regulated or was 
considered to need regulation in some way by most of the interviewees. Even in those 
two regulatory regimes (BE and EE) where it was prohibited for commercial security 
providers, the need to take action to allow it was obvious. The question was in these 
cases not actually whether it should be regulated but what aspects of it should be 
allowed and put into law. The dilemma here was that if the private investigation was 
‘legalised’ as a commercial security function, in the present environments it would start 
to gradually grow to be one more substitute to core police functions. Based on all the 
interviews made with the regulators and other interest groups in different regulatory 
regimes and on other data, the points made here describe well the general way of 
thinking and the dilemmas faced when trying to reason what to regulate in the context 
of private investigation. 
9.4 Regulated legal entities  
Security companies/security providers 
Security guards do not carry out their duties in a vacuum, but in most cases as an 
independent entrepreneur or as an employee of a commercial security company 
(institution) or an in-house security organisation. Thus, usually the logical law writing 
process proceeds by first defining what aspects of these entities should be regulated. It 
is not an easy task because the commercial security activities include everything from 
self-employed security professionals to small family firms to nationwide companies to 
huge multinational enterprises with hundreds of thousands of personnel. 
In all the regulatory regimes under study there was some kind of definition of what sort 
of legal entity/company was considered to be commercial security one in need of 
regulation. Amongst the regimes under study, probably the simplest, but nonetheless a 
good description of a legal entity providing manned commercial security services, was 
that from Queensland Government (1993:§8): “A security firm is a person who, or 
partnership that, engages in the business of supplying, for reward, the services of crowd 
controllers, security officers or private investigators to other persons.” 
The control of the security companies is achieved by setting specific requirements on 
the company structure, its management and its administrative rules on reporting and 
contracting. The companies’ general behaviour in the marketplace is steered by 
implementing (country-) specific codes of conduct. The aspects of regulation 
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concerning security providers are, in general, universal. On top of the normal local 
requirements on registration as legal business entities, the security providers were seen, 
in all the regulatory regimes under study, to need a separate, special registration/ 
licensing in order to provide (security) services listed in the industry-specific laws. This 
registration was carried out by an authority dealing with these kinds of procedures 
especially for commercial security providers or generally to different licensed 
businesses.    
General preconditions for licensing could be found in the regulations of all the 
regulatory regimes under study. These all included the prohibition to perform the 
regulated private security activities without a license/registration. There were also 
specific conditions like a ban to execute within the firm other business activities 
besides those under the act as in Belgium, or to be involved in certain kinds of business 
activities as in Estonia. In some regimes certain minimum standards were also set on 
the capacity to render a security service. These could include, for example, 
requirements on office space, strength of administrative staff, and equipment as was the 
case in Belgium and South Africa. 
The rules on legal entities providing commercial security services often include specific 
requirements on the ‘institutional’ representatives of the companies, including owners, 
board members and executive/responsible managers. These statues are implemented to 
prevent organised crime or criminal elements from using commercial security 
companies as frames for their illegal activities. Because of the difficulty to control 
owners, this kind of control had been in practice skipped in the regulatory regimes 
under study. Some substitutive control had been achieved by the local private security 
regulations which required commercial security providers to be registered as local 
companies.  
The interviewees did not have comments on the principles to control companies as 
businesses. Only the aspect of equality was commented; if the operational personnel 
should be regulated (licensed), that should concern the whole staff from guards to CEOs 
and board members. The designation of individuals considered to be ‘institutional’ 
representatives of the security companies reflects the general business law practice; 
these characters are the legal and responsible face of a business entity. In the 
commercial security context there is a generally accepted pattern to set extended ethical 
and also professional requirements on top executives in all the regulatory regimes under 
study and on board members in Estonia, Queensland, South Africa and Sweden. In the 
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real world it has turned out that the use of men of straw, even in the commercial security 
context, makes the effectiveness of control on executives limited.  
Swedish interviewee comments express the similar union and employer thinking on this 
matter in a country with long history of social dialogue:  
“All the board members need to be approved and controlled. Everyone in a 
company has to be approved and controlled.” (Industry expert) 
“…they should have the same requirements up and down the organisation; higher 
requirements cannot be imposed on a guard than can be imposed on a director or 
a board member” (Industry Expert)  
Contracts, liability insurance coverage, subcontracting 
Examples of specific contractual and liability regulations included in private security 
legislation in the six regulatory regimes under study are presented in Table 21. As 
commercial security activities grow and become vertically specialised, they are also 
increasingly beginning to be organised administratively in the same way to achieve 
effective business control. In order to control the business activities, especially the 
integrated and combined service solutions and because of the increasing contract values, 
the different aspects of contracting and liability are given more importance in the 
regulations. Only South Africa of the regulatory regimes under study had in its 
regulation an obligation of a written contract and Belgium and New York had a 
requirement to uphold compensation guarantees. The opinions of the interviewees 
basically supported a more formalised and regulated way of contracting, but it was 
interesting that in practice a ‘light’ and even oral agreement culture was still strongly 
alive. All this had been given limited importance and the business parties still relied on 
general business law practices and had not understood how crucial contractual matters 
have become today as one of risk management tools, particularly in commercial 
security. 
Table 21 Rules on contracting and liability 
 BE EE NY QLD ZA SE 
Obligatory written service contracts        x  
Rules concerning liability and protection from liability       x97         x    x  
Compulsory insurance (bond) requirement     x       x    
Subcontracting rules        x    x 
 
Especially in Queensland a local culture was eminent:  
“A client will think that contract law is efficient. You don’t need special 
legislation on that.” (Expert) 
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“The contract signing is covered by separate legislation, by business legislation.” 
(Manger) 
“I don’t know the percentage but I would guess that great portions of the people 
do it with a handshake.” (Industry expert)  
This kind of statements describe not just the actual situation but probably also the 
immature business culture within the local private security industry. On the contrary to 
this reality, the usefulness of a written contract for all parties was understood by others 
in the same environment, as can be noticed from comments like:  
“Do I need to contract for that? I think I would like something in writing … and it 
helps the clients to understand where they stand. …I think it is a benefit for all 
parties, it is a safeguard.” (Expert)  
“I think it would be a positive thing. …it would give more protection, because the 
contracting parties would know from the very beginning in the relationship where 
they stood and equally by itself would know what the obligations were.” 
(Manager) 
There was one more aspect from the authorities’ point of view which was taken up by a 
Swedish interviewee; even if contracts in private security were a totally unregulated 
sector in Sweden, the inspectors visiting security companies went through contracts, if 
they existed, in order to control that no illegal tasks had been approved to be performed 
by the guards:  
“…what we are looking at, is that there are no unlawful assignments taken. That 
means in the first place that there is not given to the guard tasks of personal 
checks, that is, to inspect peoples’ bags or equivalent, or to enter facilities or 
equivalent, to make a house search. Those kinds of contracts have appeared.” 
(Industry Expert) 
Business-related liabilities have gained increased importance and attention, even in the 
commercial security, since the terrorist attacks in the United States and other parts of 
the world. Commercial security providers and their insurers have been faced with new 
cases of previously unheard proportions. For example, the airport security screening of 
the passengers, on the planes targeted in the 9/11 terrorist attack created liability 
lawsuits against the commercial security companies. In the societies with a British legal 
heritage included in this study; New York, Queensland and South Africa, this matter 
had been taken into consideration in the industry specific legislation. 
The CNI protection contracts, a result of the privatisation of former nationally run 
infrastructure industries and services, have changed the responsibilities on security of 
these objects to the new (non-governmental) owners. Examples of these high-risk 
objects are, for example, water supply, energy production, public transport, parts of 
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defence industries and so on. At the same time, the astronomical liabilities connected to 
these objects have made new kinds of contracting and insurance arrangements 
unavoidable. This had been taken increasingly into consideration when deciding what to 
regulate in the industry-specific legislation in Estonia and Sweden. Sweden is a world-
class trailblazer in this sort of regulation with its special laws (Swedish Government 
1990) concerning the use and powers of commercial security providers in guarding state 
objects of CNI. In South Africa there is separate legislation concerning this subject, 
which also defines the role of private (security) actors in this context (South African 
government 1980; 2007).  
The interviewees had a unanimous opinion on the need for a regulated insurance 
coverage, expressed well by the following Australian comment:  
“There should be that kind of policy as part of the licensing process, those things 
should be there. The issues of insurance and cover, those types of insurance, 
should be administered at licensing, there should be a requirement.” (QLD 
Manager) 
Subcontracting is a general problem strongly affecting the rights of security firms’ 
employees, but also the transparency of contracts from the customers’ point of view. 
For business profitability the smooth planning and organisation of the work is crucial. 
This tempts the security providers to use all means, legal and occasionally even illegal, 
to optimise their utilisation of manpower. This sometimes happens by using 
subcontracting in an unsound way. The basic drawbacks of this model of action can be 
found in several ways throughout the industry. The unsound consequences on the 
credibility of the commercial security were well described by one interviewee: 
“One thing that is probably the most complicated is the subcontracting of guard 
services. This is an area that we are trying to work through with state 
governments. You can get what you call multi-contracts, five or six levels and the 
problem is that everyone is taking a cut and in the end of the day the poor little 
guard at the end is probably getting cash in hand - a very low wage. The client is 
not aware that the contract is passed in hands. It’s good to know that a contract 
has gone through six seven hands, because they [customers] may not like it. If 
there are five levels of people taking the margin, the service delivered at the end is 
probably going to be sub-standard.” (QLD Manager) 
In order to create and maintain the credibility of the commercial security activities, 
these kinds of arrangements should be controlled by industry-specific regulations, as 
was the case in Sweden and South Africa. It is also important in order to clarify the 
responsibilities in case of misconduct, loss or crime which the security provider or an 
individual guard may be called to account for. 
144 
 
One separate area that should be regulated in connection to the commercial security 
companies is their obligation to document certain parts of their activities, store them for 
a fixed period and to submit immediate or annual reports to the authorities and 
customers. There were different procedures mentioned in the legislations of the 
regulatory regimes under study but no uniformity could be found. Furthermore, the 
interviewees seemed to have given little thought to this matter and had no actual 
comments on its implementation into their local private security statues. Most of them 
agreed upon the importance of careful documentation but they did not see it to be a core 
question in the writing of regulations. Many interviewees thought that these were 
matters belonging to general business legislation. This was interesting because the 
development of the industry will beyond controversy require improvements in this part 
of commercial security regulation. 
On top of the basic regulations imposed on security companies by industry specific 
legislation, there was in all regulatory regimes a variety of supporting but binding rules 
included which can be called the codes of conduct98. They covered very different 
matters in the different regulatory regimes. These rules are primarily directives 
affecting the commercial security business and companies, even if in many cases they 
also cover individual persons working within the industry.  
Commercial security personnel  
After defining the segments of the manned commercial security activities to be 
regulated, and what requirements to set for legal entities running them, the next step in 
the governments’ logic in writing the laws (regulations) seems to be to define what 
personnel and what personal qualities of the personnel to regulate. The main objects in 
this context are the security guards who create the bulk of the personnel and who are the 
most visible part of the commercial security industry. Even if it sounds peculiar, there is 
a basic obstacle when trying to research and compare the different aspects of the 
regulation on the security guards – there is no existing transnationally accepted model 
of how to do this, and accordingly little uniformity could be found in the regulatory 
regimes under study.  
To regulate the individuals working within the private security industry, the profiles of 
them and the jobs performed need to be delineated. To demonstrate the diversity in the 
‘legal’ definitions, even of the core players in the industry, the security guard can be 
taken as an example by comparing the law text definitions on this personnel group in 
the regulatory regimes under study. 
145 
 
 Belgium had not made a legal definition for a security guard at all. 
 Estonia had made the definition by listing individual requirements of a security 
guard. 
 New York had made the definition by listing functions and detailed tasks 
performed by security guards and by describing their employment status.    
 Queensland had made the definition by pointing out a single function performed 
by guards. 
 South Africa had made the definition through the description of a guard’s 
employment status. 
 Sweden had made the definition by mentioning one employment status element 
of a guard. 
These examples emphasise the diversity in the ways the laws are written in general, but 
also the fragmentation in defining some of the basic things in commercial security 
regulation. A comparative summary table of the security guard/security officer 
definitions, as well as the original law texts, accompanied by the CEN and ASIS 
standard descriptions, is presented in Appendix 6. This comparison emphasises the 
general challenges in making regulation comparisons.  
What commercial security personnel to regulate? 
The security personnel working within manned security are not only comprised of 
traditional security guards. There are a lot of different (special) duties where the 
individuals have a specific working title which describes their actual tasks. In practice 
the licensing and licensing requirements of these persons are also in many cases 
differentiated in the regulations. Even if the traditional security guards were licensed in 
all the regulatory regimes under study, it was not the case of personnel performing the 
specialised guard services. Table 22 presents the general scope of regulation of the 
personnel within manned services and the auxiliary staff of the companies. 
Table 22 Licensing of main commercial security personnel (guards) 
   BE   EE    NY QLD   ZA   SE 
'Guarding' personnel       
       Security guard/security officer     x     x     x     x     x     x 
       Bodyguard        x     x     x     x     x     x 
       Event attendant (crowd controller)     x          x     x     x 
       Door supervisor (crowd controller)     x       x      x 
      Alarm receiving and monitoring station operator      x     x      x     x  
‘Non-operational’ personnel / Auxiliary staff          x 
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The table shows that in this study there are only two categories of manned security 
service personnel that were regulated in all the six regulatory regimes: security guards 
and bodyguards. Private investigators, different kinds of crowd controllers and alarm 
receiving and monitoring station operators were considered in some regimes as less 
important and/or less threatening from the society’s point of view. This was not logical 
because private investigators commonly interfere with citizens’ privacy, different kinds 
of crowd controllers are probably those who most often use force in their work, and the 
alarm centre operators have access to more confidential documentary and operational 
daily customer information than any other specific personnel group. 
The employees who are not involved in the day-to-day operational activity; salesmen, 
white collar financial staff, secretaries, car mechanics, cleaners, janitors and so on, have 
similar and sometimes even better access to company’s crucial internal or customer 
information. However, only Swedish regulation, out of the six in this study, included 
compulsory directives on a (total) screening of the auxiliary personnel.  
Most of the interviewees had the opinion that more or less all personnel within security 
companies should be regulated. The following comments, describe well the general 
opinions amongst the interviewees on this subject:  
“I would like to say that everyone who has something to do with the activities, 
both directly and indirectly, should be controlled.” (SE Industry expert)  
“…I think security officers, guards, bouncers, bodyguards, they need a high 
degree of control. I think there should be regulation, some degree of regulation for 
all the occupations.” (QLD Expert)  
“I think definitely security contractors like crowd controllers, static guards, 
mobile patrols. They really need to be regulated; operational security personnel - 
yes.” (QLD, Expert) 
To regulate auxiliary staff was not considered quite as important. The various aspects of 
this matter were well represented in the comments of Queensland interviewees. The 
control considering non-operational personnel was seen to be important.  
“I think it should be regulated that any person who is actively involved in the 
security of property or personal safety should be regulated. That includes sales 
people, it includes installers and it includes monitoring staff. ...the industry has 
reached a strong consensus that all those people should be included.” (QLD 
Manager) 
“… it is very feasible that anybody and everybody who work in the industry are 
regulated in some form and must have a license.” (QLD Industry expert)  
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Alternatively, there were some comments in which the interviewees saw the need to 
control all staff, but thought that it should be left to the companies’ discretion and 
responsibility.  
“The auxiliary personnel, I think it should be the responsibility of the company 
hiring them in order for them to have a license, that all of their personnel go 
through certain screening processes, I think that should be mandatory. So I do not 
think it should be regulated.” (QLD Expert)  
“Licensing [white collar] might be a step over because there will be a number of 
issues rising the question what else goes with the licensing.” (QLD Manager) 
9.5 Detailed aspects on what to regulate on an individual level 
A core part of the contents of all regulation is the list of requirements set for individual 
security guards as a precondition for licensing and working within an approved security 
firm. In all the regulatory regimes under study there were three main components in this 
context that were regulated: the minimum age, the personal suitability (clean criminal 
record) for the work, and the minimum compulsory training. 
Out of these three generally agreed requirements, the minimum age was unanimously 
seen by the interviewees as a prerequisite because the security guards were considered 
to be in a position of trust and responsibility that required them to be of age. The other 
basic requirement that did not raise any comments was the need to have a clean criminal 
record and personal suitability to work as a guard. There were different detailed 
requirements on this subject emphasised in different regulatory regimes, but the general 
practices included in the laws and the interview opinions were totally unanimous in the 
need for these controls to be implemented. Training as such was supported by all. A 
summary of the main existing requirements in the legislations of the six regulatory 
regimes under study is presented in Appendix 7. The more problematic part of these 
controls was their practical implementation, of which procedures are handled and 
commented on by the interviewees in chapters 11.   
The interviewees had very little to comment on about the basic legal rules connected to 
health, integrity, suitability and other diversified general requirements set for security 
personnel in separate regulatory regimes. It seemed that the basic controls are so 
obvious that there was no need to challenge them. The matters which let the tongues run 
were the different aspects of the length of compulsory basic training as well as the need 
for obligatory special and refreshment training arrangements. 
The specific subject of granting extra powers to guards was very much a local and 
cultural matter which welled from the general attitudes in the different societies under 
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study. It was seen a legal matter not connected specifically only to the private security 
but to general laws in a country. However, there were some interesting views presented 
on the principles of this subject which are discussed separately later in this text. 
Compulsory basic training 
In the following text only the areas within basic training which were considered during 
the interviews to need compulsory regulation are discussed. Everyone seemed to have 
some ideas about what, in this context, should be regulated. Most of the interviewees 
thought that the length of the basic training should be included somehow in the 
regulations. The existing fixed lengths varied a lot. The content of the training seemed 
not to be an actual topic in any of the regulatory regimes under study because the main 
subjects to be included are very similar and arise from the basic requirements set 
universally on commercial security personnel. Another, extremely touchy topic is how 
the training in practice should be organised, including its financial and administrative 
challenges; this is handled in chapter 11. The variation in the length of the compulsory 
basic training in the different regulatory regimes under study can be seen in Table 23. In 
Belgium, Queensland and South Africa it was not specified in the private security 
legislation, but left to the training organisers to propose for authority approval, 
according to their ideas of how they would run the basic courses.  
Table 23 Minimum compulsory basic training and its governance  
 
Basic compulsory 
training99 length 
in hours 
Main training organisers (accredited) Examination organiser 
BE N/A Company Training organiser 
EE 66 (16+50)100 Company/Training corporation 
(Accredited) 
Industry Association (ETEL)101 
NY 24 (8+16)102 Company/Training corporation 
(Accredited) 
N/A (in practice the training organiser) 
QLD N/A103 Training Corporation Training organiser 
ZA N/A104 Training Corporation Training organiser 
SE 128 (88+40)105 Company/Training corporation 
(Accredited) 
Training organiser (BYA) 
In compulsory training, the examination is a question to be considered carefully when 
writing regulations. As can be seen from Table 23 the control of the basic training has 
been left very much to its organisers. It means that in practice the licensing authorities 
have a limited possibility (interest) to have control throughout the quality and results of 
the training. This leaves a loophole to make shortcuts, which affects the quality and 
reliability of the training systems. As the compulsory basic training is considered crucial 
in the commercial security context by all the parties, it would be important to have it 
regulated throughout: the length, the content, the training providers and the examination 
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arrangements. There are a lot of different kinds of detailed rules set in the regulatory 
regimes under study on training, most of them related to the general local culture of 
organising these things. A sample of these country-specific directives is presented in 
Appendix 8.  
The sufficiency and length of compulsory basic training  
There were divided opinions amongst the interviewees on the general sufficiency and 
length of the compulsory training depending on their interest group. However, most of 
them expressed that with regard to the fundamental guarding assignments the training 
was adequate. Examples describing the common thinking of all the interviewees in 
different regulatory regimes can be found in the following comments: 
“Today you can say the training is good.” (BE Expert) 
“It can be said that this kind of training is never adequate, but for the basic work 
and its purposes it is enough.” (EE Industry expert) 
 “…basic training is basic training, it is fully enough, but what happens after that 
is another thing.” (EE Expert) 
“I think that the training is long enough, if it is carried out in a proper way as it 
should. … If a fellow wants to study and get knowledge, there is enough of it. The 
attitude [motivation] is another question.” (EE Manager) 
“And I think it is long enough, enough for a guard as the basic training.” (SE 
Industry expert) 
Some of the interviewees were ready to comment on the side of the sufficiency of the 
training the actual length of it:  
“It is long enough, yes and no? It is long enough because before there was no 
formal education so every hour added is an improvement.” (BE Expert) 
“I would not like seeing it becomes too long. I am an academic but I think 5 days 
is too short to learn everything that is needed. I would be interested to see what 
the minimum is for adequate security. Is it two weeks, is it one month, I am not 
sure.” (QLD Expert) 
“…there is no straight answer. I think that within 60 hours they can get, when 
they want, a kind of basic knowledge, for sure.” (EE Manager) 
“I think it is long enough if it is executed as planned.” (EE Manager) 
“Three days as in New York is too little. Two weeks [80 hours] would be a right 
length for the compulsory basic training.” (NY Manager) 
“New York presents eight-hour requirement and this Union has been arguing for a 
40-hour programme. And towards that end we created a 40-hour training 
programme.” (NY Industry expert) 
“The standards should be higher. I think one week is not enough. … And just the 
basic training, I mean they need to know the laws. They need to meet all the 
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national competencies on all the different levels and I cannot see how one week 
can address that. It is too complex.”(QLD industry expert) 
The compulsory basic training is one of the core factors in ensuring that the societies’ 
requirements of minimum professional competence and knowledge level of the security 
guards are met. Anyhow, the interview comments concerning it were not very 
convincing. It seems that even if the interviewees had an idea of how the existing local 
basic training reflects the needs, they did not have, or were not ready to present an exact 
opinion on how long (comprehensive) it should be. This describes the delicacy and 
difficult character of this matter. This also makes it extremely difficult to find a solution 
to compulsory guard training length if even the industry’s own reference group 
representatives and other experts are hesitant to comment on the matter in an explicit 
way.  
Special training 
Compulsory basic training is very much seen as a guarantee that security guards will get 
the basic knowledge of what their rights and responsibilities are, as well as what risks 
and expectations they will face in their work. The interviewees, however, did not 
consider basic training to be sufficient for all the specific professional tasks performed 
by security employees. There was compulsory specific training, for example, for the 
dog-handling and the possession of weapons on duty. Depending on the needs, the 
interviewees turned out to have different ideas and practical models of how the needed 
skills could be achieved. In most cases the special training was on a voluntary basis. 
The short length of the basic training was also supported by the fact that many (most) of 
the security guard jobs diversified so much that not even a longer common basic 
training period would meet the job-specific requirements. The general feelings on this 
matter within the whole security community were well described by a customer 
comment: “To be in the port, controlling loading of sand is a totally different thing from 
being in a retail shop where you need to communicate with people; there are divergent 
levels of requirements.” (EE Expert) The same interviewee saw the task-specific 
training to be so important (and customer specific) that he had organised it himself in 
co-operation with the security company: “So after they [guards] had got the basic 
training; immediately after that, as I had employed experienced security personnel, I 
organise own training including matters which I require from the guards.” This 
comment tells about the importance of not only security segment specified but also the 
151 
 
customer-oriented and task-oriented training and that it is tightly connected to the 
customer’s own visions and requirements as presented in Table 3 on pages 29-30. 
The general, growing need for special training was explained in a very simple and 
down-to-earth way by a Swedish industry expert who emphasised the growing 
complicity of the tasks performed:  
“[Special training] has been there before and it is there now. In the same way as 
the companies’ organisations have been specialised into certain segments of 
guarding, the requirements on training have been increased. New training courses 
have been created in areas where we thought the tasks performed are so important 
that they must be trained and must know something of it before they start with it.” 
(SE Industry expert)  
Here the problem is a more general one, also faced in other contexts; what training 
should be in the interest and under the control of the society and thus made compulsory, 
and what should be left to be steered by the markets and the business needs.  
Refreshment training 
There is one more part of the training which logically should be compulsory and 
included in the regulations. This is ongoing refreshment training, which is compulsory 
in Belgium, New York and Sweden, and which was commented on by many of the 
interviewees. It was widely noticed that the laws and the environment of commercial 
security work change and develops fast and continuously, so all security guards need to 
be retrained in some way periodically. Comments on this matter included, for example, 
the following argumentation:  
“There is no refreshment training. It is ridiculous really. The laws change. If you 
are not going back for training, in a five year period the whole Act is evolved. 
Every renewal [of the license] should include another refreshment course.” (QLD 
Industry expert)  
“An 8-hour classroom refreshment training would be needed every second year.” 
(NY Manager) 
 In certain situations the customer can take the driver’s seat to continuously ensure that 
on the top of the regulation knowledge the level of special skills required are prevailed 
and even increased: “Then I had a rule for the security company that one day every 
month is a training day; customer contacts, all evacuations, all basic safety procedures, 
guard’s responsibilities and powers, all this is carried out.” (EE Expert) 
 It was obvious throughout the interviews that compulsory refreshment training was also 
in the interest of the regulators (societies) and should be included in the rules in those 
regulatory regimes where it was missing. The comments made by the interviewees 
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about the actual models and techniques of how to organise and to improve the 
implementation of the refreshment training are handled in chapter 11. 
Extra powers 
If there is a need to give extra powers or protection to commercial security personnel, it 
means statutory regulation because in all cases it is a constitutional matter. Certain basic 
citizens’ rights can be violated when some state authority (powers or protection) are 
given to private actors. In the six regulatory regimes under study this matter had been 
solved according to the legal model and culture of the state. In the Anglo-American 
states, citizens’ powers have historically been on a level that in practice makes extra 
powers unnecessary. In the other regulatory regimes where the citizens’ powers are not 
on the same level, some extra powers as well as extra protection have often been 
granted. Table 24 illustrates well the difference between the two types of regulatory 
regimes under study concerning this matter. 
Even if there were some cautious opinions in favour, the majority of the comments from 
the interviewees were reserved on granting or including extra powers to private security 
guards in industry-specific regulation. The comments made were primarily about the 
expediency of commercial security personnel’s extra powers. Unanimously it was 
agreed that if there were extra powers these should be specified in the legislation. Extra 
powers were also seen as a litigation risk and an additional economic burden because 
they would, in practice, mean special (extra) training. This was the case especially in 
New York where these worries were well described by the following comment:  
“…we are so much more litigious than you are in Europe. … Granting extra 
powers only means that the level of safeguards we’d have to have in place in 
training and selection of our people would be almost at the level of a police 
officer.” (NY Manager) 
Representatives from all the regulatory regimes under study regardless of the present 
legislation shared similar, careful views which can be noticed in the following 
examples:  
“I would be a little scared to give them large powers. …if help is needed then the 
guard has the contact to the alarm centre, the alarm centre has the contact to the 
police, and our other patrols, and they will give the advice.” (EE Manager) 
‘I think that instead of opening up the well of looking for granting of more 
authority, we may have to look how can we in a better way communicate with the 
police departments in this respective.” (NY Manager)  
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Table 24 Extra powers and protection 
  BE   EE  NY QLD  ZA SE106 
Granted extra powers and protection:       
   Inspection of clothing and goods of persons    x          x 
   Identity controls of persons    x        x 
   Denial of access to guarded area    x    x       x 
   Auxiliary traffic control for police    x      
   Detention (apprehension) of persons in certain situations    x    x       x 
      Security check as a part of detention     x       x 
      Removal from the object as a part of detention     x       x 
      Identification on site as a part of detention     x     
      Escort of detained to a police authority or medical institution     x     
Special legal protection of guards performing their duties        x107 
 
It can be noticed that as in these comments the interviewees emphasised the co-
operation with public law enforcement. Presently, extra powers were not a ‘hot’ 
regulation issue generally in any of the regulatory regimes under study, but its 
importance was seen to grow if the tasks performed by commercial security will in the 
future include more CNI or public order type of jobs.  
One interviewee made the logical comment that the granting of extra powers probably 
also means pressures to change weapon policies concerning security officers:  
“And I think the problem is not mandated to our rights. …the second you give 
somebody more authority to match certain powers, you have to give them a course 
on that, which is probably going to lead to increase in weapons. I’m not a fan of 
weapons, either in our hands or in the police hands. I think that is too easy a 
solution in some cases.” (NY Manager) 
 This matter has two dimensions; first, it is a law enforcement related status booster for 
guards, and second, the powers and weapons give actual added value in their daily 
work. It is a challenge for all regulators to find locally the best balance concerning extra 
powers and weapons. There is no ‘one size fits all’ solution to be found in these matters. 
9.6 Regulated equipment 
In addition to legal entities and commercial security activities there are a group of 
work-related accessories (equipment) which are usually regulated. The most common 
of these are the uniforms and different kinds of identification used by the front-line 
security guards and crowd controllers. Some regimes had requirements on patrol cars 
(BE, NY and SE) or monitoring station components (BE and EE), but in general the 
regulations included few requirements on equipment. A specific area of equipment 
regulation is the directives on the possession and use of non-lethal weapons and 
firearms, of which neither are solely private security regulation matters. In all 
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regulatory regimes under study there was some kind of national legislation in place on 
weapons, at least firearms, which also set the frame for their use in the commercial 
security context.  
Clothing and general identification of a guard 
As can be seen from Table 25 there are several rules related to the private security 
guards’ clothing and its use in four of the six regulatory regimes under study. In New 
York and Queensland, the regulations on guard uniforms were, in practice, non-
existent. The uniform was the subject on which most of the interviewees had their own 
opinions and comments to make. It seems that visibility and appearance in security 
work is an exceptional matter, even if the clothing, as such, in most cases does not give 
the user any extra ‘official’ status or powers.  
The general advantages of wearing a uniform were mentioned by many of the 
interviewees; not a single one opposed the compulsory use of it. The common points of 
all interviewees, made here by a Swedish industry expert included, first, the benefits of 
general recognition by the public: “It has been considered important by the society, that 
this person can be recognised in his duty. ...it is motivated by the fact that the public 
must see that this is a person with guarding duties.” Second, the general ‘respect-
creating’ impact of it was emphasised: “Not, that they would have any powers or 
enforcement rights but, however, it is to some extent a security factor for the public that 
there is a guard present nearby.” Third, the operational and co-operational factors in 
incident situations were taken up: “And there may be a need for him [the guard] to be 
visible when he takes action, and it may be significant for the police arriving to the 
scene to distinguish the detainee from the person who made the detention.”  One more 
point was raised by another interviewee; wearing a uniform means that there are certain  
Table 25 Examples of regulation on uniform and identification on it 
   BE   EE   NY QLD   ZA   SE 
Uniforms   (x)   (x)   (x)   (x)   (x) 
   General obligation to use them on duty108    x    x      x    x 
   To be approved by authorities     x       x 
   Considered a general identification of being a  security agent    x    x      x109     x 
   Prohibition of uniforms resembling those used by authorities      x    x110    x    x 
   Ban to provide a guard uniform to an unauthorised person        x  
   Specific rules for returning the uniform         x 
Identification       
   Requirement of visible company badge/name    x    x      x    x 
   Requirement of visible name and/or number     x     
x111 
  x    x  
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demands accompanied with it: “We have uniforms because there are special 
requirements, there are special expectations imposed on this person.” (SE Industry 
expert) 
The main single point taken up by a majority of the interviewees was the present 
unacceptable practice of commercial security providers trying intentionally to use 
clothing resembling that of police or other authorities. This was expressed in the 
category of general comments, like:  
“If this is let loose [use of similar uniforms], we could get uniforms which some 
customers would like, they would love this, but the public would not like it, it 
would backfire.” (SE Industry expert)  
“… it must not look like those of the police. That is the only rule we have, and 
that is controlled.” (SE Industry expert)  
 “It should not resemble any of the national uniforms and specifically the name 
which should not mention police or those staff of things.” (ZA Expert)  
 “I agree the uniform should not be mixed with the ones authorities wear during 
the performance of their duties and while they are on the client’s property.” (QLD 
Expert)  
 “Especially with the globalisation it is important that the guard will not be mixed 
with a police” (SE Industry expert) 
In New York, where the guard uniforms were not regulated at all, it seemed to be also a 
non-topic amongst the interviewees who had very few comment to be made on this 
subject. One of them answered only that:  “There are restrictions of the size it needs to 
be and where it needs to be located, the emblem.” (Manager) The reason for the ‘total’ 
indifference may be the local culture which focuses on the essential topics. This can be 
interpreted from the following comment by another security professional: 
“Uniforms are not standard. I think they describe rather recognisably [guard 
function]; still the law does not address those appearance standpoints... I look at it 
like this, if we don’t have laws regulating something it is probably because it is 
not a real big issue for us. ...I think the market itself sort of controls it.” (Manage)    
As can be seen from Table 25, Queensland was the other regulatory regime under study 
which in practice had no rules about uniforms, only on the headwear. A couple of 
chosen comments made by local interviewees describe well the general attitude on this 
matter. The problem in this kind of non-regulation situation was commented in the 
following ways:  
“If you are simply just looking like a police officer and conducting security work, 
that’s probably ok. If they are looking like a police officer and acting like a 
policeman, then that’s an offence and they can be charged with that”. (Manager)  
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“That seems to be an area where there should be a requirement for differentiation 
because they [guards] don’t have the same powers. If they appear to be police, 
they can abuse their powers.” (Expert)  
 “…you look around and some companies do have remarkably similar outfits to 
the police special forces troops… You should not pass yourself off as something 
you are not. This is a temptation to some.” (Industry expert) 
Individual identification of a guard   
The uniform is the general identification for a security guard/security officer, but 
another subject which was widely considered to need regulation was a reliable 
individual identification of the licensed personnel. In all the regulatory regimes under 
study it was compulsory to carry an ID on duty, and in some of the regimes it needed to 
be carried so that it was permanently visible. As can be seen from Table 26, rules 
concerning regulation of ID cards are basically very similar.  
The need to regulate the ID certificates/cards is probably so obvious that the 
interviewees had very few comments on it. The opinions were more about the practical 
model of providing them. Comments from different regulatory regimes emphasised the 
importance of an ID and unanimously supported its use at work: “I think if we take a 
matter as important as the ID card, it must be there.” (SE Industry expert) The 
importance to identify a security guard/security officer in a conflict situation was 
recognised and taken up: “Badges and IDs are important and officer numbers for the 
citizens to identify a guard to be one and to have information if a complaint is made.” 
(NY Manager) 
Table 26 Identification certificates (cards) 
    BE    EE    NY   QLD    ZA   SE 
The ID is:       
   Company bound     x     x     x    
   Personal        x            x      x 
   Provided by the authority     x       x112      x  
   Provided by the company      x      x      x 
There are:       
  Specific rules of carrying and representing the ID     x     x     x     x     x     x 
 
On a personal level, an ID could also be seen as a certificate of ‘official’ approval:  
“I am thinking what added value it actually gives that they have the card, a simple 
ID card? Then everyone sees that he is a guard, there is his name, and it means 
that people also understand that he has passed the training and he has some kind 
of powers”. (EE Manager)  
The practical challenges to be found in the process of ID issuance are discussed in 
chapter 11. 
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Weapons and firearms  
Even though the basic trend and policy is a no-arms one, both non-lethal weapons and 
firearms are an ongoing discussion topic among the regulators and personnel of the 
commercial security. Most of the interviewees had comments on firearms, but the need 
and necessity of the non-lethal weapons were, to many of them, a non-topic that they 
had not thought about. The comments in the following text on the two weapon 
categories have been handled separately. 
Non-lethal weapons 
The definition of non-lethal weapons, sometimes also called ‘cold’ weapons, is 
wavering, which can be noticed also from the legislation of the regulatory regimes 
under study in Table 27. In the commercial security environment, and in this text, gas 
sprays, truncheons (batons, night sticks, and telescope batons), colouring equipment, 
paralysers and handcuffs are included in this category. In three of the regulatory regimes 
under study there were industry-specific private security regulations on non-lethal 
weapons possession and use. In Belgium all these weapons were prohibited, in Estonia 
and Sweden there were comprehensive and partly detailed rules on their possession and 
use. In the other three regulatory regimes under study there were no industry-specific 
rules on this kind of equipment. 
Table 27 Regulation on non-lethal weapons 
   BE     EE   NY  QLD   ZA   SE 
Totally prohibited     x113       
Specific restrictions and instructions      x        x 
               Gas sprays      x        x114 
               Truncheon (baton)      x      x      x 
                              Specific technical standards             x 
               Colouring equipment      x     
               Handcuffs      x      x                   x 
 
The Belgian situation where all non-lethal weapons were prohibited from private 
security seemed to be clear as was expressed by a local association representative: 
“As an association we are completely against it [weapons]. I have to say further 
that as a Belgian association we are completely against it. That is also the point of 
view of the authorities. Our guards in Belgium, they cannot use pepper spray, 
hand-cuffs, sticks, even in the Belgian legislation the size of the torches are very 
limited because you know as well as I do that some torches are so big that they are 
used as weapons.” (Industry expert) 
Belgium is, however, a good example of the changing requirements imposed on private 
security and how they create situations where this kind of absolute policy and 
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argumentation had become indefensible. There were a couple of serious incidents at the 
railway stations, and in one of them a private security guard was killed. Belgian 
Railways made a case based on the fact that guards are not sufficiently protected against 
violent passengers. This led to a modification in 2004 of the private security legislation:  
“It is put in the law of private security but as a completely different chapter and 
it says that a special kind of security service, security department, can be 
established by public organisations of public transports. And these guys are 
allowed to do a couple of things that any other normal private security guard is 
not allowed to do. They cannot arrest but they can physically hold people – 
detain them. They can use hand-cuffs; they are allowed to use the pepper spray.” 
(Industry expert) 
This situation touched on three fundamental questions in the organisation of commercial 
security and its regulation, questions which were not only connected to Belgium, but 
were faced also in other regulatory regimes: 
 First, the security industry (in line with the authorities) had a basic stand 
supporting a no-weapons 'whatever' policy which they had to reconsider in this 
situation.  
 Second, the authorities changed the law for only one type of activity because of 
Belgium Railways’ heavy lobbying. The security industry considered this unfair 
because other guards in other environments faced the same risks: 
     “…the motivation to do this by the authorities was to say the guards, the in-house 
guards of the public transport companies are exposed to a lot of risks and we 
said; hay wait, we also have a lot of private security guards who are exposed to a 
lot of risks, so why do you work with double measures for the same kind of 
activities.” (Industry expert) 
 Third, the work previously open and in many cases performed by commercial 
security companies was excluded from them by this new part of legislation that 
gave in-house security extended powers and tools to support their activities. 
This is a common situation faced by the societies and the regulators. The actual work of 
commercial security companies turns out to need extended powers and tools in order to 
be carried out in a proper way. In this Belgian case, the government’s solution was to 
create a new category of security providers to cover a grey zone. This situation can be 
noticed in all regulatory regimes. The solution presented here is not unique and can be 
found in different ‘colours’ in different times in different countries, for example, within 
the regulatory regimes under study in Queensland (Australia) and Sweden115. As often in 
these cases the political expediency, not the facts, decided the outcome. The actual 
decision-making process in Belgium was well commented on by one of the 
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interviewees: “But it was a political compromise between a few ministers and there 
were nothing we could do about it.” (Industry expert) 
In Estonia and Sweden there are specific rules in private security regulation on the use 
of non-lethal weapons. The basic idea is that if you have these kinds of ‘tools’ for your 
work in your possession, you should have adequate legal and practical training in how 
to use them. At the same time the laws emphasise that these types of equipment are 
there for occupational health and safety reasons, for use in protection, not to manifest 
any ‘extra powers’ of the guard. The approach to these matters was in general very 
pragmatic, which can be noticed from a comment made by a Swedish regulator on 
telescopic batons and their use:  
“A new baton model has been taken into use, one which can be called telescope 
baton. We have been a little hesitant to accept it because there were risks in its 
use, but now we have found out how to train its users. There is a great demand 
amongst the personnel for it because it is lighter to carry and also easier to use, 
and it has really a great effect.” (Industry expert) 
Another comment made by a union representative strikingly emphasises the core idea of 
carrying ‘cold’ weapons in private security work: “Regarding baton and handcuffs, 
one’s goal has to be to protect oneself and others. One must not use them as 
enforcement tools.” (SE Industry expert) 
In Queensland, the rules for the possession and use of non-lethal weapons were not 
included in private security regulation but in other legislation. They were, however, a 
part of the guards’ tool-kit and thus included in the licensing and training processes: 
“There are regulations that cover the use and the carrying of handcuffs and batons. They 
are part of the licensing process, and the training process covers those elements 
specifically.” (Manager) 
In New York and South Africa, the attitudes concerning non-lethal weapons were clear: 
“The ‘cold’ weapons do not need regulation; they are not a problem in everyday 
operations.” (NY Manager) and correspondingly: “I think it could become over-
regulated for me, if you actually start regulating those non-lethal weapons as well.” (ZA 
Expert) In another New York opinion which correlates with the previous ones the actual 
situation was commented on:  
“So I look at it like this: if we don’t have laws regulating the handcuffs, that’s 
because probably that’s not a real big issue for us. ... I would say the percentage of 
security officers that carry handcuffs and weapons of any type is probably less 
than 1/10, and it is an extremely small number.” (Manager) 
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The union in New York did not seem to make this matter a priority either. A union 
representative made also a specific comment about the right to use handcuffs: “I am not 
aware of discussions within labouring management if they would fit security officers 
with handcuffs, because they don’t have any authority to make arrests.” (Industry 
expert)  
Firearms 
Firearms are connected to all security activities in the minds of common citizens. As the 
police forces are armed in all the regulatory regimes under study, the topic, on the 
general level, also touches on commercial security personnel. The possession and use of 
firearms is in the first place regulated in all countries by special ‘gun’ legislation which 
sets the platform for the local firearm policies. As can be seen from Table 28, all the 
regulatory regimes under study had, in addition to the general gun laws in their 
industry-specific private security legislations, rules for the possession and use of 
firearms at work. In principle the actual control was carried out according to the general 
fire-arm legislation and by the authority responsible of its implementation. 
Table 28 Regulation on firearms within private security work 
   BE    EE   NY QLD   ZA   SE 
Firearms possession principally allowed for private security     x    x    x    x    x    x 
Specific restrictions and instructions on gun possession and use     x    x    x    x    x    x 
            Specific training required    x    x    x    x     x 
            Only company-owned firearms allowed     x     x    x          x 
            Specific ‘rules’ on the possession and use of guns on duty      x       x 
 
When it comes to the possession and use of firearms within security work, there is a 
philosophically common undercurrent that commercial security should be ‘unarmed’. 
The risks faced in certain segments of the work and in certain tasks performed are, 
however, such that in real life this principle cannot be followed. When performing high-
risk tasks, for example CIT, protection of CNI and alarm response, the possibility to 
possess a gun on duty was more a rule than an exception in the regulatory regimes 
under study. In this matter interviewee comments on details and emphasis varied, 
reflecting the general assumptions of the risk environments and the attitudes locally 
concerning guns in their societies.   
Belgium, as with the non-lethal weapons, was a good (general) example of the most 
often faced argumentation for gun possession and the balancing between different 
interests and interest groups. First, shooting incidents in society, which need not 
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actually happen within the commercial security work, trigger new and stricter ‘rules’ on 
weapon possession, as was the case in Belgium:  
“Because of the problems we had last year with this wild guy shooting in 
Antwerp, the whole general firearm law became much stricter. As a result of that 
we had a new Royal Decree even for the private security and its use of arms, it 
became much stricter.” (Industry expert)  
 Second, even though the basic opinions of authorities and companies is ‘no guns’, a 
black period in the middle of the nineties with a lot of hold ups in CIT, some even 
lethal, made it psychologically impossible in Belgium to totally ban firearms from 
guards. A strong opinion from the operational frontline personnel led to a situation 
where it was admitted: “Ok, we are in principle against it but it is a very sensitive 
historically grown issue for the trade unions. ...one of the concessions that both we as 
companies and the Ministry of the Interior had to do was to allow the arms, the 
firearms.” (Manager) 
In Estonia, after the new independence, guns and gun possession were connected to the 
development of the society. In the Soviet Republic of Estonia civilians could not 
possess firearms. In the beginning of the 90s, when the new state’s organisations were 
not yet fully operational the situation changed and thus a lot of unregistered firearms 
were around: “Everyone felt a need to protect themselves” (Expert). Guns were 
acquired for this purpose and most of the guards were armed as well. This had now 
changed and the general attitude in the society is that guns are not needed. In guarding, 
special duties are still seen to require firearms, but their visible possession is at the same 
time seen to be undesirable, as was noted in one of the interviews: “Alarm response is 
another service where guns could be needed. …I don’t see it positively if in the shop 
premises or hotel or some other place the guard has a gun, it scares me.” (Expert)  
In New York the interviewees’ attitudes on firearms were very reserved. This was 
somewhat surprising because the United States is a country known of its liberal gun 
policies. The extra area of concern related to Anglo American jurisdictions – liability – 
was taken up here, as in Queensland, to be a matter affecting the possession of firearms 
in commercial security work. This was a special issue that did not seem to be of concern 
in other regulatory regimes under study. Comments from the interviewees in New York 
were very clear on this subject:  
“No firearms for private security.” (Expert)  
“[Firearms should] only be possessed by the private security officers on specific 
tasks and environments like nuclear plants and oil refineries and always under 
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strict control to avoid misuse. Never in public places like malls, sports events and 
so on.” (Manager)  
“In New York the security officers are not armed. …the security officers who are 
a part of this union are unarmed and the security officers we have been seeking to 
organise in this market are not armed.” (Industry expert) 
In Queensland, the pragmatic approach to this topic could be seen in the comments 
given by the representatives of the different interest groups. The front-line operational 
personnel of the industry were unanimously for fewer guns. However, the daily realities 
faced in the work, the changes seen in the society’s risk environment and the new tasks 
performed by commercial security providers were noted by most of the interviewees – 
guns are here to stay, whether we like it or not. The 'official' opinions of the trade 
unions were very strict but the other interviewees were more pragmatic: 
“… a very small proportion [of security guards]  is armed here and there is a 
movement really away from arms, because it is a liability issue if a guard is 
armed.”116 (Industry expert) 
“…but in union it is an issue that we have opposed in the past and continue to 
oppose arms. …action is a role for the police force and not the security guard and 
we don’t really see they should force security guards to carry firearms.” (Industry 
expert) 
 “I believe that it is wrong. I don’t believe security officers should carry firearms. 
I don’t think the firearms and the security industry are a good combination. 
However, the way world is moving with increasing terrorism I can only actually 
see it increasing. If it did that, then I would prefer if it was done on a stronger 
regulatory basis with higher levels of training and with limited areas of use.” 
(Manage).  
An academic who had followed up the trends in commercial security had a very clear 
opinion on the future: “I cannot see private security without weapons, never.” (Expert) 
A representative of the authority saw the future in the same way: “I think there will be 
weapons used within private security and I cannot imagine a change especially for 
security guards. I [don’t] think any other license category requires a weapon.” (Industry 
expert)  
In South Africa, arms are present in every citizen’s daily life. With the high number of 
armed crimes the guards were very much in possession of firearms in their work. Two 
expert comments on the possibility to disarm private security portray the general feeling 
amongst all local interviewees:  
“Not [less arms] because of the criminal situation in this country and the forces 
you are up against, because the guys running out there, they are more heavily 
armed than our police force at the moment. So you need to have armed security 
forces.” (Expert)  
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“You cannot drive effective security in this country without arms. There are too 
many arms out there in the hands of the criminals.” (Expert)  
This does not mean that there were no concerns about the present firearm policy and 
their possession by commercial security providers; this could be noticed from a third 
expert comment:  
“You don’t need the guy standing in front of a shop to have an automatic firearm. 
For me that’s always been a concern. If I got into a shopping centre and there is a 
guard with a semi-automatic rifle, and I know that his training probably was three 
days, then I’m worried.” (Expert) 
In Sweden, firearms were one item in the toolbox available for a guard in his work, even 
if they did not possess or carry them in practice. The opinion amongst the industry 
strongly opposed guns at work. This matter was not considered an actual topic, as can 
be noticed from the following statement: “The [gun] regulations really work, and there 
is no need for further regulation as far as I can see, it is not mismanaged in any way.” 
(Industry expert) An opinion on the knowledge of the existing situation amongst the 
decision makers was descriptive and supported the understanding that guns are not a hot 
topic presently: 
“…it turned out then that members of parliament sitting on the Board of National 
Police do not have a clue that there are protection guards, no idea of the kind of 
weapons possessed, they just said: Yes, if guards have guns, then we have at least 
to stop that, those they cannot have.” (Industry expert)  
As such, the companies were very restrictive for the possession of firearms, even though 
it would be allowed by the regulation. The basic Swedish attitude was well revealed in 
the statement of another industry representative: “…when we think about protection, 
then one has to act with sound intellect [wits] and not with firearms.” (Industry expert) 
Taking into consideration the opinions presented during interviews in the regulatory 
regimes under study, the following conclusions can be made: First, all weapons, but 
especially firearms are not seen to belong to commercial security, second, most of the 
interviewees considered them, however, to be necessary in certain tasks now and more 
so in the future. The real world needs seemed to steer the authorities and the industry to 
accept weapons as a result of an unavoidable development trend of growing pressures to 
perform tasks including ‘vigilant’ protection of persons and properties.  
9.7 Analysis and discussion 
The six regulatory regimes had quite similar outcomes when choosing what and who to 
regulate? Differences can be noticed in the width and comprehensiveness of the 
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supporting regulation which can be called ‘codes of conduct’. The variations on what 
and who to regulate can be explained by national administrative, political and cultural 
factors. Some choices were also conscious expressions of political evaluation of 
commercial security services. Some of the regulatory regimes had implemented laws to 
effectively rein in the industry, but some of them had had a willingness not only to 
control commercial security, but also to enable it to become a formal partner in the 
strengthening of national security infrastructures. 
Opinions on in-house security varied as did the existing legislation on this subject. The 
majority of the regulatory regimes had seen that public interest issues were strong 
enough for including it in the regulations. It is understandable that there is a public 
interest to have special rules concerning licensed premises as the risks for violence and 
bodily harm caused by security work are manifold. This activity is not principally 
guarding but door supervision (crowd control), the status of which is also interpreted in 
different ways within the regulatory regimes under study. 
The answer to the first actual question of what activities should be regulated had already 
been answered for the main segments in the existing regulations of the regimes under 
study. The interviewees seemed to have very little to say about the core activities within 
the manned security services, that is: static and mobile guarding including call outs, 
event security and close protection. Conversely, two other manned security services, 
traditionally considered ‘marginal’ within the profession, door supervision and private 
investigation, got a lot of comments from the interviewees. The regulation of these two 
segments of services seemed to be desirable but problematic and the regulatory regimes 
even had different ways of handling them, both principally and in practice.  
Concerning door supervision (crowd control) the interviewees, from Belgium, 
Queensland and Sweden which had included this activity in the private security 
regulations, presented a lot of arguments for the need of improvement, especially on the 
control of this activity. The interviewees, from Estonia, New York and South Africa 
which had left this area outside of private security legislation, identified the problems 
and challenges in this segment, but did not actually see it as a part of private security 
and did not either present any specific ideas for its control.  
Private investigation as a commercial security segment was excluded by the law in two 
of the regulatory regimes under study, Belgium and Estonia, where it was seen to be 
primarily an official (police) function, and in Sweden it had not been regulated at all. In 
the rest of the regulatory regimes under study, New York, Queensland and South 
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Africa, it was included in the private security legislation and considered a normal 
commercial security activity. The comments given on this subject clearly reflected that 
everywhere there is a need for private investigation services, but to draw a line between 
police work and private work, in this context, is extremely difficult and it is under 
constant evaluation. Close protection was experienced as such a special and marginal 
activity that only a few actual comments were made about it.  
The regulatory requirements of commercial security companies were taken as an 
existing fact with little comment. More detailed rules related to the companies' business 
activities, like contracting and liability, were, however, not as clear a topic in many of 
the regulatory regimes under study. Although the laws in all of them did not include 
requirements of a written contract with defined minimum content and compulsory 
liability clauses (Hess and Wrobleski 1996:72-92), they were unanimously seen by the 
interviewees to be needed in some form. In the same way, the idea of compulsory 
preservation of certain documents, for example, contracts and on-duty reports were 
thought widely to be a good idea for control reasons. The detailed 'extra' subjects 
regulated varied, reflecting the different priorities in the different societies, but all of the 
regulatory regimes under study had some of them. The main things pointed out in this 
context were related to the compliance with the obligations towards the authorities, the 
consumers of commercial security services and the public at large.  
The security guards' licensing, training and right to weapons were the subjects most 
commented on by the interviewees. The significant number of lengthy comments made 
on different aspects of compulsory and voluntary basic, special and refreshment training 
tells about the importance and difficulty of regulating and organising these activities. It 
also showed that in all the regulatory regimes under study these matters were not totally 
under the security authorities’ control.  
The interviewee opinions on clothing and identification were unanimous and 
emphasised their importance as visible symbols of a guard’s special status. The 
possibility of confusing the appearance of uniforms belonging to the authorities (police) 
with those of security guards was considered a risk to be avoided by regulation on 
clothing and headwear. Interestingly, for the two regulatory regimes missing rules on 
uniforms (QLD and NY), it did not seem to be an actual problem! The clear 
identification of the security company (employer) and the individual guard was 
considered a basic requirement. Company logos on uniforms and personal ID cards 
(numbers) were unanimously seen as a must in security work.  
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The granting of extra powers to guards was not thought by most interviewees to be a 
good idea. Generally, the interviewees’ opinions on the possession of weapons, both 
non-lethal and firearms were cautious. There was, however, a general belief 
underpinning the comments that weapons will be needed to carry out the increasing 
number of tasks being re-allocated to the commercial security sector. 
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CHAPTER 10:  INTERVIEWS - HOW TO REGULATE? 
 
How to regulate commercial security activities is primarily a political and 
administrative question, meaning that the ministry that has been designated to handle 
these matters will resolve them according to the existing models and resources available 
to it. The different interest groups outside the government, including the security 
industry, usually have very limited possibilities to influence the internal government 
processes during which the practical solutions of law implementation are decided upon. 
Three issues were commented on from the interviewees in this context. First, there were 
mainly hypothetical questions on the possibility of having self-regulation in private 
security and the desirability of harmonisation (federalisation) of the regulations. 
Second, there were the more down-to-earth administrative issues like, who should be 
the supervising authority and what the role of the police should be? Third, there were 
the questions relating to the handling of the core tasks, e.g., licensing and training which 
is considered separately in chapter 11. The similarities in the opinions expressed by the 
interviewees on these matters were interesting bearing in mind that within the 
regulatory regimes under study there were widely different solutions on how the 
handling of them had been decided upon and organised. 
10.1 About self-regulation 
Self-regulation was a topic on which most of the interviewees had an opinion. This 
indicates that there is an ongoing discussion, partly led by academics supporting it. The 
people in charge of the actual regulation and living under it were, however, quite 
unanimous in their opinion that in the present world it is not a possible arrangement to 
steer commercial security.  
“I don’t believe in self-regulation. The better the industry is regulated by the 
government the better it develops to fulfill the tasks for which it exists.” (EE 
Manager) 
“I think we should have a role in how it should be regulated but it is much too 
fragmented to sub-regulate itself.” (NY Manager)  
“The theory and principle of self-regulation is good but self-regulation never 
works in private security environment.” (NY Manager)  
“My belief is it should be regulated. Self-regulation is not, I don’t believe self-
regulation would be a current option.” (QLD Manager)  
“No, it does not work. … Self-regulation never works.”  (QLD Expert)  
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”[Self-regulation?] No, I don’t think so. Especially not today when the official 
sector is too expensive and there has to be found substitutive commercial 
solutions.” (SE Industry expert)  
 “Self- regulation will never replace the authority. … It is not the answer to 
everything, definitely not in the security industry, that I can tell you.” (ZA 
Industry expert)  
These comments can be summarised with the idea of dependence expressed by a 
Swedish manager: ”Private security regulation is a triangle of influence: government – 
customer – security provider, which self-regulation does not put into effect.” It is 
notable that most of these opinions were from representatives of regulated groups 
within the industry who could be supposed to oppose government control.   
In any case, there were also some comments in which the future was left open for some 
sort of industry self-regulation. An important point was made by one of the interviewees 
when he mentioned that self-regulation had been tried, at least in some way, in the 
commercial security context but even the basic goals set for its implementation, by the 
government, had not been possible to achieve: “My belief is that there should be some 
sort of regulation and the fact is that the industry could not regulate themselves properly 
or they have done it in such a haphazard manner that government felt that they have to 
step in.” (ZA Expert) In another comment it was pointed out that there can be self-
imposed rules on top of the statutory regulation. The problem expressed was that it is 
quite difficult to enforce these kinds of directives on all the players within the industry: 
“No, no, no, voluntary regulation can be a complement to statutory regulation, and then 
we are talking about the moral of gentlemen’s agreement on quality. ... It helps, but 
slightly, slightly.” (BE Industry expert)  
There were some comments made which were in support of self-regulation as a policy 
in today’s ‘modern’ world. One of them was based on the strong opinion of commercial 
security being a business in a free market environment:  
“From personal and academic point of view I am in favour of a kind of 
legislation but a limited legislation – why? Because private security due to the 
fact that it is private is part of the market, and in the market it is quite simple, it 
is always searching balance between the demand side and the supply side. I 
strongly believe in the concept of the market as being a spontaneous order who 
tries to regulate itself due to prize, competition, quality and so on. From that 
point of view I am more in favour of a legal framework not going into details. 
What happened in Belgium is that today legislation, regulation of private 
security is coming so big that in my opinion it is already over-regulated.” (BE 
Expert) 
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There was another expert who thought quite optimistically that the industry would 
mature and then return step-by-step to self-regulation, but even he saw some threats in 
this kind of development:  
“I think if the industry is regulated by the government a certain period of time 
until the industry can show that it is capable of regulating itself, then maybe we 
can go back to self-regulation actually. It does open the floodgates again for the 
cowboys but maybe that is a long term plan within the industry.” (QLD Expert)  
In Queensland two other interviewees took up the possibility to have a mixed system 
where the industry associations need to approve the applicant companies as a 
precondition for licensing. This model had been tried in some (other) Australian states: 
“There are a couple of different models in Australia. Co-operation model has been 
picked up by the NSW jurisdiction. ...down there they require the security firm 
applying for corporate licensee to be a member of an approved security 
organisation, if not, then that’s a grant for suspension of that license, cancellation 
of license.” (QLD Industry expert) 
 The idea here is to make the security industry take lead responsibility and partly care of 
the compliance control work through their organisations. There was another opinion 
given on the same subject, a more cautious one:  
“I think it [co-regulation model] has a very important place, but sincerely with 
obvious limitations, an obvious one is that it is not compulsory to join, so it is 
very clear that a large number of firms can operate quite successfully without 
being members.” (QLD Expert)  
This interviewee was somehow sceptical and brought up the possibility of a split within 
the security industry and the creation of new rivalling associations, competing with each 
other:  
“As well they make money and want members, so there is a hesitance for them to 
enforce the law and investigate and prosecute members. ... I don’t think co-
regulation will happen in Queensland now, ASIAL wants it but there seems to be 
a lot of resistance.”   
As a summary of the opinions on self-regulation can be taken a comment made by a 
manager who works in the tough, profit-oriented security market of the United States 
and knows the realities of the business:  
“I’ll say no [to self-regulation] because there are too many companies and there is 
going to be the company out there having only 5000 men hours per week, maybe 
it is two or three accounts, they are going to do whatever it takes to make the 
biggest profit because whatever profit they make it will go straight in their 
pockets and to say that people would self-regulate themselves in the US - I don’t 
see that happening.” (NY Manage)  
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When summarising the interviewee opinions (Table 29), including those taken as 
examples in this presentation, it is obvious that in the regulatory regimes included in 
this study, self-regulation is not seen as a solution for steering and controlling 
commercial security activities.  
Table 29 Opinions on self-regulation 
Regulatory 
regime 
General opinions Divergent opinions 
Belgium Self-regulation – no, no, no. Voluntary regulation can be 
complement to statutory regulation.  
I am in favour of legal framework not 
going into details. 
Estonia I don’t believe in self-regulation. Own initiative is needed if the 
authorities cannot fulfil all their 
responsibilities. 
New York The theory and principle of it is good but 
self-regulation never works in 
commercial security. 
I do not see that [self-regulation] 
happening. 
 
Queensland Self-regulation never works.  
I don’t think co-operation needed for 
self-regulation will happen in QLD now.  
Self-regulation is not a current option 
Maybe self-regulation is a long-term 
plan within the industry. 
Co-operation model has been picked up 
by ASIAL. 
South Africa Self-regulation will never replace the 
authority.  
The industry could not regulate 
themselves properly. 
 
Sweden Self-regulation, no, I don’t think so. 
Self-regulation do not fulfil the different 
requirements set for the industry. 
 
10.2 Federalisation and harmonisation of regulation 
Should and could there be common rules for commercial security in countries like the 
USA and Australia, or in an entity like European Union, which are all connected 
somehow to the regulatory regimes under study? The need for common rules was 
expressed by many of the interviewees, but internal political realities seemed to have 
made this solution generally impossible for the time being. It was obvious that, at least 
today, commercial security regulations will not be the first area in legislation where the 
states’ legislative independence concerning law enforcement-related matters will be 
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broken up. The interviewee comments in this context are mainly from New York and 
Queensland as this matter is principally relevant to them. In the European Union, the 
split is in many ways administratively and culturally even more complicated because it 
affects the law enforcement governance models of independent nation states. Even so 
the interviewees from Belgium and Sweden, expressed some opinions on this matter. 
The situation and attitudes are generally still diversified in Europe as have been 
expressed by national associations of commercial security (De Clerck, et al 2007:20-
33). 
In the State of New York the interviewee opinions supported more streamlined rules on 
this matter. No common or structured policy could, however, be found amongst them. 
One aspect commented on was the hope for nationally standardised background checks 
on security guards in order to streamline their basic control: “What I’d like to see on 
federal level, I think a security officer needs to have a proper background check run by 
the FBI. (Manager) In another comment an interviewee hoped for a federal minimum 
standard, which could be extended by the state governments: “The minimum statutory 
standards [regulations] should be federal applying to all the states in the United States. 
The individual states could then add on top of that special things they see to be needed.” 
(Manage) The same interviewee also saw terrorism as a good justification argument to 
support this kind of federal legislation: “The threat of terrorism could be a tactic to 
enforce federal regulation because anything else would not make the states to accept it. 
An emergency like terrorism threat could do that.” This interviewee was, however, 
aware of the basic problem in achieving this kind of model: “The balance between the 
states and federal legislature and executive is such that no-one wants to change that 
balance.” 
  In another comment the approach was a more cautious one and emphasised voluntary 
co-operation. “As far as to be state or federal, I think that it would help if both the state 
and federal authorities became more engaged on the issue.” (Industry expert) Also this 
interviewee took up the terrorist threat as an argument for more streamlined regulation. 
He commented on a federal report on the 9/11 incident which included discussion on 
the role of commercial security in protecting critical national infrastructure. The 
interviewee wondered, however, why there was no follow up of this path by saying:  
“And an interesting fact is in that report, and it is yet to be followed up, 85% of 
the infrastructure in this country is protected not by public security officers but by 
private. This is totalling statistics and talks about their importance I think, the 
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scope in this country. But unlike other aspects in the 9/11 commission report there 
is no follow up in regard to the private sector security officers.” 
The comments here reflect some hesitancy and caution to express opinions too strongly 
on this issue.  
In Australia, the matter of uniform private security regulation has been handled by the 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG). Even if all the practical facts support a 
federal streamlining of commercial security regulation, again the state legislative 
independence principle tips over this kind of proposals. However the idea is still alive 
(Davitt 2010; Sarre and Prenzler 2011). As can be seen from the following comment by 
a Queensland official, before the proposal was turned down, there was a genuine need 
and will for change:  
“...last year (2007) COAG, that is the peak ministerial body comprising of prime 
minister and all the premiers throughout the States agreed and then decided that 
harmonisation is a way to move forward in terms of providing a uniform 
[security] industry. ...The logical and theoretical model should be a single piece of 
legislation, and theoretically speaking the most logical choice would be the 
Commonwealth Government’s single piece of regulation which covers all the 
states.” (Industry expert) 
The terrorism threat, as in the United States played also in this discussion and decision 
making a vital role, as was stated in the same context: 
“That was primarily related to the counter terrorism agenda that COAG held at 
that time at its hold. A review that was conducted by the minister of another 
department was consistent with that wish so it was working towards that goal and 
that harmonisation... We are getting very, very close to standards of criteria on a 
lot of things.” 
The comments from people actually working within the industry supported 
harmonisation. They had met the problems of the present situation in their work and 
wanted a change. They saw that the guards and the industry would benefit from this 
kind of development: “From a security personnel point of view I would like to see a 
federal regulation with national competency standards applied across the borders. So it 
would make the license portable.” (Expert)  He also pointed out that the streamlining of 
checks connected to licensing would be easier to perform: “It would also let other 
jurisdictions to access criminal records from all over the country.” In practice he was as 
sceptical as the others of the possibilities to achieve this. “I cannot see it 
[harmonisation] happening in the medium term. ...In the next ten years, no, in twenty 
years there may be some considerations.”  The same interviewee came back to the 
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subject in another context and described in a clear and more comprehensive way the 
situation as well as a model of desirable best practices serving all interest groups:  
“It is a mess, a complete mess. If I had my way I would take all state power away 
from regulating the industry and I would give it to the Federal Department of 
Justice. That way we would get a uniform set of regulations and laws and a 
uniform set of competencies standards which the industry has to make before 
being licensed. It just makes sense, it really does and I just find that the disjoint 
approach with each state doing its own thing actually adds to the poor perception 
of the industry as a whole. So for clients who have a number of offices in different 
states, they have to deal with all these different systems. It is burdensome and they 
should not have to worry of the extra workload associated with combining 
different legislation in every single state. So federally applied jurisdiction and 
applied regulation would work much better. I think politically it is going to be 
really tough to convince the states.”  
A similar statement was given by a frontline security professional:  
“It should be regulated on the federal level because Australia is a very large 
country but the population is predominantly on the eastern seaboard. What we 
need to do is to get consistency between the regimes in the states, that’s an ideal.” 
(Manager)  
He was, anyhow, also very sceptical of the possibility of common regulation: “But 
reality is reality. The state will not give up its power to regulate, in which case the state 
regulation will be the second option.” An academic opinion given in this context was 
unanimous with this: “Absolutely it should be [harmonised] but it is unlikely in 
Australia. The current Federal Government is simply not interested. I have to be 
pessimistic about the prospects to finish short term harmonisation.” (Expert) After 
saying this, the interviewee explained his optimal solution to this matter if only the 
actual facts of good regulation would be considered:  
“COAG has no powers, they have to agree. It is all voluntary, that’s the problem. 
So they can meet and they can agree to try to create national standards but the fact 
is that it is only happening in a very limited way mainly with training, it’s the 
common training standards, you know, national competencies. So that is a good 
thing but I mean that if you look around Australia just now the systems are very 
different. The terminology is different, everything is different: disqualifying 
things, disqualifying periods, license categories, license fees, suitability tests, 
some states are doing fingerprinting, some are doing drug and alcohol testing 
others aren’t, so there is not much harmony. I think the federal department of 
justice should get the eight jurisdictions together and say let’s try and find a 
common act, common set of regulations we can agree on and my office will 
provide resources to co-ordinate that. At the moment there is no incentive for 
Queensland or any jurisdiction to communicate with their counterparts for 
harmony, you know.” 
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It is not just the streamlining that is the problem. In Belgium where the state structure is 
fragmented and political culture fractured, there is also a threat that the control which is 
now centralised could be split similarly with the present public police organisation. The 
industry as such has a strong desire to keep the regulation federal:  
“It [regulation] should be federal, absolutely. In Belgium the party that now won 
the elections, wants a new [decentralising] state reform. But it has nothing to do 
with this kind of issues [private security regulation]. … It should remain on 
federal level.” (Industry expert) 
Even in Sweden there were some strict opinions favouring a more comprehensive 
(centralised) structure for the regulation and especially its implementation as can be 
noticed from the following industry expert comment (Eriksson 2007a:28)117: “We want 
to have a total and streamlined control of those regulations there are concerning security 
companies, guards, crowd controllers and protection guards, as many of these matters 
overlap and the existing legislation is basically common.”  
Based on the general and detailed opinions presented by the interviewees, there is 
clearly a practical argument in favour of the harmonisation of commercial security 
regulation which is overruled for the time being by historical models of administration 
boundaries and partisan attitudes. The comments on a streamlined regulation were very 
similar. The interviewees looked at the matter from a practical and operational point of 
view and in their opinion the best way to take care of the matter would be the creation 
of a federal/harmonised model. It was as obvious that they understood the political 
impossibility of this kind of set up for the time being. A basic summary (Table 30) of  
Table 30 Opinions on federalisation and harmonisation of regulation 
Regulatory 
regime 
Opinions Comments 
Belgium Regulation should remain on federal level 
(centralised). 
Decentralisation of governance should not 
include private security regulation.  
New York 
 
I’d like to see it on federal level. 
The minimums statutory standards should 
be federal applying to all the states. 
There should be uniform (minimal) 
federal statutory standards on private 
security. 
It would help if both state and federal 
authorities become more engaged on the 
issue 
 
The threat of terrorism could be a tactic to 
enforce federal regulation. 
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Queensland COAG decided that harmonisation is a 
way to move forward in terms of 
providing a uniform industry. 
A logical choice would be a single piece 
of regulation which covers all the states. 
I would like to see a federal regulation 
with national competency standards. 
I would give regulation powers to the 
federal authorities. 
Federally applied jurisdiction and 
regulation would work much better. 
It should be regulated on federal level. 
Absolutely it should be harmonised. 
It is primarily related to the counter 
terrorism agenda. 
I cannot see harmonisation happening in 
the medium term. 
Politically it is going to be really tough to 
convince the states of the superiority of 
this kind of arrangement. 
Sweden We want to have a total and stream-lined 
control of those regulations there are. 
 
We would want to evaluate the Finnish 
model with one authority having total 
responsibility. 
 
the comments in this study shows the unanimous attitudes of the interviewees on these 
matters. Not a single opinion in favour of decentralised regulation was given. 
10.3 The structures and work of the regulatory administrations 
In the regulatory regimes under study the basic private security administrative structures 
and the implementation organisations were a part of the government organisation (Table 
31). In the same way the procedures of licensing and daily follow up control were in the 
hands of the state officials. Because of this the interviewees, especially the operationally 
active ones, did not have or express many detailed opinions on how to organise this 
activity. The governmental ministry/department in charge of the private security was 
also in charge of the police matters, except in New York and Queensland. It is, 
however, important to notice that the police authorities are the actual license and 
controlling organisation only in Estonia. This is a central factor to bear in mind when 
the relations between police and commercial security providers are handled in this 
section.  
TABLE 31 Licensing authorities in the regulatory regimes under study 
 State   Superior Government Authority    Actual main licensor 
   BE   Ministry of the Internal Affairs   Ministerial Department 
   EE   Ministry of the Internal Affairs   National Police Commissioner / Local  Police   Prefect 
   NY   Department of State   Division of Licensing Services118 
 QLD   Department of Employment, Economic 
  Development and Innovation 
  Office of Fair Trading 
 
   ZA   Department of Police   Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 
   SE   Department of Justice119   County Administrative Board  
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The present administrative organisations were mentioned by the interviewees in several 
ways. The different accentuation in different regulatory regimes was understandable as 
the administrative models and local ways to control the commercial security activity 
varied a lot, especially in practice. In most of the comments the present models were 
seen as an existing reality and improvements were primarily wished for in the practical 
daily work. In this matter the focus was not on the governance models but on the ‘daily’ 
smoothness of the arrangements from the commercial security companies’ business 
point of view. 
Belgium 
In Belgium, where the responsibilities were concentrated in the Ministry of the Interior, 
the basic arrangement was accepted, but: “…we believe that the Ministry of the Interior 
has too much concentration of powers.” (Industry expert) What was meant by this was a 
basic dilemma of concentrating too much of the regulation and its implementation 
powers in the same authority. When reading the description of the system it is no 
wonder that the industry sometimes feels frustrated as was commented similarly by 
interviewees: 
“It is the Ministry of the Interior who writes all the legislation and the Royal 
decrees and the ministerial decrees and even within the ministry it is the same 
department, so we are talking of one department, one direction of private security 
in the Ministry of the Interior. It writes the law, ok and that’s a monopoly. 
Secondly if there are things in the law that are not very clear, they do an 
interpretation. It is the same department who does the pre-screening, it is the same 
department who gives authorisations to companies, it is the same department who 
gives the licences to the guards, it is the same department who sends out its people 
to do the controls, and it is the same department who arbitrarily decides how high 
the fine will be. And we think that is something - too much monopoly.” (Industry 
expert)       
Estonia 
In Estonia where the police have a leading legally mandated role in all practical 
commercial security control, there were problems in the actual processes. It seemed that 
they were unwilling or incapable of discharging their tasks as the main regulatory body. 
Comments from the industry representatives were very negative and included a wish for 
a more customer oriented licensing and control practice. The situation could be 
compared with the Belgian one where one authority had dual roles in the regulation 
process. A comment on law drafting process by a commercial security representative 
describes the feelings within the industry:   
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“And it was clearly reflected during the law drafting process that the division of 
labour was in certain tasks problematic if co-operation between police and private 
security does not function. Even if we have always said that they lead and have 
also offered the leader's role to them, they want to take it but are not capable to 
execute it. If asked, of course, no-one admits this straight away.” (Manager) 
Attitudes within the industry on the control organisation were sceptical but without 
suggestions for better alternatives as can be noticed from the following comment by 
another industry’s manager: 
“Even if they should have their role as supervisors, a leading role, sometimes one 
thinks that it should be better if one would not need to have anything to do with 
them. In that sense it would be good if there could be some totally neutral body in 
between, but at the same time this body should have knowledge and skills to 
supervise and lead, so who would be there - again the police.” (Manager)  
The same feelings on the dual police role were expressed in a third industry 
representative comment calling for an independent ‘broker’ between the regulators and 
regulated:  
“Maybe the police are being bumptious. A kind of a separate licensing unit could 
in my opinion be a solution. Then there would not be such pressure, such stress, 
the police would be the police and the private security the private security.” 
(Manager) 
New York  
The administrative organisation of the control of commercial security was clearly not a 
topic in New York. The comments made about the private security administration 
structure supported, however, a police driven system, which is not the existing 
arrangement. “The obvious practical controller of security industry is the police. They 
have closer contacts to and better understanding of the real private security business 
challenges than other departments.” (Manager) One reason for this opinion could be the 
huge difference in the private security regulation and control arrangements compared to 
the neighbouring state of New Jersey, which together with New York in practice form a 
congruent urban area. The neighbouring system was considered new and superior 
compared with the local arrangements. This was taken up by another interviewee 
stating:  
“In New Jersey it [supervision, licensing and control] is run by the state police, 
they understand security, they understand police work, they understand what it is 
to do the job every day and they work very well with the industry and understand 
it a little bit more.” (Industry expert) 
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Another factor taken up was the old bureaucracy annoying the ‘customers’, which was 
commented  politely by saying:  “I really don’t care personally which agency this is, I 
think it needs to be in the hands of a group or entity that is going to be responsive to the 
industry [customers] and have a streamlined process.” (Manager)  
Queensland  
In Queensland, the matter of the responsible authority had been given more attention by 
the different stakeholders. The regulator opinion was clear; the police would be the best 
alternative, but again state autonomy made the systems different.  
“Essentially the question comes back to: should police regulate private security? 
There is a lot of academic commentary in relation to this. I have read most of it, so 
there are arguments for and arguments against it. You have the arguments that the 
police has an interest of conflict here, you are regulating a competitor essentially, 
but then again there are arguments for that the police essentially have valuable 
information in liaison to individuals. They are able to be more robust who should 
hold a license. Personally I believe police should regulate [the industry] because 
they have the expertise, they have a larger network in terms of dealing with it.” 
(Industry expert) 
This basic opinion was supported by one from the 'field' licensees commenting:  
“I think it should be the police. They have the responsibility of dealing with the 
police security and safety. To me it is a parallel responsibility with the private 
security industry. [Police should lead] to ensure that the private security industry 
support and supplement the police, not replace them” (Manage) 
 Another manager dealing on a daily basis with these matters was more hesitant: 
“Actually it is in confusion. In Queensland licensing regarding firearms is with 
the police, and the other licensing is with the Office of Fair Trading. Two, three 
years ago there was talk of everything going over to the police but that might not 
happen, it’s changed.” (Manager)  
An academic with thorough knowledge of private security had the opposite opinion 
supporting the present system with a regulator independent from the police:  
“I think it is just business regulation we are talking about, I think that belongs to 
Fair Trading. The police I don’t think should be in the business of regulating an 
industry. Potentially there is a conflict of interest and it is not just their job, their 
job is to fight crime, but I think they have a supplementary role within the 
legislation in giving the licenses etc.” (Expert)  
The interviewee continued by commenting that the police are for practical reasons, even 
in Queensland, the ones making the background checks and participating in this way in 
the licensing process. Their role is to act as a bureaucratic link in an administrative 
system: “But also the criminal history checks have to be done by the police. Or at least 
179 
 
they have to provide the data base to Fair Trading.”  This expert had a clear sense that 
the main regulator should in the future also be the Office of Fair Trading, even if in 
some other Australian states the responsibility had been given to the local police 
organisation:  
“So I think the primary regulatory role, the day to day work of processing 
licenses, conducting investigations, setting standards, developing policies - Fair 
Trading. Supplementary role for the police ... I don’t like the idea of police 
departments regulating security industry at all.” 
These opinions show that the personnel in QLD who are involved in the daily regulation 
implementation work support to some extent a police driven regulation system and do 
not consider the academic 'threats' of this kind of arrangement as a serious problem.  
South Africa 
In South Africa the government structure for controlling commercial security operators 
and personnel was steered by a politically appointed commission which was not felt to 
be commercial security oriented. The council members did not have actual commercial 
security experience or knowledge; however they were supposed to be the ones deciding 
the strategies for the actual licensing and control of the industry. This was commented 
cautiously by some of the interviewees: “The PSIRA is headed by a council appointed 
from people outside the industry. … It is very political and does not have straight 
contacts to the industry.” (Expert) Another similar comment reveals also a lack of 
transparency in the governance:  
“The council of PSIRA is very political and according to the law they must not 
have any connection to the industry.  That is interesting and to be honest, I cannot 
answer the question why is that so. …The persons in the council have political 
and commercial interests, they run big businesses, businesses in housing and 
health and also other things like that. (Industry expert) 
The industry understood the need for a strong regulatory administration: “Definitely in 
South Africa, you need a very strong regulating authority.” (Manager)  The commercial 
security providers were, however, not totally happy with the present organisation and 
especially its cost to the industry: “We have got a regulatory authority PSIRA which is 
actually a government subsidiary, government controls it but it is subsidised by the 
industry. It creates a lot of unhappiness because it costs companies money.”  
The communication between licensors and licensees in actual daily work had also been 
very limited which was straining the relationship between the regulatory body and the 
security industry:  
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“I don’t know why they have taken so long to start to communicate with the 
industry. I cannot honestly say what their problems are, they have had a website 
running about six months, you cannot phone them easily, you cannot talk to them 
easily and that is a problem from the industry’s point of view.” (Manager)   
The industry was, however, trying hard to open a dialogue. Interviewees were hesitant 
to comment on the organisation structure of the authority. Probably the reason was the 
transition situation in the society where the governance of commercial security was still 
‘political’, even if it was in principle organised in a structured way.  
Sweden 
In Sweden, the organisation of regulation was not a subject amongst the interviewees. 
Only one expert commented in more detail about the existing system. The special 
arrangement of the division of labour made the governance model interesting. In 
practice the police wrote the detailed statutory directives but the local civil authorities 
took independently care of their practical interpretation and implementation. The 
common nominator of these authorities was their connection to the Ministry of Justice. 
This situation was commented by a civil servant in charge of the implementation of the 
rules in the following way: 
“No, I think Department of Justice is good because they take care of police 
matters and these are such things that tangent anyhow policing matters. It is partly 
the same methodology, same problems which are faced. They have knowledge of 
the problems, better than any other department could have.” (Industry expert)  
The system was based on the over 350 years old provincial governance system where 
there are independent county administrations (today 23) with governmental civil 
servants representing the state locally, including the commercial security licensing. 
These administrative units are historically very independent as can be noticed from the 
following comment: “...we shall represent the government. And we are independent 
authorities who shall ourselves apply the laws which we use, without listening to any 
parties, not even the government in individual cases; there we shall only apply the 
legislation.”  
This Swedish system with the independent local licensors is considered to be 'near' the 
licensees but it lacks the expertise resources in most parts of the country because there 
is only a limited number of security companies registered outside Stockholm and some 
other main cities. 
There were, however, some strict opinions favouring a more comprehensive structure 
for the regulation and its implementation work as can be noticed from the following 
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comments: “We think that responsibilities between National Police Board, County 
Administrations and local police authorities are too blurred. We would want to evaluate 
the Finnish model with one authority having total responsibility.” (Industry expert) 
Discussion 
No general uniformity can be found in the opinions given in different environments. It 
can be only stated, as has been done in other contexts earlier; regulatory regimes are 
unique entities with their own local strengths, weaknesses and challenges. The 
structures steering commercial security activities are in most cases loosely connected to 
this business, but based primarily on the political circumstances and general structures 
within the societies. As can be seen from the summary Table 32 below, most of the  
Table 32 Key interview points on regulatory administration 
Belgium The security industry thinks that too much law- and regulation drafting, 
interpretation, execution, control and penal authority has been centralised to one 
governmental body within the Ministry of the Interior. 
Estonia The police are not capable of executing fully the leading and supervisory role and 
tasks belonging to them according to the private security legislation. 
The police have the best knowledge and skills to supervise and lead private security. 
There could be a totally neutral body between the police and private security. 
A separate licensing unit could be a solution. 
New York The obvious practical controller of security industry is the police. 
Police understand (private) security work. 
It does not matter who controls private security, the authority should just be smoothly 
organised and responsive to the industry. 
Queensland Police should regulate private security because they have the needed expertise. 
Police should control private security to ensure that it supports and supplements them. 
I don’t think police should be in the business regulating an industry; potentially there 
is a conflict of interest. 
I don’t like at all the idea of police departments regulating security industry. 
South Africa The council of the controlling authority is very political and I do not understand why 
the law prohibits them to be in touch with the industry. 
The authority creates a lot of unhappiness amongst the companies because it costs 
them money. 
The industry is talking to the government (authority) – is the government talking to 
the industry? 
Sweden I think Department of Justice is a good authority for private security because they 
take care also of police matters which tangent with the commercial security. 
Responsibilities between National Police Board, County Administrations and local 
police authorities are too blurred – we would want to evaluate a model with one 
responsible authority. 
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different opinions and worries represented by the interviewees of the regulatory regimes 
under study on regulatory administrations and their work apply to general 
administration principles, policies and decisions. At least one general conclusion can be 
made from the table; as long as the commercial security providers’ general positioning 
in society and towards public police function are not clarified, their statutory and 
practical steering will remain blurred. 
The main consideration in many comments seemed to be the role of the public police in 
commercial security context. As can be seen from the opinions presented, a police 
driven system was principally favoured as it was thought to have more practical 
knowledge and ‘professional’ qualities which support the co-operation with commercial 
security providers. There were also strong opinions presented in which the police – 
private security connection in regulation and licensing processes was seen problematic. 
These opinions were principally based on the view that police is a law enforcement 
organisation and private security is a business activity and the mixing of these two is a 
mistake.  
The opinions collected in the table show also how mixed the actual topics and worries 
are on commercial security administration in different regulatory regimes. That is why it 
seems impossible at this stage to try to present a general model how things in this 
administrative matter should be handled. This is primarily a local matter to be decided 
locally. The general feeling amongst the interviewees were, however, that the states’ 
administrative organisations are political governance matters and in most cases out of 
the reach to influence by operational civil servants or commercial security personnel. 
10.4 The role of and the relations with the public police 
The police and commercial security providers work together, partly in the same sphere. 
Commercial security is the one with a growing role because of the developments and 
changes in the societies’ risk environments. This means that unavoidably cooperation 
and conflicts are created when a new division of labour takes shape in providing 
security.  The official role police have in the commercial security context has been 
basically decided when writing the regulations and organising the practical steps in 
licensing and controlling the industry. Even so, the tasks performed by the different 
security provider groups overlap in any case, and there are many practical things to be 
discussed and solved concerning their relations. In all the countries under study there 
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were some things the interviewees wanted to say about this matter. The interesting point 
was that the topics taken up in the different regulatory regimes under study were not 
similar and reflected strongly the local general governance and police cultures. The 
situation in New York and Sweden has especially been looked at, as it differs from the 
other regulatory regimes under study and is somehow unique even transnationally. 
Belgium  
In Belgium, a commercial security representative was very clear on the division of 
labour and the role the two, partly parallel, security organisation have in the society. 
The police role is to take care of: “...anything that has to do with maintaining of public 
order. Anything that has to do with the possibility or the right to limit the citizens’ basic 
rights...  I think that is for the police.'” (Industry expert) 
 After defining the 'sole' police domain the interviewee touched on the rest of their work 
and the division of labour with commercial security in an interesting way: “In the same 
way our [commercial security’s] role is prevention. In certain areas it is really needed 
that visible police is on the street, but there are a lot of police tasks that absorb police 
resources without giving any added value to the society as such.”  
The reasoning went on giving examples of present arrangements and police tasks in 
Belgium which the interviewee considered to be better suited to commercial security: 
“...every village, major village has its own police office. People have to go there for a 
lot of things, and there is a fully authorised, trained police guy, just sitting in the 
reception.” There were also other examples given on this matter: “Same thing in courts, 
they’ve also a reception desk in the courts where there is often police or other public 
official sitting.” After saying this, a couple of examples were given to show that the 
needed competence of commercial security providers is there: “We [the commercial 
security] do it for European Commission; we do it for a lot of clients.” The 
interviewee’s opinion on what blocks the reorganisation in this area is a political 
discrepancy in the police organisation: “First of all, the police unions [are against this], 
because they already during the last years experienced their personnel being reduced to 
a fair amount because of the restructuring of our police.”  
Estonia 
In Estonia, the situation was problematic because the police had been reorganised and 
they needed resources for new tasks and challenges. At the same time they were made 
responsible for the supervision of commercial security legislation implementation. In 
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this situation it is no wonder that they tried to handle their responsibilities as the 
licensing and controlling authority without using too many resources to this job. The 
recent history after independence had also included an unclear situation in the division 
of labour between the police and the commercial security providers which still affected 
their relations. Even if the division of labour had now been solved, there were some 
tensions left smouldering: “It was here such a time when the relations between the 
police and the private security industry were a little complicated, because still in those 
days police officers moved over to private security companies.” (Industry expert)  
One of the existing problems in the daily co-operation was brought up by a commercial 
security manager:  
“Sometimes I have a feeling that police is not neutral enough, even if there are no 
bad attitudes towards them from our side, but in my opinion the police ... have 
always seen in security companies a rival and always there is the discussion [on 
tasks]; this is ours and that is yours.” (Manager)  
The resources of the public and commercial security were also mentioned by the same 
interviewee as a possible reason for the discrepancies: “The police don’t have resources 
and the police is afraid that we take their work or that we are more effective because we 
are private companies, and they can be considered not as good because of this.”  
New York 
In New York, on the one hand, the police had no direct role in the licensing and control 
of commercial security activities. On the other hand, the whole set up was different 
from the other regulatory regimes under study because the police generally in the 
United States (Manning 2006:107) and, especially in New York City; first, did not 
suffer from limited resources in the same way as in other regulatory regimes under 
study; second, had a culture of police officers working within private and commercial 
security after retirement; third, the police provided privately or as an organisation also 
security services for a fee.  
Adequate resourcing had created a situation where the police could cope effectively 
with their challenges:  
“The police force in New York is special. It is relatively the largest police force in 
the United States and has also in other ways got the support of New York City. 
This is also affecting the relationship between the police and the private security 
on all levels.” (Expert)  
This meant also that unlike in other regimes: “Police has been able to fulfil the 
requirements of the society and there is not a grey area between the police and private 
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security tasks.” As a consequence of this several tasks which in many countries are left 
to commercial security were still in the hands of police in New York. The same 
interviewee pointed out that a strong unofficial connection between the public and 
private security could be noticed on personal level because of the culture of ex-police 
officers taking a job within private and commercial security after retiring: “Police has 
also a good and working relationship with security managers in firms and the private 
security industry because 75% of them are previous police officers.” The affect this had 
on cooperation was clear: “This relationship is working on all levels from the 
Commissioner to police districts.” 
Another interviewee, a commercial security manger, noted the way the police in New 
York were working very effectively. He saw that this is lowering the problems in 
division of labour which are commonly faced in other countries. First, he pointed out a 
general reason for this: “The police forces in general in the US are less bureaucratic 
than their counterparts in Europe.” Second he emphasised the modern approach in 
meeting old and new work challenges: “The police in New York State and especially in 
NYC are improving their tactics and productivity using newest technology very 
effectively, very much like the private security industry when trying to improve its 
businesses.” 
Adequate police resourcing and the entrepreneurial culture within the forces had made 
and kept the public-private boundaries ‘legally’ blurred between police and commercial 
security providers but in practice relatively clear as was stated by the same interviewee: 
“As the police resources have been taken care of and the police can handle their 
traditional and new work challenges, there have been fewer problems with the 
public/private borderline and the public/private space matter.” On top of this the 
interviewee commented the public space question on a general level categorically: “The 
theory is clear on public–private domains. This is not an everyday or big problem in the 
US to the industry.”  
In another expert comment the mixed role of the police was described in the same way 
as by Manning (2006:107) in his article. The police performed also tasks including 
activities which could be considered to be commercial security: “Everyone is most 
happy with the present practice where police can flexibly perform also private security 
duties through police organisation or on private bases. This system is not going to 
change in the near future. (Expert) The same interviewee commented also on the 
division of labour: “Division of labour between the police and the private security in 
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NYC is one of the best in the US.” He as well emphasised the importance of good 
personal connections between the actors: “This applies also to the relations between the 
police and private security. One explanation to this is the heavy load of ex police 
officers working in private security. This tradition works well.”  
The “classical” negative opinion police officers have about private security still 
prevailed in New York even though some improvement could be noticed. The basic 
attitude was commented on in a straight forward way: “...[police] look down on private 
security officers. They do not appreciate them as a professional group.” (Manager) 
There were, however, also more positive assessments like:  
“...when I was starting in the business, police departments had a very negative 
view of private security, very, very negative [in the beginning of the 90s]. As we 
got into the turn of the century it started to get better and now I think it is even 
more the case…“I’d like to tell you that it’s because they persuade our folks are 
more competent. I am not convinced that is why, I think there is a bit that the 
police officers on the job see private security as more a career path than they may 
have, so in their own mind they think that they may perceive it as being more 
legitimate because maybe in fifteen years you may be there”. (Manager)  
The very close connections between the police personnel and the private and 
commercial security on an individual level seemed to affect the security business a lot. 
As mentioned already in the previous interview comment, there was a strong link of 
interest, stemming from the police officers’ personal ambitions. The following 
comments describe how another manager in commercial security experienced the 
movement from police to the industry: “The large number of police officers entering the 
private security after their career in police is both good and bad. If they enter the 
existing ‘serious’ private security organisations, they will improve the professionalism 
and standards.” (Manager) 
After saying this he went on by also pointing out the risks: “But if they start their own 
business their lacking business skills often lead to ‘cowboy’ like behaviour which will 
hurt the industry. They are usually not good business people and that creates problems.”  
This interviewee also made a practical comment on the added value given by former 
police officers in private security as security managers buying services: “Ex cops have 
good contacts to their former organisation and they can skilfully organise their 
operations in a way that there will not be discrepancies concerning public/private 
questions and legal actions.”  
A phenomenon not found in the other regulatory regimes under study is the practice of 
serving police officers working within commercial security: “Off duty police officers 
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can be hired for security work both by the security companies and straight as in-house 
by customers. Sometimes they even offer clients their services actively.” (Manager) An 
interesting detail, mentioned by the same interviewee, was that they could perform their 
‘private’ tasks in some cases using their police outfit: “These police officers can and do 
work [in private security] in their uniforms and with their duty weapons.” These 
policemen can be hired and paid straight by the customers or by a commercial security 
company subcontracting their services.” 
Queensland 
In Queensland, the police did not have any direct role in regulating, licensing or 
controlling commercial security. On the one hand, there were not any actual opinions 
expressed on the relations between the police and the commercial security providers, 
which reflected a situation where the interaction between the two security providers 
were insignificant and without any bigger problems. On the other hand, there were 
strong opinions on the police influence in questions concerning commercial security: 
 “Their [police] role is to enforce the laws using the public powers they have. It 
would just seem almost like, not a conflict of interest when they [police and 
private security] are working parallel but they are distinctly different from each 
other. I think they need to be separated. I feel that it is just not appropriate that the 
police would regulate security industry. I don’t feel comfortable with that. That is 
my opinion.” (Expert) 
Some other experts when asked if the police role in private security was a problem, 
answered shortly: “Probably not because the present role of the police has now become 
very reactive.” (Manager) and even more categorically “I don’t see the police 
departments in different states having a role in being the regulator, as far as the 
licensing is concerned.” (Expert) Looking more exactly at the co-operation, the answer 
from an academic was: “I think it is attached, it is not close. There is some cooperation, 
it is fairly ad hoc. ...But I think there is still the sense that police have far superior 
training.” (Expert) Also this interviewee commented about the police’s interest in 
private security: “Not very interested, no. I think they are too busy and they are just not 
trained to think about private security. I think they probably have a superior attitude.”  
The comment of one of the interviewees describes in one way the wretched ‘truth’ of 
the relation between the police officers and the commercial security employees:  
“What we are left with at the end of the day is a scene of two forces; one a 
highly trained, directed and accountable public force and the other a less 
professionalised quasi-force which, in many instances, is less trained and much 
less accountable to the general public. Together they move around both public 
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and private areas, in a sea of misconceptions about their various functions, 
engaging in a tight-lipped dialogue which hides more than it states, and using 
each other only when the economic and commercial assessments have been 
concluded.” (Industry expert) 
South Africa 
In South Africa, the police had only a supportive role in regulating, licensing or 
controlling processes concerning commercial security and thus there were no straight 
‘official’ ongoing contacts between these two services. The entire security situation in 
the country was rather complicated as the roles of the police and commercial security 
providers were in practice very blurred. Because of the overall situation in the society, 
the police cannot fulfil with their present resources the existing need for their services.   
The following comment described the core of the problem: “You don’t get police 
responding to normal security.” (Expert)  
Actually the situation was even worse. The police had to use commercial security 
services to protect their own facilities: “The situation is so bad at the moment that many 
of our police stations are protected by private security. If you go to their headquarters 
here in Pretoria you will see it is totally protected by private security.” (Expert) The 
same problems are faced also in other cities as the following comment from the same 
interviewee tells: “Recently there was a situation in Cape Town at a police station off 
the hours and then an attack, so the police complained: if there is no private security 
they’ll not go back to work because it is too dangerous.” The situation is not totally 
under police control and they seem to need and accept help for their own activities also 
from commercial security providers. 
The 'official' attitudes concerning the commercial security industry and, especially the 
part of it controlled by foreign companies had been very suspicious. Even if it was not 
exactly the police who expressed themselves here, the following comment reflect the 
attitudes of the 'official' South Africa: 
“We had two really disturbing statements of private security in this country. The 
first statement was made by the then director of national intelligence. It was front 
page news and what he was actually saying in short words was that our security 
industry has been taken out by foreign companies, foreign ownership and that 
foreigners and foreign intelligence actually are using these security companies as 
a vehicle to gain access to our confidential secrets and confidential stuff. ... Funny 
enough, Hans Wisser from the University of Pretoria who acted as an adviser to 
the Private Security Board when they started up, he made a similar statement in 
the press. ... He also said that the security industry is now harbouring criminal 
gangs who use security guards to gather information about movements of people 
at companies.” (Expert)    
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The operational police as such have very little to do with the steering of commercial 
security activities but its basic attitude is positive. The concerns are more expressed by 
the others involved in security matters:  
“No tension at all. I think that the police value the contribution that the industry is 
making. Officially as much I’d like to say that the industry is perfect and doing 
the right thing, they are not, you know. That obviously raises concerns with 
everyone. But I think ultimately that, you know, security officers and security are 
always involved.” (Industry expert)  
Another remark made by the same interviewee reflects the basic dilemma today: “In 
Africa there is a lot of community turbulence with the police, with the private security 
industry and the community itself.”  
Sweden 
In Sweden, the divided structure where the National Police Administration is 
responsible for the writing of the detailed statutory instructions, but the county 
administration is implementing them is unique. This system which seems quite 
complicated is working well, at least according to the comments from a licensing 
authority representative: “It is the National Police Administration who is the regulating 
authority and gives detailed instructions in this area, but do not themselves implement 
their instructions, which is a job for the County Administrations.” (Industry expert) This 
division of labour which looks blurred to an outsider, was according to the same 
interviewee functional: “So somehow I can think that it is a relatively good division of 
labour ... one party gives out regulations [instructions] based on its unique competency 
within the sector, another party is the one who implements them. It works well, I have 
to say.” There was also a clear message from the union side emphasising the good 
relations with the police in all matters (Lindgren 2009:3): 
 “One of the main reasons we have been able to develop a functional security 
service sector in Sweden is that we have made the respective positions [with the 
police] very clear. ...while declaring complete agreement on the need to retain 
clearly defined professional boundaries.” (Industry expert) 
There seemed to be, however, some attitudes which were not expressed clearly, but 
which could be noticed in different contexts, there was some hidden distrust concerning 
the commercial security, especially within the central (police) administration:  
“One can see an interest conflict, or one can see a sort of 'territory' marking that: 
we are the police, and they [private security] shall not ... go over here and do our 
job. Conversely if one goes to a single police officer or down the organisation 
line, these tendencies are not there ... this small aggression which may be there ... 
it is on a little higher level in the police hierarchy. It is difficult to specify, but it is 
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there. One can hear certain comments, certain attitudes can be noticed, like; we 
shall not let that go too far.” (Industry expert) 
 From the industry’s side it was totally clear who the supervising authority was:  
“A mature security industry needs to realise its existence depends on maintaining 
a close relationship with politicians, public authorities, the corporate world and 
the general public. If trust is undermined by a tendency to replace police authority 
or disrupt ‘the State’s monopoly of legitimate violence’, the entire industry could 
be destroyed.” (Industry expert)  
The special role the police had in regulation writing between the law makers and the 
controllers was considered problematic and was commented on by the industry experts 
quite harshly. One interviewee was rather straightforward in saying:  
“We need to change the mandate or create a borderline towards police .... because 
the police have an own interest, which is mixed in when they shall write 
instructions and when they shall handle the industry, and it is not good.”  
(Industry expert) 
 On a general level he goes on in another context by saying: “So, it is very extraordinary 
that an authority like police writes more or less instructions for a business. It is really 
extraordinary.” Another interviewee brought up a new instruction as an example of how 
the police use their mandate by setting, as he sees it, requirements that tangent the 
constitutional rights of the guards:  
“But what has gone wrong, I mean what has become crazy, it is that the police has 
prescribed [in their instructions] that a guard has to inform certain criminal acts, 
he has a duty to inform about them. ... And then you have to inform about the one 
with whom your employer has a business relation.... I think it is a matter between 
me and my company.” (Industry expert)  
As a concluding comment on the trust on the state (authorities) and the Swedish 
‘thinking’, can be taken the thoughts of a third experienced industry expert:  
“We must not always trust in Sweden the authorities, and the guarding branch 
must not leave its future in the hands of the authorities, waiting that they will 
create preconditions for our businesses, because that they will never do, that we 
must do ourselves.  Then we need them involved in it, but not too much.”  
Discussion 
The comments made on the roles of and relations between the public police and the 
commercial security providers were basically very similar in the regulatory regimes 
under study, except in New York. The general attitudes and opinions expressed revealed 
basic police suspicion about the commercial security and its providers. There could also 
be noticed a fear that the police resources are diminished and partly replaced by private 
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actors. The ‘negative’ arguments used in this context were the short training and lack of 
professionalism. Commercial security was made a scapegoat for the general new trends 
as well as police budget cuts in societies. From the security industry’s point of view the 
accusation to be responsible of diminishing police resources was considered crooked 
and unfair.  
From the interviews the following comments on policing versus commercial security 
provision could be highlighted (Table 33). 
Table 33 Key interview points on police versus commercial security 
Belgium There are still a lot of tasks performed by the police which are not their core activities 
and could be privatised. Commercial security provision is seen in these situations as 
an alternative. 
Estonia The police force is still in a transition situation and has not got all the resources to 
fulfil the service needs of the society. Commercial security is still fulfilling the gaps. 
New York The police force is effective and well funded. It is active to some extent also within 
the traditional sphere of commercial security. 
Queensland The police and commercial security have few common points of contact. Commercial 
security providers are not actually working within the sphere of public police. 
South Africa The police force is short of resources and overloaded. Commercial security providers 
are in many areas carrying out police related tasks. 
Sweden The police is under budgetary pressures. There is an ongoing ‘hidden’ tension 
between it and commercial security providers because the police think that ‘effective’ 
security industry is one reason for this state of affairs. 
 
In New York where the police did not have any official role in commercial security 
governance the cooperation was, however, really tight and working well. The main 
explanations for the big differences with the other regulatory regimes under study in this 
context were: 
 First, the police had been provided with ample resources. 
 Second, there was a tradition of police officers taking jobs in private or 
commercial security after retirement. 
 There were no categorical boundaries which limited the cooperation of the 
parties in different security jobs. 
It seems according to the interviews in this section that the discrepancies between the 
police and the commercial security providers are at bottom based on the insufficient 
funding of societies’ public security organisations. 
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10.5. Analysis and discussion 
How to regulate? How to organise the regulation and administration of commercial 
security? The governments of the regulatory regimes under study had organised their 
regulation processes and regulation implementation functions according to their own 
national standards. This meant that the differences noticed in basic commercial security 
governance are primarily explained by the differences in local administration models 
and cultures in general. Based on the results of this chapter it can also be argued that: 
All practical governance arrangements concerning commercial security regulation are 
both unique and local as well as based on the general administrative structures and 
cultures of the regulatory regime in question. 
Self-regulation in commercial security is a topic that had been in some way discussed in 
all of the regulatory regimes under study, but in none of them had it been used presently 
as a solution. There was a unanimous understanding that, at least for the time being, it 
was not an applicable model for control. There were some kinds of pressures and 
thoughts to use self-regulation in Queensland as a part of the approval system, but the 
practical problems it would create had been clearly understood. Some of the 
interviewees 'wished' that the commercial security industry would mature in the future 
and become ready to take over, at least some parts in the licensing and control functions 
of their activity.  
The federalisation and harmonisation of the regulation and its implementation was an 
acute matter in those regulatory regimes which are a part of a federation (NY and QLD) 
or have a ‘split’ system or a risk for it (BE and SE). In all of them the interviewees were 
in favour of some kind of harmonisation, but the general political and governance 
factors made it complicated for the time being. The Swedish with their high level of 
regulation were also to some degree hesitant as they thought that a transnational 
harmonisation could downgrade the present status of their commercial security 
community. The situation in Australia and the United States emphasises the fact that 
commercial security is such a small industry, because of which (federal) governance 
principles are difficult to be changed. 
Throughout the chapter the fundamental unsolved question concerning commercial 
security’s definition was present: should it be conceptualised as a private business or as 
a part of general state security?  This matter seems to haunt the legislators everywhere, 
but it has not been satisfactorily solved anywhere. At least in the regulatory regimes 
under study it has been set aside when looking for the practical models to control and 
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steer the industry. There were two organisational governance solutions to be found in 
this study on the top level. One where the ministry deciding over private and 
commercial security was the one in charge of security matters in general, including the 
police (BE, EE, ZA and SE), and another one where private and commercial security 
matters were handled by the department in charge of business licensing in general (NY 
and QLD). Both of these models had their supporters within the interviewees. 
The organisations created for the practical implementation and control of the regulations 
were not totally analogous to the ministry level division of labour. In this sample under 
study there were examples of: a totally police driven and controlled system (EE), ones 
with a semi-independent licensing agency (BE, NY, QLD and ZA) and one with a 
mixed administrative system (SE). All of them reflected the existing general governance 
structure, tradition and culture of their regimes. It seems obvious that the governments 
do not create new models of governance for private and commercial security control, 
but use their existing licensing structures as solution examples. There was no 
unanimous opinion amongst the interviewees on how an ideal administration model for 
these regulation matters should look.  
The actual role of the public police in commercial security regulation implementation 
and control is a conflicting core challenge in any theoretical or practical administrative 
arrangement. This was also the case in the regulatory regimes under study. The core 
question and decision here is: Should the police be a part of the actual regulating 
activity and supervising control of the industry? If so, how should this be organised in 
practice? In the regulatory regimes under study, regardless of the present police role in 
steering the industry, there were tensions to be noticed. There seemed to be different 
ideas within the police of the role commercial security can have and the professionalism 
and quality of its personnel and services. Partly these attitudes were based on actual 
experiences with commercial security. They seemed to involve, however, a desire to 
protect the traditional boundaries in the division of labour and a will to make and see 
commercial security as a junior police activity seconded to the ‘official’ police. The 
practical co-operation arrangements and the boundaries between the police and the 
commercial security providers seemed to be an unsolved ‘taboo’ which the politicians 
and authorities had not been ready to face up front until now. This had led to ‘ad hoc’ 
arrangements and legal ‘engineering’ in a part of the regulatory regimes under study. As 
it has grown and become more professional and politically powerful, commercial 
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security community has developed and presented opinions as to what its role could be, 
which could be one more reason for the tensions with the public police. 
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CHAPTER 11:  INTERVIEWS - HOW TO ARRANGE LISENCING AND 
COMPULSORY TRAINING OF SECURITY GUARDS? 
 
The licensing process for the actual commercial security companies was not a pressing 
issue. The granting of personal licenses, the control of suitability (clean criminal record) 
and fulfilment of training requirements (certificates) turned out to be the two main 
topics occupying the interviewees. In practice, the time used by the authorities when 
handling applications was the contentious point in all regulatory regimes under study. 
On the one hand, industry representatives shared a general opinion that the handling of 
applications is not as smooth as it could be and should be. On the other hand, the 
licensing authorities, in most cases, thought that the processes were working 
satisfactorily. The industry’s worries were very similar in the regulatory regimes under 
study but the systems in place had some basic differences depending on the working 
cultures developed between the parties. The main issue related to:  
(a) applicants for guarding posts being recruited to security companies from the 
beginning of the process,  
as opposed to:  
(b) applicants being recruited to security companies after they have completed their 
training and having authorisation to work as a security guard.  
Even if the procedures consist of different parts (licensing and training), they are for the 
applicants and the companies a complete entity, with different parts related to it and 
affecting its smoothness. Because it is seen by the participants as one process, it has 
been analysed as such. In the following text the licensing and training are handled 
regulatory regime by regulatory regime.  
11.1 Situation in the regulatory regimes under study 
Belgium 
Licensing 
In Belgium, as in the other regulatory regimes under study, the licensing of the security 
companies was not a ‘big deal’ as can be noticed from the following, generally 
applicable local comment: “The licensing procedure for the companies is not the first 
priority. We can handle that as it is for the moment. It is not too bad; we understand it 
has to be done.” (Manager) There were more critical opinions assessing the licensing of 
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the business as too complicated and taking too long a time: “To license a company you 
can have an average of six months. ...the licensing procedure is too long and also too 
detailed.” (Expert) 
The security guard licensing procedure and the things connected to it were strictly 
regulated in Belgium. The licensing was possible only after the training, which meant 
that in all cases it took at least one month for a guard to have a license to start to work, 
as was stated by one interviewee: “The basic training is four weeks. So the fastest 
possibility to start to work is one month.” (Manager). It has to be taken into 
consideration that this period does not include the recruiting of personnel which 
increases the ‘waiting’ time. The actual licensing process seemed to be quite smooth 
and was not experienced as a problem by the licensees or the companies, as was stated 
by in an expert comment: “The average [handling] time is now between five and fifteen 
days, so it is not too bad.”   
In the licensing process the fluctuation of the licensors handling the applications was 
seen as one of the main factors affecting negatively its flexibility. Often when a person 
had gained experience in her/his job s/he would leave. This problem was commented on 
in the following way:  
“The head of the [controlling] department has an academic background. ...other 
members are young people most of them with university degree. What we see is 
that if they are good people, they leave after two three years for the private 
industry.” (Manager) 
The whole period between recruitment and the granting of a license was considered to 
be a very problematic matter, strongly affecting the business. One of the interviewees 
gave an example of a real life situation where the interests of a company and the 
regulations were in conflict. The company was faced with an acute demand for more 
licensed personnel because of business development reasons but also because of 
changes in the customers’ security arrangements:  
“…there was an increasing demand from the clients at a certain point ... they 
needed over hundred new people so I organised here a twenty day recruitment 
campaign project and succeeded in twenty working days to have those people. It 
was a huge project but they [recruits] needed to be put urgently on work.” 
(Manager)  
The interviewee saw this kind of situation as a dilemma because to meet, sometimes 
urgent, customer needs, one has to balance the risk of bending the rules of the length of 
training: “…in a case of an incident we would not be far from a crisis situation. So it is 
difficult, if we don’t do it we lose business.” 
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Regular control of security companies’ (regulation) compliance is an ongoing challenge 
for the authorities. A complaint of an unequal scrutiny was expressed here as in many 
other regulatory regimes by a representative of the security companies:  
“That is the problem, they do not have the resources to organise this control. ... It 
is not working properly and we are from the employers’ side asking for more 
control also for the many, many small companies which are not controlled at all.” 
(Manager) 
Training 
Training attached to licensing was organised mostly by the companies themselves 
within units which, according to the law, needed separate authorisation: “The 
companies need a license and also the [training] schools need one... Every training 
institution needs a license given by the same authority which controls the industry’s 
other licenses.” (Manager) In practice the training was in the hands of the principal 
commercial security companies: “Most of the big companies have their own schools. 
...There are also some independent schools but the big three [internal ones] deliver 95% 
of the training.” There was a general wish within the industry for a more flexible 
licensing and training procedure: “I would make it closer to the business. It does not 
mean that training should be cancelled, not at all - on the contrary but it should be 
organised in another way.” (Industry expert) Models from some other countries were 
quoted by the interviewee as solutions that could be considered:  
“In some other European countries it [training] is more spread during the first 
year. For instance you have somebody you take in, you have one to two days of 
intake procedure of training for instance, then you should have the possibility to 
put the agent on stage for a first period of experience and call him back within one 
week.”  
There were, however, plans in Belgium to centralise training arrangements and moving 
private security education to a publicly controlled institution:  
“...the major discussion in our country today is, should every security company 
have their proper training internally or should there be one school. If you go and 
look into the mindset of the authorities, they are trying to go to a one school 
model to harmonise this and of course to have more impact on it.” (Expert) 
The commercial security industry viewed this as an attempt by the authorities to 
increase their influence on the training and create government controlled law 
enforcement education:  
“Now the examination is done by the authorities themselves so more and more 
you can see government having an impact on the training. It is good if you come 
to one institution but which is still in the hands of the private sector itself, not a 
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public school on private security with a system where you have next to a regular 
police academy a part that is for private security personnel.”  
Estonia  
Licensing 
In Estonia, the companies were obliged to inform the police immediately a new recruit 
for a criminal record assessment. Training certificates were given by the industry 
association (ASA) and the register of persons who had passed the examination was kept 
by them, not the authority (police). The information was also forwarded to and 
registered by the National Vocational Training Centre. The reason that police (the 
licensing authority) did not keep any registers of the approved guards was due to their 
limited resources at the time of the implementation of the first industry-specific 
regulations. The original law set obligations for the police: “…a guard must have a 
guard card and professional certificate, and the card is given on grounds of the 
certificate. The police give the card.” (Industry expert) The police did not, however, 
start to keep the register or to provide the approved guards with the cards. The industry 
had been proactive in this matter and had even been ready to sponsor the equipment for 
the register keeping, but:  
“…the police said that it would mean so much work, and how could it be 
organised? …they did not co-operate and they did not have at that time computers 
… we said that it is not a problem, we will provide them, but they said no, we 
don’t take this kind of donations from private actors.”  
From the industry and guards’ point of view the registration and the guard card issuance 
was a police responsibility. The time without a register had created the problem of how 
to build the registers of all the guards approved during all those years: “So much time 
has now passed and the people have passed, they have their certificates and to organise 
the card to them is a quite difficult job. …administratively a lot of money is needed so 
that it can be materialised.”   
The question of systematic control of criminal records of commercial security personnel 
was unsolved in Estonia. The information of a guard’s misconduct, especially if it 
happens out of work, did not always reach the employer because there was no actual 
system to record this. The information flow was dependent on the activity of the local 
police districts. In the companies there was a firm need to have the information: “But if 
there were a register, naturally the police would have an obligation to inform the 
company that their employee has been caught of a crime affecting his license … but 
today the register is missing.” (Manager) The situation and the courses of action were 
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not uniform and depended on the activity of the local police handling the case. The 
actual responsibility of the police was commented on by the same manager in the 
following way: “If they have a case [concerning a guard] they should follow up it till 
the end. Today they do something and something they don’t.”  Without a 
comprehensive register and an ongoing follow up the police have and will have 
problems as the controlling authority managing its follow up task efficiently. Some of 
the companies tried to be active themselves with the ongoing control of their staff, but 
there were limited possibilities to do this because private businesses were not allowed to 
have data on their personnel’s criminal records: “The companies try naturally 
themselves to get information by making background checks of the staff but they don’t 
have legal right to ask again from the police if there is new information of their staff or 
not.” (Industry expert) 
Training 
In the Estonian system, the training was operationalised in two phases. The first sixteen-
hour introductory training, before starting to work as a guard, was given by the 
companies and there were no guidelines for its content or the trainers’ qualifications: 
“The applicant gets this kind of two day training, orientation training, which comes 
from the firm. It is not ruled in the law who can organise this training.  ...not even the 
content of it is clear, what should be included?” (Industry expert) The basic training 
course was fifty hours and the training was provided by approved trainers. The control 
of them was, however quite light: “The fifty hours training can be given by a trainer 
who has the license from the Ministry of Education. The license must be applied from 
there but there are no strict requirements, so actually by presenting papers almost 
everyone can get it.”  Control of the training was left to the industry association which 
was accredited by the educational authorities to do this. This could be understood as a 
kind of self-control performed by the industry: “But what controls the system is the 
NVQ system, and our National Association is the accredited body giving the certificates 
after exams. We have had problems to organise exam controllers, independent from the 
trainers.”   
The ‘official’ basic training course and examination has to be completed within six 
months after starting to work. The labour legislation, however, allowed fixed 
employment contracts for two six-month periods and this had been used as a loophole to 
have a guard working for one year before taking the basic, compulsory training. As the 
law on private security was not clear on this matter, the industry saw the situation to be 
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uncontrolled and unsatisfactory: “It is a loophole today which has been used. It is one 
thing that we want to remove from the present law”. In Estonia there was also the 
problem that guards without any training were sometimes employed due to a “shortage 
of labour force.” (Manager) 
The relatively ‘free’ control on training and the kind of ‘self-regulation’ of examinations 
and certification could be noticed in all of the interview comments. The length of the 
training was generally considered adequate and especially with the huge turnover of 
workforce the idea of a longer training period was not considered to be reasonable: 
“…but the turnover is so big today that in this situation it is almost impossible to 
organize the training in another way.” (Manager) The financial factors connected to the 
huge turnover within the industry were also taken up when considering the organising 
of the training: “It can be said that training is never long enough, but for the basic tasks 
and considering the difficulty to get workforce and its turnover, so bigger investment in 
training is not profitable.” (Industry expert) The connection between the turnover 
problem and business profitability was also expressed by another industry expert: 
“…and taking into consideration the difficulty to recruit workforce for security jobs 
today, and the drain, it is not worth to invest more into training.” (Industry expert)  
The importance of motivation of the applicants taking the course was also emphasised 
as an important factor in getting the message through: “I think that if one wants to study 
and gain knowledge, there is enough of that [training]. There could be one hundred 
hours more but if one does not want to learn, he comes out as untrained as when 
starting.” (Manager) This comment emphasises that security guard training is not only 
about filling the requirements of the regulations but must also be educationally of high 
quality and deemed to be worthwhile. 
New York 
Licensing 
In New York State, the licensing procedure was quite orthodox and was, in a way, done 
afterwards. When a guard had been employed and trained the license application 
documents were forwarded to the licensor, the Division of Licensing Services which 
generally managed all kinds of licenses in the state. The granting of guard licenses took, 
however, a long time as noted by one interviewee: “It can take anything from three 
months to six months for the security guards to get their licenses”. (Manager) The 
employer had to forward the license applications within forty-eight hours after the guard 
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applicants’ initial training had been accomplished, accompanied with the 
documentation: “In New York State what we do is: a person comes in and does an 
application, we fill out the state required paper work with the fingerprint cards. We have 
48 hours from their finishing their initial training class to get that paper work to the 
state.” 
 There had been discussion about prohibiting a guard to start working before having a 
license, but in practice applicants were put to work before the license had been granted: 
“We can put them to work in New York State prior to that [license approval], 
following company guidelines of background checks. We issue them a temporary 
ID card. So probably within five to seven days from when they started their 
training we have them out at the site.  And we feel that we have done everything 
humanly possible to make sure a person we put out there has the proper 
background check.” (Manager) 
  The risk of putting a guard to work in this way was partly the employer’s: “If this was 
not allowed we would be in a heap of trouble here in New York State and have some 
manpower issues. They [the applicants] would go and get a job and it would not be in 
security, it would be in fast food or retail store and we would lose them.” (Manager). 
For the same manager New York State interpretation of private security regulation was 
very formalised, which created problems in practice as the industry-specific laws were 
over fifteen years old and in some details out-of-date:  
“I compare it [New Jersey] to New York where it [licensing] is under general 
business law, there is something missing. The people that are running it are 
[formal]; it is either black or it is white. There is nothing wrong in following rules 
and procedures, but if you have the same thing running for fifteen years, 
something has had to have changed within it. Let us move with the times and 
work with it.”   
The licensees had a dilemma which was pointed out by an operational manager in the 
following way: “I don’t want to call up someone [licensor] to say, well this is how it is 
written and this is what we are going to do. If you look at it logically [the regulation] it 
does not make any sense, but the bureaucrats hide behind the paper work.”  In addition, 
the system was inadequately resourced and operated with rudimentary technologies:  
“In New York all is a paper procedure. All the fingerprints are done manually. To 
be fair to the people in New York there is a budget that they can only have an 
exact amount of people ... it is a very manual process which is not fair to them 
either. When I am talking about the agency I am not talking of the people in it, 
they just do not have enough people, they could use some help.”   
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Training 
Compulsory guard training in New York State was twenty four hours and it was 
supported by eight hours of annual refreshment training. The basic course was 
organised by approved training institutions (companies) or by the commercial security 
companies themselves:  
“In New York we have a training school certificate which is good for two years. 
Every two years we have to renew it. We send them a list of all our trainers, a 
copy of the curriculum that we have been using over and over. What they also 
want to know is a list of all our training classrooms.” (Manager) 
 According to the same manager there was a control test to be passed at the end of the 
courses, the questions of which were approved by the authorities: “In New York it is a 
fifty question exam at the end of the training and they need to get certain percentage to 
pass. We make the questions and they are approved by the state.” Because the training 
system was short in duration and flexible it gave the employers quite ‘free hands’ in 
choosing the ways to organise it and it affected only marginally the recruitment process. 
As the compulsory training was very concise, the companies usually had their own in-
house training programs, specialised to meet differing customer demands. Interviewees 
did not support a longer basic training period. The focus was on constant customer and 
site specific training as can be seen from the following comment: “I think the training 
should be consistent. As such I don’t think high rise building training is necessary in 
Idaho. And the training should commeasure with the local environment that’s there.” 
(Manager) The trade union view was that extra training was an important tool to 
improve the general knowledge and professional profile of the guards:   
“This Union has been arguing for a 40 hour programme. And towards that end we 
created a 40 hour training programme. We here trained, I would say, about 3000 
security officers over the past two years, here at the training facility in the Union 
building.” (Industry expert) 
There were also ideas put forward about the new ways of training and the use of IT-
based tools (Roper, et al 2006:237-258) as expressed in the following interview 
comment:   
“The security officers have the time and in most case also the equipment available 
for on the job e-learning. The material is not available today. It and the test 
packages should be created. A [compulsory] e-learning test could be taken for 
example four times annually. This is a very powerful tool not utilised yet in a 
proper way.” (Manager) 
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Queensland 
Licensing 
In Queensland, the licensing process was centralised in the state through the Office of 
Fair Trading. The handling of an application for a personal license took several weeks 
and created problems for the security companies when recruiting new guards. The 
authority partly blamed the applicants for the delays. 
“It is probably six to eight weeks at the moment from the time we receive the 
application. Of course there are issues that hold up the process and particularly 
from the applicants’ perspective. I mean they are not providing all the information 
so we have to go back and ask other information.” (Industry expert)  
The background check for criminal history was the core activity in licensing and it was 
a time-consuming process because all the information was not available on-line for the 
licensors. They needed to contact other authorities to get all the necessary information: 
“For the criminal record check we get the hits from Queensland and all over Australia. 
It is done centralised from Canberra. That has been one of the problems that licensing 
has not been passed.” 
In Queensland, there were not only the criminal record check to be taken into 
consideration but according to the law it was also necessary to make an evaluation of 
the general suitability of a licensee. Only after having constructed a complete 
application, did the licensing authorities start to handle the case:  
“We then do the criminal register check and we basically divide the applicants in 
two categories, there are probably some judgements to be made particularly of 
their advert crime registry. So we have to go through and then to decide if they in 
fact are eligible and secondly suitable given the results of the crime registry 
check.” (Industry expert) 
 The licensing authority admitted that they did not have the most effective and flexible 
arrangements in place. Evaluation of suitability was a complicated matter. “We do not 
have full systems to do that at the moment. But part of the review itself is to look how 
this information could be obtained. In terms of actual convictions it is a different matter 
because the act allows for an ongoing probity process.”  
Interviewees commented on the licensing process quite caustically, especially the 
present processes in criminal checks. One comment was about the federal registry: “… 
there is no national registry for criminal records. We are in discussions with Australian 
Federal Police. …It just has not gone anywhere.” (Expert) He went on stating that in 
Australia, the problem was: “There is no uniform approach to holding peoples’ records 
204 
 
because there is no confidence that the privacy can be assured. ... That is a cultural thing 
and that will take a lot of years to regress.”  Another security expert emphasised the 
difficulty for companies to acquire information: “Private security organisations don’t 
have it [criminal record data] because of the privacy laws. They don’t have the 
resources to check upon individuals to uncover their character, past history, any 
involvement in criminal activity.” (Expert)  
When commenting on the time of application handling, a commercial security manager, 
noticed: “The process takes up to eight weeks. Because the legislation, quite rightly, 
means that the person cannot access employment until he receives his license.” 
(Manager) In his opinion there was one main reason for the long-time span in the 
checks: “It appears that the majority of the problem is the property checks, the length of 
time it takes to do that. I feel that they probably get lost in all the other checks they have 
to beat on the people.” 
There is another factor related to the employment process impacting on the licensing 
and training in Queensland. Contrary to the other regulatory regimes under study, the 
applicants in Queensland, as a general rule, were not connected to a security company 
before they were licensed. This meant that the companies were not involved in the 
licensing (training) process. They hired persons who already had a license: “So 
predominantly you are looking for someone who got a license and that’s where the 
bottleneck is.” (Manager) According to this interviewee this also meant that they did not 
have an active role in licensing and training, even if it would have been important for 
their business. The reason for this was costs: “If you employ them and require them to 
be licensed, who pays for the training and who pays for the license?” Some of the 
‘serious’ companies had understood this handicap and had tried to change the practice. 
There had been proposals to implement the model of taking care of applicants from the 
beginning by vetting and ‘hiring’ them conditionally before training and licensing. The 
industry did not accept this model: “The industry didn’t like it at all. They could not 
work it out, the investment in the training first. They just did not want to do it. It is 
pennywise foolish. They are saving, but long term not.” (Manager)  
Concerning the actual licensing process, some of the industry’s representatives were, 
however, optimistic that the situation could be improved: “I think we should train and 
process the license virtually immediately. Now there is a big delay, four – six weeks 
before the license is processed which means that a chap cannot work which means he 
has no income.” (Manager) The same expert put in a little nastily that: “Processing of 
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licenses as so, the actual physical license is easy. A ten year old could do that on a 
computer.”  There was also a suggestion that the application papers could be sent to the 
licensor before the training to speed up the process:  
“We said: put the application form, references in straight away but the Office of 
Fair Trading did not like it. It was too much work, too complicated, it deviated 
from the norm. By getting everything through parallel, after the seven days the 
applicants would just need bring the training certificate and that’s it. It is down 
seven days, minimum seven days ahead of what they do today.” (Manager)  
On these problems of licensing and training guards, a summary opinion can be 
presented using the comment of a seasoned academic:  
“Well, I think that is a cultural difference in common practice. I have noticed that 
myself, and I think it is unfortunate that we work that way. If we have a tradition 
in our firms that we don’t hire and train, it is even more important that the 
regulator is as efficient as possible. There really should not be any reasons for 
delays.” (Expert)  
He also addresses the financial threats in the licensing procedures, warning of making it 
too complicated and thus too expensive for all: the companies, the guards and the 
customers:  
“If [licensing] fees are used properly for their purpose there should not be a 
problem. I think one of the big dangers with regulation is that you make security 
too expensive. …keep on checking that they are not an obstacle to good security 
work.”  
Training 
As seen when looking at the licensing process, the compulsory basic training in 
Queensland was organised by separate training institutions which were in most cases 
not a part of any commercial security company. These institutions as well as the 
individual instructors need not be approved by the private security authority, but are 
registered and controlled by the Department of Education:  
“As a company we do not need a license. We are training because we are linked to 
the Department of Education. ...it is what we call the AQTF. So we must be 
registered on the NTIS, and in order to be registered there the company goes 
through very, very high checks.” (Manager) 
 On the official relation of their license to the local private security regulatory authority 
the same interviewee stated: “We are registered there not according to the local private 
security law. And the only way the certificates will be recognised by them is by us 
being registered by the Department of Education.” Individual instructors are approved 
separately and the emphasis in their requirements is on experience:  
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“But again that license, that person needs to be attached to the AQTF and so on. 
Under the new regime the instructors must have the certificate for training and 
assessment. At the moment what they will rely mostly on, is industry experience 
and certificate for the training. So that’s more a qualification than a license.”   
The way the training was organised in practice was described well by a training 
professional:  
“We run our courses here over seven days. So it is Monday to Friday, weekend 
off, Monday, Tuesday and then we start again the next Monday. So we roll 
continuously through. … That’s what I decide with the training pack from the 
Department of Education. I work it up. Some do it in five days; some might say 
ten days.” (Manager) 
 In Queensland the training institutions not only decided on how the courses were 
technically run, they also controlled the curriculum content and examinations. The 
interaction between the training organisers and the companies was minimal because of 
the recruiting system.  
The regulators were also balancing recruitment problems and the actual educational 
needs when approving the length of the basic training. There was an ongoing dialogue 
between the authorities and the industry about these matters:  
“It is a very topical issue, training, so the chief executive of our department had 
decided that a certain minimum level of courses needs to be obtained before you 
can apply for a license. That has been done through industry consultation on the 
basis that if the courses are made too high as in details and phrased specific in 
things to learn it could harm employment in the industry.” (Industry expert) 
The administrative structure and the organisation of training were complex and this 
obviously affected the quality and cost effectiveness of the whole process.  
South Africa 
Licensing 
In South Africa the controlling authority handled the applications but needed police co-
operation for criminal record checks on the guard license applicants and the re-checks 
on already licensed personnel: “When the paper work comes to our offices, we verify 
the training credentials and so on, but the fingerprints and so on goes to the police for 
scanning.” (Industry expert) The system was strict and the guards could only start to 
work after the background check and completion of the compulsory training. This was a 
lengthy process and was a challenge to the security companies:  
“Licensing of guards is very difficult, there is a waiting period of three four 
months to get a registration because of the check of the background.  Now there is 
a law that you may not employ a security officer before he has a PSIRA certificate 
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and a training certificate. You must fulfil all the criteria before you can get this.” 
(Manager) 
The same interviewee pointed out that there are also cultural challenges related to the 
behaviour of the workforce:  
“The industry in South Africa has got a huge [workforce] turnover, which is a 
cultural thing. We got people in South Africa who do not care if they have a job or 
not, they are not serious about keeping their jobs. When they feel they do not want 
to come to work they quit their job and hang around and later go to another 
company. So it is very difficult to control the situation”.  
For the companies this is a pressing operational and financial problem: “The input cost 
is very high, to scrutinize every time a new employee, the training and all those things.”  
The ‘customers’ of the regulatory authority, the industry representatives, were not 
totally satisfied with the licensing and control processes and especially the quality of the 
services offered (Olivier 2009:23120). There was a feeling that the government makes the 
industry pay for services which should be covered by the state: “You need to subscribe 
to them [PSIRA]; you need to pay a company premium and as well one on each 
individual you employ as a security officer.” (Manager) The security industry felt that it 
should be treated as such with respect. There was a feeling that the governing authority 
PSIRA was not up to its tasks, which leads to bending or even ignorance of the rules 
from the industry’s side.  
“The industry is very big in relation to our normal economy; this is one of the 
fastest growing industries in South Africa. ...This is a very complicated industry 
to manage, it is time consuming and very expensive to follow up all this 
legislation, so the majority of the industry ignore it, they know that the 
regulatory authority is small, regulatory authority cannot control it all, it is 
impossible so there is a lot of fly by night illegal operators real regulation 
breakers. ...No private business wants to be regulated by the government but this 
is, as you know and understand, a serious matter.” (Manager) 
There were technical governance problems because of the fundamental political changes 
in the country; too many things were going on at the same time:  
“They need to get the existing system sorted out and working before they try to 
broaden the regulation and only when something is working you can refine it. 
Because to keep working on something that is not working is never to get into 
place. So my feeling is that they got a regulation they have problems with, good 
and bad, let us fix that… It is just the government…things just don’t happen. In 
the private sector you got a business to run to show a profit to cover costs. They 
[government] do not have the problem so they don’t have a corporate drive to be 
profitable or successful, they have funding coming in regardless of the levels of 
efficiency. So I think that is a huge problem.” (Expert) 
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The other critical factor in this relationship is the pivotal role that the commercial 
security industry plays in South Africa:  
“The security industry will carry on like it always has. It is a dynamic industry, a 
lot of instrumental entrepreneurs and if the authorities cannot keep up with it, the 
industry is going to keep on going and the authorities have to join up at some 
point. I think there is resistance from the industry to work with the authorities; 
they need to keep up with us.” (Manager)  
Training 
The training in South Africa was organised by ‘outside’ special companies which were 
accredited by education authorities. The system had, however, not been renewed 
together with the new legislation and this had created a somewhat open situation. “With 
the new legislation in 2002 there were not actually new standards for training, though 
we kept the old standards of 1992 for the different categories of the security officers.” 
(Industry expert) The same interviewee explains the training system in the following 
four comments. Outsourced training is not without problems: “You see, at this stage the 
whole training is outsourced to private companies. The exams are controlled by the 
accredited instructors and the accredited training facilities reporting to us, which creates 
a lot of problems.” The training was not under adequate control and business interests 
were sometimes stronger than the loose directives in the old regulation. This had created 
pressures for tighter control by the authorities: “You can think immediately, you know, 
it is a private business trying to make money, huge market, and a lot of corruption. Our 
system will be changing. The quality assurance of training will be controlled by the 
authority.” The actual renewal of the regulations on training had already started121:  
“We review all the training standards within security industry for the time being. 
We are supposed to implement new legislation this year for all the categories. 
...They do not meet the standards of the industry any more - everything is 
reviewed presently. In the guarding side there will be a certain minimum, 
common to everyone.” 
There was also a plan to streamline the private security training by making it a part of 
the national education arrangements. “We are working with SETA122  who will take over 
the function from the authority. ...this is a huge challenge to the whole industry; they 
have to move over to the new system, the training situation will change in the future 
with SETA”  
The present situation was commented on by two industry experts differently in a very 
crude way, emphasising the non-existent quality and control of the training 
arrangements: “It’s one thing to say I’m going to regulate the industry and another thing 
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to enforce that regulation policy properly, so I think training is bad although there is a 
very good curriculum.” (Expert) The interviewee was emphasising the possibilities to 
take shortcuts in organising the training today: 
“...there is too many opportunities to buy your credentials ... security training is 
currently advertised as correspondence courses, if you think about it realistically, 
to take a correspondence course and then get your certificate - you have to be at 
the physical place to be trained. In theory there is a national exam system but in 
practice not.”  
Another industry expert expressed his opinions (Smit 2008:12-14123) by stating:  
“Regretfully, neither the PSIRA nor SAQA systems have covered themselves in 
glory over the past ten years. Private enterprises and commercial training 
companies have looked after their own needs and profits, which, while 
understandable, have resulted in standards dipping and training being 
fragmented.” (Industry expert) 
It seems that the planned new legislation and emergent practical training needs will 
create a huge challenge for both the authorities and the industry in the coming years. 
Sweden 
Licensing 
In Sweden, licensing was decentralised to the county administrations and therefore 
uneven in nature. In some of the provinces there were over one hundred security 
companies licensed but in some others only less than five. In those with only a few 
companies, licensors were ‘near’ the licensees, which meant that they had a good 
understanding of the local circumstances and their control work was near the 
‘customer’. In contrast, the knowledge and routines of the authorities working with 
security companies of different sizes were more professional in nature. According to the 
private security legislation, individual security officers (as well as the companies) 
needed to be approved by the county administrations. The work was very much about 
controlling and following up the criminal records of the applicants. 
According to the authorities, the licensing process for individual security officers took 
normally about three weeks. The background checking procedures had been streamlined 
in 2006 with a new regulation on access to police registers which had cut the time for 
handling license applications. In the following three quotations an industry expert 
comments the process: “…we got the right to enter the police registers ourselves… So 
we check the criminal register and we look into the suspicion register that is the ongoing 
investigations which have not been closed.” Problems started if something divergent 
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was found in these registers, and extra controls had to be made: “There is an 
investigation pending somewhere, it maybe even considered secret so that we do not, 
cannot have the information. …in individual cases, unique cases, it may take much 
more time.” In this context only the on-line access into the database of the security 
police was off limits for the licensors. The legislation concerning the handling of this 
information in Sweden was complicated: “We need to send them [the security police] a 
letter asking for their opinion and their activity has now been fenced by a political 
control function which is called the register authority.”124 This procedure took time and 
‘delayed’ the handling of applications. In 2006 there were discussions and a proposal 
from the controlling authority when renewing the law that the check concerning the 
records of the security police should be left outside the guard licensing procedure.125 The 
proposal was not accepted and a main delaying factor remained in the licensing 
process.126  
Interviewees representing the industry criticised the prolonged nature of the application 
process. An industry association representative thought that the whole process was 
poorly run and mentioned several weaknesses from the guards’ and companies’ point of 
view:  
“There are no structures, no committed persons, maybe there is data technology 
which is not functioning, people are not present, they are sick or they attend 
courses. It is a lot of things, and then if you increase volume you put more and 
more work on something [organisation] that does not function, you get some kind 
of total chaos.” (Industry expert) 
The possibly serious consequences of the delayed processes were hinted at by the same 
interviewee: “The licensing process takes in certain places two months. So the 
companies break the existing rules because they cannot live with it.” (Industry expert) 
The reason given for this state of affairs was that the civil servants in charge of handling 
applications did not have adequate experience of the commercial security business and 
its operational needs. The other serious handicap stemming from the long licensing 
procedures was maybe even more serious for the running of the businesses: “But the 
existing problem, that is that you have these long handling times … in areas where you 
have a certain turnover of personnel, there the person you have hired do not sit there and 
wait for two months but disappears.” (Industry expert)  One goal with the new 
regulations on data access was to stop this from happening. A comment by the same 
expert on the reasonable time for handling a ‘normal’ licence application was maybe a 
little over the edge, but demonstrated the gap between industry’s expectations and the 
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reality: “Yes, in a computerised world this could happen by return of post, they would 
be able to do it within 24 hours. No, it should not need to take a longer time as all 
information is available.”  A union representative who had participated in the work to 
improve the licensing process had similar opinions on the acceptable length of the 
process: “If I go to an employment interview at Securitas on Monday, I have to know 
next Monday if I have been hired or not. And I think a week, yes that is acceptable.” 
(Industry expert)  However, the interviewee was aware of the actual situation amongst 
the authorities: “The county administrations have actually answered that they can solve 
this within a week but it is The Security Police who cannot cope with the control. It is 
there where it takes time.”  
Training 
All aspects of the training process were strictly regulated in Sweden and directed by the 
National Police Board. The actual training was organised practically by one institution, 
BYA which is administered by the industry’s social partners. The courses run by this 
school were longer than the minimum required by the regulations. This had been 
achieved through collective agreements which included also the use of a statutory fund 
collected from security companies. The social dialogue (cooperation) between the 
industry’s trade unions strongly influenced the national training arrangements. This 
interaction was also emphasised in a union representative’s comment: “We made a 
collective agreement with the employer on training, and then the police took this 
training and said: this is the regulation.  So we have to find new training entities for 
collective agreements because they have regulated all.” (Industry expert) In another 
union comment on the training (Lindgren 2009:2), the connection between money and it 
was emphasised: “Now that the Government has adopted it [the collective agreement 
training requirement] in its legal framework, I hope we can go even further, and 
increase our demands.” (Industry expert) The profit-oriented thinking of all parties, also 
the employees, was obvious when looking at another comment of the same union 
representative: “More advanced services command better pay – for security companies 
as well as their employees.”  
Although, the training was formalised by regulations and arranged well in practice, 
there were pressures to develop it. An example of this was the use of a licensed 
temporary workforce on an ad hoc basis. There was, from the industry’s point of view, 
a need to make the rules more flexible for these kinds of situations and personnel: 
“There we have an ongoing discussion because in the new directive the police are 
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thinking of increasing the requirements on refreshment training. We have in this context 
said that we should look at the tasks performed.” (Manager) There was no discussion 
about ongoing training for the full-time personnel, but about the problems faced with 
the ad hoc situations where there was an acute need for extra guards as commented by 
the same manager:  
“But then there are separate cases, for example a hospital has a fire and we need 
twenty guards in half an hour, and there are people who are willing to take the job 
and have worked for us before and are on our list and those we want to use. 
However we do not want to give them all the refreshment training. But that is not 
acceptable; all should have the same training exactly. This discussion does not 
feel good.”  
This manager interviewee raised another aspect of the training regulation, asking if it 
should be there if it is not controlled: “Then if this training should be regulated is 
another question. The worst situation is that if the authorities do not follow up that the 
personnel have the training, shall we then regulate it?”  
There was a general feeling here, as in the other regulatory regimes under study, that the 
training curricula and methods in private security regulations had not followed the new 
general trends in teaching.  
“The police want to regulate in detail. In modern training today the frame what a 
student should know is set, there are no directives that he should have three hours 
of night stick techniques, seven hours and three minutes guard related legislation 
and so on. I think here we live in a world thirty years back, it is not a model of 
today.” (Manager)  
The stakeholders in the Swedish commercial security industry were proud of the quality 
of their ‘product’ and they saw a need to defend their high standards as there were 
discussions going on about harmonising, i.e., decreasing, the regulations on private 
security throughout the European Union:  
“We are happy with the present arrangement of the training with BYA. It is a part 
of the building of a respectable public picture of our industry. In this we are quite 
special here in Sweden. … It is, however an industry that wants something, and 
has a goal to impact on, for example, the Service Directive, to have a right 
training standard.” (Industry expert)  
A professionally trained and highly certified commercial security industry could 
guarantee both profits and good salaries and conditions of services:  
“It means that if you increase the competence of the guards, they can do more for 
the customers; think more, work more and then you can also increase the price. 
...at the same time the guards can earn more and the companies can also get more 
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money. So a service branch which does not think of developing its services will 
end in a competition situation with low wage countries.” (Industry expert) 
The profitability of the Swedish commercial security companies and the salaries of the 
guards are amongst the highest in the world. 
11.2 Analysis and discussion 
The practical organisation of licensing and training activities is the most important thing 
in practice for the guarding companies’ businesses. According to the interviews in this 
chapter it seems that in all the regulatory regimes the commercial security providers 
were unhappy of the approach towards and quality of licensing processes. Overly 
bureaucratic and lengthy licensor practices hindered the industry in multiple ways. As a 
summary of the interviews, the observations and comments in Table 34 can be 
presented of the actual situation in the regulatory regimes under study.  
 Table 34 The practical organisation of guard licensing and training 
Regulatory 
regime 
Licensing Training 
Belgium The licensor is a separate department 
within the Ministry of the Interior.  
The licensing procedure (time) which is 
from five to fifteen days is generally 
considered swift and acceptable. 
 
The training is controlled by the 
licensing authority. 
The length of the basic training is 
generally considered adequate. 
The training is carried out by security 
firms or separate training companies 
approved by the private security 
licensing authority. 
The authority runs the exams. 
The organising of the training is still 
not finally agreed. 
Training requirements are considered 
inflexible by the industry and causing 
problems in compliance. 
Estonia The licensor is the police who do only the 
basic control (criminal records) but do not 
have adequate resources to keep a register 
on the guards and their training. 
The time span for the (minimal) check is 
adequate (a few days) but the licensing 
procedure as a whole is suffering of 
limited police resources. 
The controlling authority in training is 
not the private security licensor. 
The length of the basic training is 
considered adequate. 
The exams are drawn up and run by the 
industry association. 
The organising, control and registration 
of the training is ‘outsourced’ to the 
industry association. 
The big fluctuation of guards creates 
problems in compliance. 
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New York The licensor is the Division of Licensing 
Services that does not have straight access 
to all the information needed. 
The licensing procedure takes three to six 
months which is not considered adequate.  
Because of the long time span in license 
handling, the security companies have 
been allowed to use ‘unlicensed’ personnel 
on their own risk during the application 
process. 
The licensing authority has not sufficient 
personnel and technical resources for their 
job. 
The controlling authority in training is 
not the private security licensor. 
The length of the training is considered 
adequate.  
The training is carried out by security 
firms or separate training companies 
accredited by the state educational 
authorities.  
The exams are run by the training 
institution using questions drawn up by 
them but approved by the authority. 
Queensland The licensor is the Office of Fair Trading 
that does not have straight access to all the 
information needed. 
The licensing process takes from six to 
eight weeks, which is not considered 
adequate by the applicants and the security 
companies. 
Commercial security companies are not 
involved in the licensing process. 
The controlling authority in training 
execution is not the private security 
licensor. 
The length of the training is considered 
adequate, even if discussed. 
The training is carried out by separate 
training companies accredited by the 
Commonwealth training authority. 
The approved training institutions are 
relatively free in planning and carrying 
out the training and the exams they 
draw up and present for approval to the 
training authority. 
South Africa  The licensor is the Private Security 
Industry Regulatory Authority, an 
independent body under the Ministry of 
Police. 
The licensors do not have straight access 
to all the information needed. 
The licensing process takes from three to 
four months, which is not considered 
adequate by any of the parties. 
Together with the huge turnover of guards 
the long waiting period is a problem and 
induces the companies to bend the rules. 
The controlling authority in training 
execution is not the private security 
licensor. 
The length of the basic training is in 
theory considered adequate. 
The training is carried out by special 
companies accredited by the education 
authorities. 
The accredited training companies 
(trainers) control the exams. 
The training system is not considered 
presently to function properly and  to be 
under adequate control. 
Sweden The County Administrations (23) function 
as licensors. 
The licensors do not have straight access 
to all the information needed.  
The licensing process takes ‘normally’ 
three weeks which is considered adequate 
by the authorities but not by the industry 
representatives. 
The training is supervised by the Police 
Board and controlled by the licensing 
authorities.  
The length and quality of the basic 
training are considered adequate by all 
interest groups. 
Training and exams are carried out by a 
special institution run by the social 
partners. 
Training is seen by the social partners a 
vital tool to increase profits of the 
companies and salaries of the guards. 
215 
 
 In all the regulatory regimes practical licensing requirements and principles as such 
were quite similar regardless of the governance model. The differences were primarily 
based on different, general legal and administrative cultures, practices, resources and 
techniques. In general all the licensors interviewed thought that there were no big 
problems with the licensing practices. On the other hand all the interviewees 
representing the industry in different regulatory regimes saw fundamental weaknesses in 
the licensors attitudes and practical bureau-administrative procedures. For them the 
effectiveness of the processes was a question of ‘life and death’ affecting strongly the 
whole industry. The main problems commented by the interviewees representing the 
commercial security industry were as follows: 
 All regulatory regimes under study had quite similar chronic, mostly bureaucracy 
related, problems with granting and processing licenses within a reasonable time 
frame. The reason for this seemed to be primarily the licensor’s inadequate 
personnel resources, outdated technical procedures and the dependence on 
cooperation with other government organisations. 
 The long licensing approval processes and inflexible rules on training in many 
cases caused enormous problems for the commercial security companies when 
recruiting people, as well as for the applicants waiting to start work.  
 The (too) tight and inflexible licensing (and training) processes connected to weak 
compliance control generated in certain situations a temptation to bend the rules 
on licensing requirements in most of the regulatory regimes under study 
regardless of their all over administrative maturity.   
 The implementation of training was in some of the regulatory regimes organised 
incoherently and without an adequate, responsible authority with necessary resources 
and knowledge for steering and control. Even where it had been easy to agree upon the 
necessity and even the basic length (content) of training, it’s organising and execution 
was ad hoc. The training was in practice carried out in different ways by the states, 
security companies themselves, industry associations and independent training 
providers.  The following points can be made as a summary of the interviewee 
comments on compulsory training and its organisation: 
 Compulsory training was seen by all interviewees an essential, if not the most 
important part of the recruiting and licensing process. However, from the 
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companies’ point of view it was a critical cost factor and sometimes also a 
hindrance to organise smoothly in a ‘crisis’ situation the work of guards. 
 Regulation of the length and contents of compulsory training was complicated 
enough, but the real challenges and problems were connected to the practical 
organisation and control of it, which was in some regulatory regimes under study 
not throughout planned and executed.  
 Problems were faced because the responsibilities to plan, execute and follow up 
compulsory security training were in many cases split between several public and 
private actors in the regulatory regimes and, especially the control of regulation 
compliance was insufficient. 
 
 
 
217 
 
CHAPTER 12: THE FUTURE OF REGULATION – CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This thesis has investigated the changes that are currently transforming the commercial 
security industry. It has also sought to underline the critical regulatory challenges that 
the changes pose to the industry, governments and societies. In this concluding chapter I 
will first of all summarize my key findings before going on to re-consider the practical 
policy implications of my research findings. I will conclude by briefly outlining a future 
research agenda for this neglected industry. At the outset I was confronted with three 
challenges. First, I needed to construct a reliable conceptual framework that would 
enable me to conduct a comparative study of six different regulatory regimes. Second, 
because of the lack of credible data-base, a preliminary scoping exercise had to be 
carried out to establish essential key facts. This piece of research had not been carried 
out before by any researcher or government body. Third, because regulators, academics 
and security professionals in different jurisdictions had diverse ways of conceptualising 
commercial security and its regulation, throughout the thesis interpretative work was 
required to make my research data comparable.  
My framework was constructed through three basic organising research questions: (a) 
why regulate (b) what and who to regulate, and (c) how to regulate? Both the 
quantitative and qualitative parts of the thesis were carried out using these questions as 
a foundation. The preliminary assumptions that I made about transnational similarities 
in regulating and steering the industry turned out to be incorrect and  too positive. The 
existing cultural, political, socio-legal and administrative, as well as security related 
structures of the different regulatory regimes turned out to be elements that made the 
control of commercial security diversified and fragmented.  
Findings 
The research confirmed that the official reasons given ‘universally’ as answers to the 
‘why regulate’ question were quite similar. In most cases the formal differences 
between the regulatory regimes turned out to be the comprehensiveness of the reasons 
for statutes. The interviews in the six regulatory regimes revealed distinctive national 
(political) reasons to initiate regulation and control of commercial security. In all of 
them there turned out to be decisive local, hidden ‘triggers’ for industry specified 
legislation, which could not be found in the official preliminary papers or the actual 
legislation.  
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At first sight the basic principles and content of ‘what and who to regulate’ seemed also 
to be quite similar ‘universally’. The same core matters and personnel had been in many 
cases regulated. However, in the more detailed examination of the facts, as well as the 
data gathered from the interviews, it turned out that there were notable differences in the 
thinking and emphasis within the regulatory regimes. The differences were primarily a 
result of differences in the societies’ risk environments and attitudes which influenced 
the actual security needs and political priorities. These results also emphasize the fact 
that the existing private security regulation reflects the general attitudes and 
circumstances in a society – as any legislation does.  
Answers to the question ‘how to regulate’ revealed that both ‘universally’ and locally 
the models to administer, control and steer security companies and personnel were 
diversified. Both the governmental structures and the everyday practical organizations 
responsible for controlling of the industry were reflections of the local political and 
administrative models. It turned out that there are very few, if any, administrative 
models taking fully into consideration the special needs and challenges related to 
commercial security. They are primarily ‘normal’ bureaucratic state organisations. 
According to the thesis results it seemed crucial to have a system to update the 
regulations regularly without delays when there were changes in societies’ risk 
environments and security needs. If these are not taken into consideration by updating 
regularly the statutes on commercial security, problems and even conflicts will be faced 
in controlling these activities.  
The thesis shows that in practice the key tasks in the existing industry specific 
legislation were related to licensing and the compulsory training connected to it. It 
became clear that in these matters there were many acute and even fundamental 
problems faced in the regulatory regimes. There are a lot of organisational and practical 
issues that need to be resolved by new regulations and practices as a matter of urgency.  
The fundamental principles of commercial security governance 
Throughout the thesis it was apparent that the regulation and control models set up for 
commercial security were not a primary concern for politicians and governments. Even 
the crucial decision, is this a commercial enterprise or a semi-public governmental 
activity had not been clarified in the legislative frameworks of any of the regulatory 
regimes. The lack of definition means that regulatory work on commercial security is to 
some extent blurred and contradictory. The contradiction in this fundamental question 
was expressed in a down-to-earth way by one of the interviewees saying: 
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“I am still thinking about the meaning of the word ‘private’ when we are talking 
of private security. To me it only means that we are private companies having to 
work by economic principles and standards, we have to make benefits. ...It is 
difficult to make the European institutions understand how ‘private’ you are if a 
very strict law is telling you what you can do, when you can do it, how you can do 
it, with whom you can do it. I think considering from that point of view, we are 
part of the law enforcement. The main challenge is to combine these two, to 
combine our commercial objectives and legal responsibilities. The fact is that we 
can only operate in a very strict legal framework. ...it is very difficult also to have 
this conversation and this dialogue with the public authorities responsible, 
because we are saying all the time: the more you are going to regulate us, the 
more difficult it will become for us to operate as commercial entities.” (Industry 
expert) 
In the writing of this dissertation, most of the general theories and models explaining 
why a commercial enterprise should be regulated have not been of much help. Primarily 
they have been created to explain the need to steer and control economic activities and 
the behaviour of the different interest groups in the business market environment. The 
core content of existing private security regulation, the definitions of the industry, the 
shift of state tasks and powers from public to private actors, and the protection of basic 
human rights, seem to create a ‘special’ entity that does not fit in existing theoretical 
models very well. Human rights and the monopoly on violence are not negotiable or 
flexible ‘best practice’ or ‘self-governance’ matters. On the contrary, the theories on 
how regulation emerges, develops and declines tally quite well with the actual 
developments seen in commercial security. New ideas or issues upsetting the status quo, 
pressures of various interests, changes in habitat, as well as organisational failings, can 
all be found in the existing debate on the need and the content of commercial security 
regulation. Furthermore, the public interest, interest group, and institutional theories 
describe in many ways the present behaviour of different players in the regulation 
processes. It seems that on the theoretical level it is not, in a commercial security 
context, a question of market failures or social justice, which are often given as the main 
reasons for this kind of business regulation. Rather, a failure can be detected on the part 
of the state to provide a basic commodity, that is, adequate, equal and expected public 
security, the failure of which has led to a partly uncontrolled growth in demand and 
supply of new ‘public’ commercialised security services. The reasons for implementing 
regulation may be summarised as follows: Many states have failed to provide adequate 
public security. Nor have they met the new challenges and the public expectations 
connected to rapid social change. This has led to a partly uncontrolled 
commercialisation and privatisation of ‘public’ and ‘semi-public’ security tasks, mainly 
by commercial security providers. This transfer has created a governance challenge. The 
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state’s traditional claim to be the primary provider of public security and its monopoly 
on violence are seen to be endangered. To bring this situation under control 
governments have been required to contemplate industry-specific private and 
commercial security regulations.  
In addition to addressing the research questions, the thesis revealed that there are some 
basic things that have been ‘forgotten’ or at least not taken into consideration well 
enough in the research on commercial security regulation. The local history, the 
political system, the general compliance with the laws, the status of public police as 
well as the maturity of the administrative and business environments and cultures all 
impact on the private and commercial security activities and regulation in a regulatory 
regime. Ideas concerning private and commercial security’s role and regulation needs 
are local and thus fragmented from country to country. As a consequence, the 
commercial security industry and its regulation do not constitute a global or identical 
entity. In a similar way it can be argued that to understand the world of commercial 
security, you need to understand every single country and regulatory regime and the 
industry specific statutory regulation (Berglund 1995:2). It can also be stated generally 
that if viewed internationally as well as historically, commercial guarding displays 
enormous variety. Security guards and the profession is not the same everywhere and 
because definitions are vague an uncertainty in their characterization will inevitably 
prevail for the time being (Bailey 1985:215). Sometimes there seems to be some 
nonchalance surrounding these basic truths in the commercial security research, 
forgetting that the industry is a part of the society and that its regulation and business 
performance are closely tied to the general values and maturity of its socio-economic 
environment. Every regulatory regime is different and needs to find its own application 
of regulation. Durable and functional improvements in private and commercial security 
can only be made in step with the general development of a society and its governance.  
The most significant contemporary trend within the industry is towards diversification 
and ‘verticalisation’, with the emphasis on the segmentation, specialisation and 
differentiation of commercial security services. All the parties within commercial 
security; regulators, administrators, trade associations, and security companies, are to an 
ever-increasing degree under pressure to organise themselves and their activities 
‘vertically’, reflecting the ongoing diversification and specialisation of security needs in 
societies. This trend is already affecting the industry’s activities, including regulation 
and regulation needs. The organising questions that shape this thesis: “Why?” 
“What/Who” and “How” to regulate should probably in the future be formulated more 
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specifically to one of the (‘vertical’) segments at a time.  The time has passed, if it was 
ever here, when commercial security could be understood and handled as one entity, be 
it as an aspect of  state governance or as a commercial enterprise.  
There is the phenomenon of the growing transnational and inter-state reach of 
commercial security. For example, ‘traditional’ multinational security companies with 
hundreds of thousands of employees all over the world, private military companies with 
their visible role in the trouble spots of the globe, and the pressure for free movement of 
businesses and labour in internal markets are challenges to the international, regional, 
federal and local governance structures. There is a need to take steps to create 
appropriate transnational and inter-state regulation models to streamline the steering of 
the different segments of commercial security-related activities, as has been recently 
proposed by the (UN) Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (2012). 
These steps are, however, slow and complicated processes that are always in danger of 
becoming outdated in the face of fast moving, market-oriented global changes. 
The changing challenges of governance 
Commercial security has developed steadily as a result of new security demands in 
societies. This has happened very much as with the development of any other service 
business within support industries. Governments as well as societies have gradually 
recognised private and commercial security as a ‘normal’ part of everyday life. It has 
been accepted that these services are needed because of the diverse risks and threats in 
today’s societies. The acceptance has also been strengthened by acceptance that it is not 
possible or even appropriate to increase the public security resources to meet all new 
risks. The thesis results indicate that commercial security has stepped in to meet the new 
challenges quite effectively.  
In the course of conducting this research it became apparent that it remains difficult for 
many academics and for representatives in the traditional legal and political structures to 
accept and admit the shifts that are taking place in security provision. The hidden 
political dimension was described by one of the interviewees: 
“The politicians, they don’t dare to talk to the population, to the citizens in 
general in an honest way. Because from an ideological point of view and a 
philosophical point of view, [politicians] cannot say to the population: we are 
going to protect you from now on, not by the police, we call in private security. 
They don’t dare to say that. But when they are sitting down and they are 
counting, they have a really pragmatic view and they say to us [private security 
representatives]; we cannot do it in other ways. But towards the public they do 
not want to admit it. It is sad.” (Industry expert)  
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The thesis findings show also that in the control of commercial security industry, a key 
player is the public police which have in many regulatory regimes a statutory role in 
commercial security governance and occupy a pivotal capacity to influence the 
industry’s activities. One of the politicians’ dilemmas in determining the exact role of 
commercial security in society is to decide how relations and cooperation between 
public and private security providers should be organised. Within the regulatory 
regimes under study there were different legal solutions on this matter, from total police 
control to total separation of the two sectors of security provision. Without clarifying 
this boundary, there will be on-going difficulties in cultivating commercial security 
services according to the societies’ and consumers’ changing needs. 
The increasing specialization of commercial security services is affecting all parties 
involved. In order to achieve better profitability through a higher level of 
professionalism and continuous growth, the ‘traditional’ security companies have 
increasingly focused their business activities on the core segments of activity; guarding, 
CIT and alarms. Today the majority of commercial security companies have been 
organised according to the diversified customer segments (needs) in order to meet the 
demand for new types of services and the growing requirements of specialisation. This 
change creates new challenges to the regulators and police because the regulation and 
its implementation need to be diversified accordingly, and because some of the new 
services are outside the present legal frame and authorities’ traditional core 
competences.  
It is not possible to recommend one governance model as a result of the findings 
presented in this thesis. There are, however, core issues which need to be kept on mind 
by the politicians and authorities when planning the future organisations of (statutory) 
commercial security regulation and control: 
a) The role of commercial security in societies has to be defined (recognised) to 
make decisions which enable it to serve societies in the best way today but 
especially in the future.  
b) Legislative control of the industry has to be based on a vision that takes into 
consideration the predictable trends and demands in societies’ future risk 
environments and the public resources available to face them.   
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c) Commercial security is an entity with its own operational logics and 
organisational cultures, and it cannot primarily be considered and regulated as an 
auxiliary public police function. 
d) A risk prevails that regulatory overkill will result in a situation where 
commercial security’s flexibility and strengths in anticipating and meeting 
customers’ and societies’ changing security needs will diminish. 
e) The practical management and control of the commercial security providers 
should be given to an independent authority which has professional knowledge 
of commercial security matters and which does not have ideological or interest 
group reasons to restrict the industry’s activities or growth. 
The thesis results showed that the day-to-day implementation of the regulations; the 
handling of licensing procedures and the organising of compulsory training are the key 
activities. They are the core of regulation and with the most practical challenges. They 
also affect crucially on a daily basis the business of the security companies and the 
recruiting of the guards. Even if there are a lot of problems in regulating and organising 
these activities in a satisfactory manner, there is a commonly expressed general 
willingness to streamline and speed up the licensing procedure to facilitate the 
recruitment of personnel. 
In the interview comments the disputed points on which the opinions of the responsible 
authorities and the customers, security companies and employees, differed were not the 
licensing procedures as such but the length of time they took. On the one hand, the 
commercial security companies (customers) felt that the processes took too long and 
hindered their business activities. On the other hand, the authorities thought that the 
processing times were reasonable but admitted that there were certain internal 
bureaucratic procedures in getting all the information needed and this complicated the 
processes and caused delays.  
In practice the thesis confirmed a consensus that training is needed and it should be an 
integral part of licensing requirements and procedures. The length of training required 
for licensing and the content of it varied between the regulatory regimes under study. 
The main problem was actually not the length or the content but the fact that the 
organisation of the training in many regulatory regimes was not adequately under the 
control of the licensors. Organisation and control had been left to some other 
governmental body, often under the Ministry of Education, and the actual training was 
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carried out by independent training organisations, public or private. The control of these 
bodies and their training activities varied a lot, creating a general picture of a difficult 
and partly neglected area within the commercial security licensing processes.  
Recommendations for a commercial security research agenda 
I have been involved in private security studies as a student at Helsinki University of 
Technology, the University of Leicester and City University London, as well as a 
lecturer on commercial security topics at Laurea University of Applied Studies for 15 
years. At the same time I have had the possibility to meet in a professional capacity, 
hundreds of security industry managers and customers at all levels as well as thousands 
of guards from all over the world. During this time in the field of commercial security 
research, old ideas have been rehashed and no new ones have emerged. Many 
researchers have abandoned the study of the operational logics of commercial security, 
focusing instead on the implications of commercial security for social equality, human 
rights, democracy etc. Consequently, commercial security’s regulation processes and 
developments have not garnered a lot of academic interest. Partly because of this, 
throughout the last thirty years the creation of working ‘platforms’ for this kind of 
research has been much ignored. In order to emphasize this argument, six examples 
taken from this thesis are given below:  
First, there has been little attempt to define what is meant by private security or 
commercial security and what activities are included under these terms. As a 
consequence of this no methodologies have been developed to produce reliable and 
transnationally comparable data on the industry. At the same time scholars have ignored 
industry generated data on commercial security and based their texts on often unreliable 
secondary data.  
Second, misleading myths, based on methodologically questionable data, have been 
created, such as (a) the routinely repeated argument that in many jurisdictions the public 
police are fewer in numbers than commercial security personnel, as well as (b) theories 
that emphasise the importance of mass private property and semi-public areas to the 
growth of the industry. 
Third, in many cases, academic texts express a normative aversion towards commercial 
security and concentrate on revealing, in a ‘shock, horror’ manner that it is uncontrolled, 
undertrained, unreliable, threatens human rights, undermines state sovereignty and is 
illegitimate. These arguments are in most cases not based on research. Nor are they 
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evaluated against the inefficiencies, corruption, malpractice and violence associated 
with the public police. 
Fourth, academics and politicians seem to think that by refusing to recognize its full 
significance the commercial security industry will vanish into thin air. Thus the research 
on regulation and control of the industry is in most cases a compulsive look in the rear 
mirror, not based on consideration of future developments of the security risks and 
security needs of societies.  
Fifth, there are inevitable market derived pressures which propel changes in the 
commercial security sector. The differentiation and verticalisation of the industry, as 
well as what this will mean in the future for the control of it, have not been taken into 
consideration in the existing research.  
Sixth, in most of the academic research on commercial security there is a failure to 
recognize that it is a business that acts and thinks like one. In many cases it has been 
conceptualized as a ‘junior police’ activity whose primary role is to support the public 
authorities. It has not been recognized that only a marginal part of commercial security 
is or will ever be provided as a supplement to actual public law enforcement. 
As I was drafting this conclusion two texts were published by academics representing 
two diverse, traditional approaches in carrying out studies on commercial security.  
Thumala, et al (2011) focus in their article on evidencing the moral ambivalence of the 
security industry in Britain. The authors also indicate that some of their ideas can be 
generalized to apply to the whole industry worldwide. The core question handled in 
their article is the ‘missing’ legitimacy and identity of security industry. This is an 
academic issue which is not generally a topic for the security providers. Maybe it is a 
problem in Britain, but it did not emerge as an issue in this thesis or in any of the 
thousands of contacts worldwide with the industry’s different interest group 
representatives. The authors of this article are part of a private security research 
tradition that foregrounds negative arguments about commercial security without giving 
practical ideas how to correct the situation. Their argument is that the industry has no 
distinctive identity or role and it is desperately seeking legitimacy. Given that, e.g. the 
(UN) Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice has proposed a resolution 
on the governance of civilian private security services and that in Europe alone there are 
over one million licensed and trained guards who are authorized to carry out manifold 
tasks, the question arises: how is this possible if this work has no legitimacy or 
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authorized identity? This article can be considered as a traditional academic (and 
political) text that is intended to undermine one profession, written to other academics 
but not for any constructive purpose to develop or change the commercial security 
industry. It is based on preconceived attitudes and skillful use of normative assumptions 
rather than a detailed empirically based knowledge of the industry. If these kinds of 
articles are the academic contribution to commercial security research, it is little wonder 
that interaction between researchers and the industry’s professionals remain weak or 
non-existent.   
The other new research work on commercial security is Sarre and Prenzler’s (2011) 
comprehensive research report on the positioning of commercial security in the era of 
plural policing in Australia. This work represents the other school and is a 
comprehensive study on the future trends of the industry in diverse legal environments 
of the eight Australian States. It includes practical knowledge and empirical details on 
vital aspects of the industry and its activities. It also includes ideas and 
recommendations about what should be done by the central and local governments as 
well as the industry to steer commercial security activities. This kind of study, even if it 
is focused on Australia, is setting an invaluable platform both locally and 
transnationally for further discussion and research. But what is even more important; it 
is a tool for all interest groups to understand the key challenges in developing and 
steering the commercial security industry in different societies. 
These two publications are good examples of the two different academic approaches 
that have dominated (commercial) private security research. The ‘traditional’ one 
represented here by Thumala, et al which is based on sociological theories and carried 
out by academics who do not approve of and would prefer not to acknowledge the 
legitimate existence of commercial security. The other, more pragmatic one, represented 
here by Sarre and Prenzler, is based on multidisciplinary methods and carried out by 
researchers who base their opinions and arguments on pragmatic and empirical studies. 
These academics are also worried about some aspects of commercial security activities 
but their goal is to give the decision makers and the industry tools to steer the industry 
so that it will serve in the best way the society as a whole.  
The ideal would be to get politicians, regulators, police, academics and security industry 
representatives around the same table as happened at the Cropwood conference in 1971 
(Wiles and McClintock 1972). This kind of open high-level exchange of thoughts on the 
future of commercial security would be a good start in developing our understanding of 
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the commercial security industry’s unfolding alternative roles in different societies. 
Unfortunately this has not been possible for forty years, partly because many prominent 
academics question the legacy of commercial security. Cropwood was a British meeting 
but today the makeup of a ‘round table’ should be more transnational. This would also 
give a better possibility to have such academics involved that recognize the industry and 
thus are interested to take part in a discussion of the future roles of commercial security 
and how it should be researched. This kind of meeting, well organized, could also be a 
booster for more cooperation between the industry and the academia. 
My ideas on what needs to be researched and what should be taken into consideration in 
future studies of commercial security regulation are as follows: 
a) The need to clarify the future authorised roles of the commercial security 
sector and its division of labour with the public authorities (police). 
b) The inevitable market steered development and realisation of new 
commercial security services and products which meet customer risks and 
needs.  
c) The further privatisation of public, including police-type, security tasks.  
d) The trend towards specialisation, diversification and verticalisation of 
commercial security industry’s organisations and actual operations as well 
as its public control (governance). 
e) The transnationalisation and federalisation of commercial security industry 
and its control. 
Finally  
As has been noted in this thesis, the need for commercial security regulation in its 
present form has been acknowledged and addressed by governments for over a century. 
This has led gradually to statutory regulation of the industry across diverse jurisdictions. 
Some of the regulatory areas, such as protection of citizens’ rights from illegal acts 
performed by commercial security operators, exclusion of criminal elements from the 
industry and the call for standardised minimum quality standards, have persisted 
through all these years. It seems that the basic and general reasons ‘officially’ given for 
commercial private security regulation are relatively constant. The actual challenge for 
regulation/regulators is to respond in a constructive manner to constantly changing risk 
environments and rapidly developing new security products and services created to 
meet them. To do so regulation needs to be premised on a deep future-oriented 
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understanding of rapidly changing sociological and operational environments. Morgan 
and Newburn (1998:109-110) have argued that “...it is time to give the law and order 
rhetoric a rest and have proper public debate, one that is grounded on fact”. For the 
Institute for Security Studies (2007:11) that ‘proper public debate’ needs to focus as a 
matter of urgency on “regulatory innovation because the industry is growing fast and 
legislation cannot keep up”. As in many other cases, the responsibility to provide this 
new regulatory innovation rests not only with legislators and authorities but with the 
commercial security industry and with academics, who need to produce high-quality 
empirically based data that is of relevance to rapidly developing security environments. 
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Appendix 1        'FAMILY TREE' OF COMMERCIAL SECURITY AS IT IS DEFINED IN THIS THESIS1   
   
                                                                                             Commercial Security Services                                                                             ‘Policing’                            Private Military  
                             Services2                                    Services3 
                
    Security         Private               Crowd             Guarding               Electronic          Physical/           Cash Handling         Information security4    Public order tasks                    Armed protection            
Consultancy  Investigation5    Management6                                 Security7           Mechanical             Services8                                  Private Crime investigation     Military services 
                                                                                                                                                    Security9                                                                  Parking control             
                        Traffic control 
Risk management                            Event security        Static    Alarms   Locks                 CIT        ICT security                    Court attendance                        
Business intelligence                       Door supervision   Mobile    Access control    Barriers10           Cash processing        Document security           
Security planning                                Security checks      CCTV                 Seals                  ATM maintenance    ID security  
Implementation    Close protection                                 Lighting            Security transports 
 Alarm response                     Safes 
 Reception    Vaults 
 (Key holding)     
Security Training11                     \            /      
   Monitoring and Alarm Receiving12              Attention: Security industry is a free-form expression often used in  
Protection of CNI13      different contexts of the security services, equipment production and 
Alarm receiving (& dispatching)   activities connected for example, to the businesses described in this  
    Electronic surveillance & positioning   table and its foot-notes. As the expression is undefined and its content  
Operational remote control    is wavering, certain caution should be exercised when using it.  
Guard safety control 
CIT remote control  
                                                          
1
 The focus in this table is on the ‘manned’ services and the most usual other ‘bricks’ of integrated security systems. In this presentation correctional service, actual fire and ambulance service, and production (industry) of security 
equipment have been excluded. Fire protection and ambulance services are, however, often provided for the customers within the scope of guarding (fire patrol/checks and first response), electronic security (installation of fire alarm 
equipment), and monitoring and alarm receiving (fire alarms). The lists of activities/products given under the different headings are not exhaustive, but give examples of activities/products belonging together. 
2
 Here are included activities called often private policing, such as traditional or new public law enforcement services outsourced to, or for other reasons taken over by private security providers. Anyhow, tasks carried out in semi-
public environments (e.g. malls, shopping centres, sports events and outdoor concerts) are considered in this context guarding or crowd management. 
3
 These are in the first place auxiliary services provided by personnel with combatant capability; for state organs, NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations) and private businesses primarily in conflict & crisis areas, and in failing 
societies. The providers of these services are generally called private military companies. Mercenary activities are excluded. 
4
 Includes here e.g. information and communications technology security (ICT), document security (writing, handling, movement and storage), and identification security (ID) services like provision of IDs and ID protection. 
5
 The term private investigation has today in some contexts been taken over by ’private intelligence services’ as the area of operation and the matters handled have been widened to new areas.  
6
 Also called crowd control.  
7
 Planning, installation and maintenance of Business to Business (B to B), Business to Consumer (B to C) and integrated systems 
8
 The cash handling could also be called transport of valuables which covers the transports of:  blood for hospitals, pieces of art, different kinds of valuables, documents and so on. Because cash is by far the main item transferred and 
handled the whole security transport activity has here been called as cash handling. 
9
 Physical and mechanical security is considered as a part of commercial security services only if provided in connection of other services. 
10
 E.g. installation of security fences, gates, doors, windows, blockers, etc.  
11
 Security training is an auxiliary, often licensed, service primarily aimed to fulfil the (legal) requirements imposed on operational security personnel, and which is carried out by security companies themselves, government 
representatives (e.g. police) or independent training providers (institutions).  
12
 Monitoring is today positioned in a gray zone between guarding and electronic security. 
13
 The protection of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) is a ’new’ important and growing special (integrated/converged) security service entity which also includes the terrorist aspect (CBRNE). It has not been categorised in this 
presentation, and should probably be ranked in the same category as public order services or private military services.  
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 Appendix 2 
A GENERAL PROPOSAL FOR A MODEL AND PRINCIPLES TO GATHER 
BASIC STATISTICAL INFORMATION CONCERNING SECURITY 
INDUSTRY AND ITS PERSONNEL
127
 
In order to correct the existing situation the following (minimum) steps should be taken: 
 Creation of a professional model (platform) and guidelines to streamline in the 
long run the gathering and presentation of commercial security related data on a 
national and transnational level by all parties, be they states, national and 
international associations/institutions, or researchers. 
 Short-listing of the most important statistical figures to start with. 
 Drawing up a draft questionnaire based on the approved short listing of the core 
figures needed (and possible to acquire), including guidelines to make the results 
comparable. 
In all contexts there should be assessed and mentioned in some form what is the origin 
of the given figures, are they: 
 From an official or semi-official statistical source (and if so what is the source)?  
 Based on reliable industry associations’ assessments or personal analyses?  
 An individual or institutional ‘best educated guess’?  
 Based on a specific survey examination? 
On all answers, whatever the source, there should also be mentioned the respondents 
assessment of the reliability and validity of the figure(s) on a scale from 1 to 3.
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1 THE SIZE OF THE COMMERCIAL SECURITY INDUSTRY 
The number of granted company licenses 
In most of the countries there is a licensing system for the commercial security 
companies and personnel. In most of the countries also official state or regulatory 
authority’s records are available on the number of licenses granted. 
Question 1: How many valid security company/security provider licenses are there in 
your country? 
Sub-Question 1.1: How many of the security company/security provider license holders 
carry on active security business in your country?
129
  
Sub-question 1.2: How many of these active license holders are involved in manned 
guarding business? 
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The number of individual security personnel licenses 
Question 2: How many individual private security licenses are valid in your country 
(active and sleeping)? 
Sub-question 2.1: How many of the active licenses are:
130
 
 * for guards (equivalent)? 
 * for crowd controllers/door supervisors? 
 * (for private investigators?) 
 * (for bodyguards?) 
 * (for cash services personnel?) 
* (for security electronics/other equipment installers and maintenance 
personnel)?  
Question 3: How many individual private security license holders work actively within 
commercial
131
 security in your country?  
Sub-question 3.1: How many of these active license holders work primarily:
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 * as guards (equivalent): 
    * commercially (within security business)? 
    * in in-house organisations? 
 * as crowd controllers/door supervisors: 
    * commercially (as employees of a security provider)? 
    * in in-house organisations? 
 * (as private investigators?) 
 * (as bodyguards?) 
 * (as cash services, cit and cash handling, personnel?) 
  * (as installers and maintenance personnel (security electronics/other 
equipment)? 
Sub-question 3.2: How much unlicensed security personnel work: 
 * as in-house guards? 
 * as in house crowd controllers/door supervisors? 
 * in registered private security and cowboy companies? 
The total amount of security work and the comparable man year figures 
Question 4: How many active operational guard (sold)
133
 hours are performed 
commercially within the security industry annually in your country? 
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Sub-question 4.1: How many man years is this (based on the local employment 
laws)?
134
  
Sub-question 4.2: How many commercial man years are performed in: 
 * guarding (equivalent)? 
 * crowd control/door supervision? 
Sub-question 4.3: What is the approximate total number
135
 of working hours performed 
by one commercial guard in your country? 
2 REMUNERATION  
Basic salaries 
Question 5: What is the monthly starting salary of a full-time (licensed), non-armed 
guard performing basic tasks (without overtime, weekend, evening, night, etc 
allowances)? 
Sub-question 5.1: What is the monthly starting net
136
 salary of the above mentioned 
guard (excluding the extras)? 
2.2 Average salaries 
Question 6: What is the average monthly gross salary of all guards (extra allowances 
included)? 
Sub-question 6:1: What is the average net salary of the above mentioned guards? 
2.3 Comparable industry salaries 
Question 7: What is the average monthly gross salary of blue-collars in your country in: 
 * the support (service) industry? (cleaning, catering, real estate services) 
 * the engineering industry?  
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Appendix 3  
INFORMATION AND QUESTION SHEETS USED FOR THE INTERVIEWS 
 
Profile and Research description sent to chosen interviewee candidates 
 
Dear Mr/Ms 
Researcher’s personal profile and activities 
I am a Finn living today in Helsinki, the capital of Finland and working as a Senior 
Adviser for Securitas Security Services Europe. For the time being I am the Chairman 
of the Board of Securitas Oy Finland and a permanent member in four committees on 
European level which work with the harmonisation and standardisation of private 
security and the social dialogue between the social partners (employers’ and employees’ 
associations). I am also this year the Chair of ASIS chapter 210 Finland. At the side of 
this I am presently registered as an APG (Advanced Post Graduate) student at City 
University in London where I usually stay one week every month doing transnatonal 
research on private security regulation. The title of my research is: The Regulation of 
manned commercial security services – A transnational comparative study of Belgium, 
Estonia, New York, Queensland, South Africa and Sweden. This research is carried out 
to collect material for the ongoing debate of European and global) harmonisation in 
private security and to write a thesis for the University. 
Education: Career Officer Examination / Finnish Defence College 1968, BSc in 
Mechanical Engineering / Technical College of Helsinki 1980 and MSc in Security 
Management / Leicester University 1998. My working career after ten years in the army 
have been: Security Supervisor in Bank of Finland Security Printing House 1973-75, 
Senior Consultant in Finnish Industrial Security Ltd 1975-80, Chief of Security Helsinki 
University Central Hospital 1981-85, Manager & Managing Director Securitas Finland 
1985-2000, Military Observer (UN) in Kashmir 1989-90, Executive Vice President 
Securitas Security Services Europe Division 2001-2004. The last post included 
operational responsibility of Eastern Europe countries and Mexico plus the co-
ordination of HR policies in the Division (90.000 employees). 
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Research description and activities 
Within the comparative transnational research I have made a pilot study of the statutory 
regulation of 40 countries using documents, a survey with 90 handpicked experts and 
confirmation interviews with the same experts. Based on this pilot study and other 
sources I have planned to interview approximately 50 experts in the six main countries 
under study. Five to eight persons from different private security interest groups will be 
interviewed. These interviewees should represent the branch associations, company 
managers, security managers (buyers), unions, politicians, regulatory authorities, media 
and academics.  
The interviews are focused on the private security statutory regulation, trying to get an 
idea how the present national regulations reflect the needs of different interest groups 
and how the successful the implementation has been. The main subjects of interest are 
the scope of regulation, licensing of companies and guards, compulsory training, control 
of compliance and future development needs. The interviews are planned to be used in 
the research text without interviewee names only as a summary of the different opinions 
of different groups. The chosen interviewees will be approached individually with a 
detailed list of the topics which should be discussed during a 45 to 60 minutes session.  
 
 
Pre-information sent to actual interviewees at least one week before the meeting 
 
Dear Mr/Ms  
A part of the case studies of my thesis is carried out using semi-structured topical 
interviews. Six to eight representatives of different interest groups are interviewed in six 
regulatory regimes (countries), i.e. Belgium, Estonia, New York, Queensland, South 
Africa and Sweden. The goal is to find out opinions of existing private security 
environment, its regulation and the most important challenges in regulation 
development related in the first place to the individual interviewee’s professional area.  
The planned length of an interview is 45 to 60 minutes. A voice recorder is used if this 
is agreed by the interviewee. The interviewee can at any time during the interview ask 
the recording to be stopped if he/she wants to express opinions off the record. The 
answers will be handled anonymously and in the text the references will be used 
without notes to the regulatory regime or the person / occupation. These details will be 
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listed in a separate appendix of the final thesis depending on each interviewee’s 
approval. 
From the research point of view the following questions are planned to be included in 
the discussion. They are not, however, to limit the aspect of discussion which is meant 
to deal in addition to the interviewees special knowledge area his/her personal opinions. 
 Why and in what situation is private security regulation needed in your 
country/state? 
 Constitution… 
 Changing roles… 
 Division of labour… 
 Unsuitable elements (personnel)… 
 Accountability… 
 Control of powers… 
 Breaches of privacy… 
 Status of the industry… 
 Global companies… 
 What single elements have started up governmental (political) active measures 
in private security regulation matters in your country/state? 
 Public tasks… 
 Misbehaviour cases… 
 Interest group activity… 
 Media coverage… 
 What private security domains, activities, tools, equipment, procedures should be 
regulated? 
 Approved areas of activity… 
 Business segments… 
 Companies… 
 Personnel groups… 
 Equipment  – uniforms, night sticks, handcuffs… 
 Contracts… 
 Liability/infidelity insurance… 
 How should private security be regulated? 
 Statutory or self-regulation… 
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 Federal centralised… 
 Responsible governmental authority (business/security)… 
 What should be the police authority’s role in private security regulation and 
controlling processes? 
 No police role … 
 Equal partner, junior partner, auxiliary police 
 Is the present local regulation model working well administratively from your point 
of view? 
 Government interest/commitment… 
 How could the licensing procedure and control of the private security companies 
and employees be improved? 
 special department/agency… 
 Time span in licensing… 
 inspections… 
 bigger industry self-control… 
 Is the compulsory training of different groups of private security personnel 
effective and sufficient? 
 Groups included… 
 Length… 
 Specialisation… 
 Exams/certification… 
 Refreshment training… 
 Are all licence holders in the industry treated equally by the authorities? 
 Licensing procedures… 
 Inspections…   
 Is there a working dialogue between the different interest groups and the 
government/authorities  
 Reviews… 
 Permanent/ad hoc committees… 
 local police… 
 unions/employer associations… 
 Are the regulations of firearm possession and use within private security industry 
adequate and meeting the needs? 
 General gun laws… 
238 
 
 special regulation for private security… 
 the real need/case histories… 
 the future development… 
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Appendix 4 
TOPICS TO BE INCLUDED WHEN CONSIDERING WHAT TO REGULATE
137
 
1). Setting of the general legal preconditions for commercial security activity by 
defining the commercial security industry, its role in society and the governance model. 
Based on these fundamental decisions, making evaluation of: its sphere of operations, 
its relation to authorities, its division of labour with authorities (police), its physical 
appearance, its extra powers, its right to possess weapons and its control by authorities 
(including their industry specific powers). Answers to the following questions should be 
provided by the regulators: 
 What is private and commercial security (definition)?  
 What is the general role of commercial security in the society (business or semi-
public law enforcement)? 
 Where can commercial security operate (spheres)? 
 private spheres 
 public spheres 
 semi-public spheres 
 Should inn-house security be regulated? 
 What sort of tasks can commercial security generally take/perform? 
 Should there be special regulation of protection of CNI objects by commercial 
security providers? 
 How to organise the public/private division of labour? 
 co-operation between authorities/private/commercial actors 
 the role differentiation between police/private/commercial security 
 police officers holding an office working within private/commercial security 
 How to identify security officers? 
 the diversification in appearance authorities/private/commercial security actors 
(uniforms) 
 the general markings and company badges on clothing 
 the personal ID, its issuance and use  
 Is there a need for extra powers and extra protection? 
 Is possession of weapons to be allowed? 
 non-lethal 
 firearms 
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 How should the control and accountability be ensured? 
 all over responsibility of private/commercial security regulation (the responsible 
authority) 
 controlling/licensing body and its status 
 formalised co-ordination body (authorities/industry) 
 appeal procedures 
 reports 
 inspections 
 internal avenue of appeal (licensing) 
 3rd party complaints handling 
 sanctions 
2) Setting of the industry specific legal preconditions for commercial security providers 
(companies/personnel) by defining : the segments of activity to be controlled, the basic 
compulsory requirements for companies and personnel, the minimum training, the 
equipment allowed, quality standards and the interplay between providers and 
customers. Questions to be considered and answered in this context are:    
 What segments of security activity should be included? 
 What basic controls are needed for legal persons? 
 companies 
 personnel 
 What are the minimum training requirements and their content (exams)? 
 How to organise the compulsory training? 
 What requirements and control should be set on equipment?  
 dogs  
 uniforms and protective clothing  
 cars 
 weapons (non-lethal and firearms)  
3) Setting of the business and quality related requirements, standards and codes of ethic 
to formalise the business relations, to protect the customers and to guarantee minimum 
quality of services. In this category belong also the working condition and social 
dialogue matters if they are not prescribed in other statutory regulations. Questions to be 
considered and answered in this context are: 
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 What compulsory rules are needed in security provider versus customer 
interactions? 
 compulsory written contracts  
 formalised minimum content of contracts 
 minimum liability and fidelity insurance obligations 
 formalised obligation of incident reporting and its preservation 
 What arrangements would be recommended for trade union interaction? 
 collective agreement on wages and terms of employment 
 formalised social dialogue interaction 
 union representation on company boards 
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Appendix 5 
DIRECTIVE LIST OF TOPICS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN PLANNING 
HOW TO REGULATE 
 Statutory or self-regulation? 
 How are transnational treaties affecting the local regulation model? 
 Should the regulation be harmonised (federal) or local (state)? 
 Should the whole private security industry be regulated together? 
 different segments by the same or separate laws 
 all private security legislation administered by one or several authorities  
 is verticalisation affecting the law structure and content 
 Who should have the administrative responsibility for the commercial security 
regulation? 
 writing of legislation 
 development of legislation 
 running of permanent advisory committee for public-private co-operation  
 How to organise the administrative implementation and control of the regulation? 
 internal or (semi-)independent controlling authority? 
 centralised or divided authority? 
 centralised or decentralised execution of ‘daily’ control duties? 
 co-operation arrangements between the authorities and the industry 
 How to organise the practical day to day execution of regulation duties?  
 granting of licenses and co-operation between authorities in the process 
 screening of security providers 
 training arrangements (exams) 
 the submission of certificates 
 the follow up through reports and inspections of security providers 
 citizens’ and internal complaint handling 
 How to fund the licensing and control procedures - fees? 
 The granting and use of industry special authority powers?  
 (How to regulate industry specific legal penalties and their execution powers?)  
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Appendix 6 
 
DEFINITIONS ON SECURITY GUARD / SECURITY OFFICER
 138
  
 
Main points in legal definitions of guards   BE  EE  NY QLD  ZA  SE  CEN ASIS 
Personal requirements:  
- citizenship/permanent residence 
- basic education  
- professional training  
- age  
- language proficiency – 
- personal characteristics/moral standards  
- physical condition and health 
  
  x 
  x 
  x 
  x 
  x 
  x 
  x 
     
 
 
  x 
    
   
   
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performing functions: 
- protection of individuals 
- protection of property 
 
   
  
   x 
   x 
 
 
   x 
   
  x 
  x 
 
 
 
Performing tasks: 
- deterrence/prevention 
- observation 
- detection 
- screening employees and visitors 
- inspection of packages and vehicles 
- escorting visitors and parking issues assistance 
- reporting 
- preventing unauthorised entry/trespassing 
- street patrol service 
- response to security incidents 
- enforcement of established company rules 
- apprehension of violators 
- monitoring security and life safety equipment 
- utilising various security measures 
   
   x 
   x 
   x 
 
 
 
   x 
   x 
   x 
   x 
   x 
   x 
    
    
  x 
  x 
  x 
 
 
 
  x 
  x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     x 
     x 
     x 
     x 
     x 
     x 
     x 
 
     x 
     x 
Employment: 
- employed by a guarding company 
- working for remuneration/fee/reward 
- other than police officer 
   
   x 
   x 
   x  
 
  
  x 
  x 
   
 
  x 
 
 
 
  x 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Belgium: No specific definition(s) of a guard or a security officer. 
Estonia:  A guard
139
 is a person who has undergone initial training and who performs 
the duties of a security guard on the basis of a contract of employment 
entered into for a specific term with a probationary period of up to four 
months, who is an Estonian citizen or a person holding a permanent residence 
permit in Estonia, who is at least 19 years of age and who has completed 
basic education, who is proficient in Estonian at the level established by law 
or by legislation issued on the basis thereof, who is capable of performing the 
duties of a security guard in terms of his or her personal characteristics, moral 
standards, physical condition and health, and whom the restrictions specified 
in subsection 23 (1)
140
 of this Act do not apply. 
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New York: “Security guard” shall mean a person, other than a police officer, employed 
by a security guard company to principally perform one or more of the 
following functions within the state: 
a. protection of individuals and/or property from harm, theft or other 
unlawful activity; 
b. deterrence, observation, detection and/or reporting of incidents in 
order to prevent any unlawful or unauthorised activity including but 
not limited to unlawful or unauthorized intrusion or entry, larceny, 
vandalism, abuse, arson or trespass on property; 
c. street patrol service; 
d. respond to but not installation or service of a security system alarm 
installed and/or used to prevent or detect unauthorized intrusion, 
robbery, burglary, theft, pilferage and other losses and/or to maintain 
security of a protected premises.  
Queensland:  Who is a security officer; 
(1) A security officer is a person who, for reward, patrols or guards 
another person’s property. 
(2) Despite subsection (1), a person is not a security officer merely 
because the person- 
(a) is an employee of a person who does not, for reward, patrol 
or guard another person’s property; and 
(b) as an employee, patrols or guards the employer’s property.  
South Africa: Security officer means a natural person- 
 (i)  who is employed by another person, including an organ of state, and who 
receives or is entitled to receive from such other person any remuneration, 
reward, fee or benefit, for rendering one or more security services; or 
 (ii) who assists in carrying on or conducting the affairs of another security   
service provider, and who receives or is entitled to receive from such other 
security service provider, any remuneration, reward, fee or benefit, as regards 
one or more security services; 
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 who renders a security service under the control of another security service 
provider and who receives or is entitled to receive from any other person any 
remuneration, reward, fee or benefit for such a service; or 
 who or whose services are directly or indirectly made available by another 
security service provider to any other person, and who receives or is entitled 
to receive from any other person any remuneration, reward, fee or benefit for 
rendering one or more security services; 
Sweden: Security officer shall be understood to mean a person employed in an 
authorised security company performing security operations on behalf of 
another party, but not the party who is the guard or another  party who 
performs  security operations as referred to under Chapter 1 Section 1(2)
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CEN: Security officer/security guard:  
Person who is paid a fee, wage or salary and is trained and screened and 
performs one or more of the following functions: 
 prevention or detection of intrusion, unauthorized entry (access control)  or 
activity, vandalism or trespass on public or private property; 
 prevention or detection of theft, loss, embezzlement, misappropriation or 
concealment of merchandise, money, bonds, stocks notes or valuable 
documents or papers; 
 protection of individuals from bodily harm; 
 environmental protection and management in rural and maritime domains; 
 enforcement of (whilst obeying) established company rules, regulations, 
policies and practices related to crime reduction; 
 reporting and apprehension of violators as defined by national law. 
ASIS
142
: Security Officers 
Organisations use security officers to supplement or amend other 
controls/measures where human presence and human decision making is 
needed. 
Responsibilities: Security officers may carry out various responsibilities 
including, but not limited to, 
 screening employees and visitors in reception areas; 
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 controlling access to the facility at other points 
 monitoring security and life safety equipment 
 conducting patrols on foot or using some type of vehicle 
 responding to security incidents; 
 documenting incidents; 
 escorting visitors; 
 assisting with parking issues; 
 inspecting packages and vehicles; 
 utilizing various security measures (doors, locks, alarms, CCTV  
cameras, lighting, etc).  
ASIS
143
 has in another publication defined a private security officer in the 
following way: 
Private Security Officer – An individual, other than armoured car 
personnel or a public employee (federal, state, or local government), 
employed part or full time, in uniform or plain clothes, hired to protect the 
employing party’s assets, ranging from human lives to physical property 
(the premises and contents). The definition excludes individuals who are 
not employed in the capacity of a private security officer.   
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 Appendix 7  
Main regulatory requirements concerning security guard / security officer 
   BE    EE  NY QLD  ZA SE 
Permanent national or EU / federal resident status    x144     x     x    x  
               Time limits for residence or interruptions of it              x  
Not involved in certain other professions      x145     x146    
Minimum age    x147     x148     x     x    x     x149 
Evidence for identity      x      x   
National language skill level      x        x150 
Compliance with relevant training requirements    x151     x     x     x    x     x 
               Specific for management     x     x     x      x     x 
               Specific for security officers     x     x     x     x     x     x 
               Possibility to get a restricted license without basic training  
               special  supervision (6 months) 
     x152      x   
               Specific for former government ‘security’ officials       x153    
Experience requirements for certain areas of activity       x       x154 
Requirements for approving a guard license        
          Not found guilty of specified offences (clean criminal record)     x     x     x     x     x     x 
                            Also outside the regulatory regime     x        x155     x   
                            Also unrecorded findings of guilt     x       x      x 
                            Specific list (definitions) of disqualifying offences     x       x     x  
          Not found guilty of improper conduct (general suitability)      x     x     x     x     x 
                            The person is a risk to public safety       x     x   
                            The license would be contrary to the public interest        x         x 
                            Dishonesty or lack of integrity        x   
                            Use of harassing tactics        x   
                            Doubt of general trustworthiness      x    x156       x 
           Advance taking of the laws of bankruptcy      x      x   
                          Medical requirements and/or test     x157     x     x    
           Psycho-technical requirements and/or examination     x158      x    
                            Known to have mental problems or abuse of narcotics       x       x 
Clearance of former employment in public service           x  
                            Not been discharged from public enforcement position       x    
           Restrictions if currently employed in public enforcement services      x        x159  
                         Restrictions if former police officer or equivalent    x160      
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Appendix 8  
Compulsory basic training regulation related requirements  
   BE   EE  NY QLD   ZA   SE 
Compulsory basic training regulated    x     x    x    x    x    x 
Specific (national) training committee    x          x  
Official security officer grade system in training     x      x    x 
Compulsory further (refreshment) training    x     x     x    o161 
Specification of the number of hours of all compulsory training        x    x162      x 
     Specification of the maximum weekly hours and length of lessons         x 
      Specification of the maximum number of pupils per instructor         x 
      Specification on classroom and on the job training realisation                       x 
Specification of the topics included in compulsory training        x163     x    x    x 
      Manager               x 
      Basic security officer     x     x    x    x 
      Special events security officer (crowd controller       x    x    x 
      Dogs and dog handlers     x       x164 
      Cash-in-transit         x 
     Shop surveillance         x 
     Close protection         x 
     Use of expandable (telescope) batons         x 
Qualifying examination      x     x    x    x 
     Authorised examination holders     x     x   
Specific accreditation system for training establishments    x    x    x165    x    x    x 
     Specific accreditation requirements for dog training centres        x  
Accreditation of training establishment trainer    x     x    x    x    x    x 
     Specific requirement for experience in security work            x 
     Specific  accreditation of dog and handler instructor       x   
     Specific accreditation criteria for security firearms instructor       x   
Training certificate requirements and submission        x    x 
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Chapter 2 
 
1
 There are several different words and definitions concerning the security activities carried out by non-
governmental corporations and personnel. The most general is private security which is also used 
almost unanimously by the governments in their legislation. This word includes, however, also 
activities carried out by as in-house by companies, non-profit organisations, voluntary groups and 
vigilantes. This thesis is primarily focused on security activities carried out by business oriented 
companies and individuals who provide their services for a fee. That is why the words commercial 
security and (private) security industry have been used of them, when seen appropriate, parallel with 
private security. After the submission of this thesis (UN) Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice (2012) has published a proposition concerning the definition of civilian private security 
services.  
2
 Within the sphere of crowd management different (national) words are used for the service and the 
people attached to this service. Terms; crowd manager, crowd controller, attendant, doorman, ‘bouncer’ 
and door supervisor are all used for the same functions according to the vocabulary of the regulatory 
regime under study. 
3
 Things to be taken into consideration when researching the figures on commercial security activities are: 
First, in most countries, especially regarding guarding and crowd control, there are a great number of 
part-timers and temporary staff who do not work full hours. How should they be handled in the 
statistics? Second, there is a question of how many hours full-time guards work in different countries? 
The weekly hours are different, as are holidays and other terms of employment. We have, for example, 
in Europe, the Nordic countries, where full-time guards normally work less than 160 hours per month, 
and the East European EU countries, the United Kingdom as well as Far Eastern countries, where the 
norm is, on an average, 230 hours per month (Flynn 1997:135; Hakala 2007; Button and Park 2009: 7). 
How can the size of the industry be compared by the number of guards if these facts are not taken into 
consideration? Third, the different countries define their private security segments differently. In 
addition, they collect and group the data and keep (or do not keep at all) the records concerning the 
industry in different ways (Kempa et al 1999:200). Consequently the figures presented in the available 
literature and even by industry’s associations and governments do not provide a reliable basis for 
transnational comparison.   
4
 Studies commonly referred to in transnational texts are: a small size-ranking exercise (Berglund 1995; 
Nordberg 1996:2) made for an international ‘Ligue’ meeting of the all-over quality factors in the private 
security industry; George and Button’s (1996; 1997a; 1999) and Button’s (1998a; 2005a; 2005b; 2007a) 
studies, which were partly carried out to support the case for regulation in the UK; Ottens, er al’s (1999) 
extensive book on private security arrangements in Europe; de Waard’s (1993; 1999), de Waard and 
van de Hoek’s (1991) research papers, which aimed to fill a gap of non-existing comparable data of the 
industry in the EU; Cukier, et al’s (2002) article on Canadian private security regulation in an 
international perspective; Sarre and Prenzler’s (2005:7-16), Prenzler’s (2005a) and Prenzler, et al’s 
(2009a) academic examinations of the Australian situation; and Weber’s (2001: 2002a; 2002b; 2003) 
and Morre’s (2004a; 2004b; 2006) by the Social Partners (CoESS & UNI-Europa) ordered 
comprehensive, partly comparative data collection reports of legal and other aspects of the private 
security industry in the EU. The last figures published have been collected by CoESS and its different 
local partners (CoESS 2008; INHES and CoESS 2008; CoESS and Almega 2009:8-10; FederSicurezza 
2009:10-11; CoESS and APEG/BVO 2010:11-17; Sarre and Prenzler 2011). 
5
 Examples of texts including this comparison without any explanations: Kennedy 1995:101; Hume 
1997:18; Kempa et al 1999; Johnston 1999:183-184; Griffith 1999; Sarre and Prenzler 1999:17; 
2005b:14; Karlsson 2000; Westerberg 2000:20; Bayley and Shearing 2001:1; Button 2002:97-100; 
2008:5-6; Prenzler 2005a:51-52; Caparini 2006:265; Camacho Vizcaino 2008:17; CoESS & ALMEGA 
2009:10; FederSicurezza 2009:10-11; Zedner 2009:2; Button and Park 2009:2; United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime 2010:4-5; Hadley 2010; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011:1, 20-21 and Thumala, et 
al 2011:284. 
6
 Because of language limitations only theses submitted in English or Finnish were included in this 
review. A majority of the theses discussed here have been also published as books. 
7
 This engineering’ approach to security is one more example of the way to widen multidisciplinary 
research in security studies. Pesonen gives one more aspect also on the guarding activities as he was the 
managing director of a big commercial security company. 
8
 The background of the author and his opinions are in a way ‘unique’ as he has worked a long time as a 
guard, a supervisor and a manager in commercial security as well as a full time university lecturer and 
barrister specialised in private security matters (Hakala and Pisto 2010). 
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9
 Shearing and Stenning’s definition of mass private property was introduced in this article (1981) in 
connection to growing private security presence in semi-public environments, especially shopping 
malls. This new area of service has been used wrongly in the literature as one major reason for the 
general growth of private security businesses globally, as is pointed out by: Jones and Newburn (1999); 
van Steden (2008:152-154) and Zedner (2009:92-93). There are, however, studies like the article by 
Hou and Sheu (1994:21) where the authors make a conclusion that the increasing wealth, the mass 
property, is the main reason for the growing use of private security services in Taiwan. This definition 
has been widened by M. Lalonde to ‘mass private space’ including also guarding objects like: 
universities, hospitals, gated communities and entertainment zones (United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime 2010:5). 
10
 Wood has used in this text a quotation on the ‘messy realm’ from Garland (1997:199) 
11 The difference in approach and thinking between the ‘real life’ actors and the academics can be well noticed when 
comparing security industry managements’ and Zedner’s (2009: 92-96) views on the business drivers. Zedner as an 
academic emphasizes the sociological changes in societies as business people within commercial security talk 
primarily of changing customer needs and thinking. There is a wide gap in approach; commercial security 
representatives are focused on customers, academics on society at large. 
12
The growth in the main markets of guarding (Europe and North America=64% of world market) has 
been during the last ten years stable and has followed the GDP development. This was also the case in 
2009 when the growth in guarding business, due to global recession, was zero in Europe and negative in 
North America.   
13
As a curiosity, it can be mentioned that in the European context there is an interesting family connection 
between some of the present multinational companies and their evolution. Out of the industry’s main 
players during the last twenty years, Securitas, Group4 and Falck, as well as Secom have a common 
family-bound history (Söderberg 1979:192-197; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011:45). 
14
Somewhat reliable Securitas (2007:49, 54-55; 2009: 30-32) figures are available for the North American 
and European guarding markets. They show that the ‘globalisation’ impact on private security is quite 
high compared with other businesses. In North America (US, CA & ME) ‘foreign owned’ market share 
in guarding is over 25% and in Europe over 35%.  
15
In 2011 the size of the largest multinationals, measured by employment (Securitas:12, 25) was 
approximately: G4S – 635.000; Securitas – 316.000; Prosegur 120.000. The enormous recruitment 
challenge caused by guard turnover can be imagined as Securitas, for example, announced it to have 
been during the year 2011 in the USA 44% and in Europe 28%.  
16
Both tables (5 and 6) have been modified from Nielsen’s (2008) presentation slides based on Securitas 
and CoESS data. In the modification of the tables several sources concerning figures about the market 
and its growth in Europe and the USA were used, such as: Securitas (2000b); Security (2004:18-21; 
2010:28); Zalund (2010:20-26). All these texts support the presented information on the basic trends in 
the table. 
17
A comprehensive academic study by ASIS (2006) describes the present status of security organisations 
throughout the US, commenting also the impacts of 9/11 on the security measures and budgets.  
According to a US Government (1993:32-38) study, no drastic changes can actually be noticed in the 
basic structure of the US private security market. The situation described in a US Government paper 
(1975) is very similar with the later ones. The biggest companies dominated already then over 50% of 
the total market and even many of the firms on the present list are the same. 
18
As in the majority of published official, academic and other texts on private security in English, the 
word regulation is primarily used in this thesis to mean jointly all the official private security related 
enactments published by the public authorities (governments); laws, acts, statues, ordnances, decrees, 
executive orders, orders in council, bylaws, statutory regulations, directives, codes of conduct, and so 
on.  
19
A general summary statement made by a regulation specialist (Vogel 2010:68) describes well the 
common opinion on this matter: “…while private regulation has resulted in some substantive 
improvements in corporate behavior, it cannot be regarded as a substitute for the more effective exercise 
of state authority at both the national and international levels. Ultimately, private regulation must be 
integrated with and reinforced by more effective state-based and enforced regulatory policies at both the 
national and international levels.” 
20
This project is based on a resolution made by the (UN) Commission  on Crime prevention and Criminal 
Justice (2009) and has included  a background paper (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2010) 
and several session and working papers both by the UN organisation and the international experts 
(Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2011d). The process has 
led to a draft resolution recommendation by the Commission (2012) which includes a comprehensive 
list of definitions concerning the civilian private security services as well as principles for their 
oversight and regulation. 
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21
 Confusingly the authors are here using the term ‘private police’ (not policing) as a synonym to private 
security in the same way as Draper (1978), Shearing and Stenning  (1981:220) and Stenning (1992:147-
148) 
22
Some of the present problems and challenges concerning private security have been pointed out by van 
Steden and Sarre (2010) and Thumala, et al (2011) criticising heavily commercial security provision, 
the quality of its activities and the affect it has generally on policing functions. These articles reveal an 
interesting misunderstanding of the actual role, character and powers of the bulk of commercial security 
activity by mixing up the controlled and structured ‘business’ role it has in most industrialised 
democracies with the undefined and un-researched threats they say it poses. Button (2011) has taken up 
the ‘problem of non-existing compulsory training of security managers in the UK. He also emphasise 
the negative effect ex police and ex army officers working within the industry have on its development 
and quality. The problem with his argumentation is that he does not clearly indicate if he considers 
commercial security activities as a private business or as a semi-public policing activity which should 
be comprehensively controlled by state rules even for management education.   
 
Chapter 3 
 
23
 Definitions for terms, widely used in private security context worldwide (also by interviewees in this 
thesis), can be found in Green’s slang dictionary (2004:280, 435, 802, 797, 971). ‘Cowboy’ is a 
tradesman who ignores the basic ethics and business standards of his peers and aims only for money.  
‘Fly by night’ is anyone dubious, crooked, criminal, especially used of a businessman who takes one’s 
money but fails to provide any or at least adequate recompense. ‘Mom and pop’ is a small corner store 
stocking just the bare essentials. ‘Moonlighter’ is one who takes a second job, undeclared for tax 
purposes. ‘Quack’ is an incompetent medical charlatan. 
24
 At the time of the pilot study, the number of EU member states was 25.  
25
 Anglo-American documents and regulations from the United States, Canada and Australia would have 
been available in abundance, but because of their similar legal environments and argumentation, only a 
limited sample of them was included to demonstrate the local culture in steering the private security. 
26
 Private security related documents were utilised in this thesis from following regulatory regimes: ACT, 
AF, AU, BW, BE, BR, BU, CA, CL, CN, DK, EE, ES, FI, GE, IE, IN, IS, JP, KE, KR, LS, MT, NL, 
NO, NG, NSW, NT, NY, NZ, ON, PK, QC, QLD, PL, RU, SCT, SE, SG, SL, SK, SW, TR, TW, UA, 
UG, UK, YU, US & ZA. 
27
 The magazines referred to here are: Aktuell Säkerhet (SE), CoESS Newsletter (BE/Europe), ESSPress 
(EE), Ligazette (CH/Worldwide), Securianen (SE), Securitas Kliendleht (EE), Securitas Magazine 
(SE/Worldwide), Security Electronics (AU), Security Focus (ZA), Security Management (US/ASIS) 
and G4S Magazine (UK/Worldwide) 
28
 These conferences and seminars were held in various locations in Africa, Australia, Europe and North   
America. 
29
 The ‘other’ column includes security industry and public law enforcement experts who had all over 
local as well as cross-national expertise on the subjects under study. 
30
 The theories and models of situational relativists are primarily connected to the theological studies, but 
present also ideas which can be used in this kind of comparative study as presented for example by 
Lilien (1974). 
Chapter 4 
 
31
The comments are based on the situation in South Africa when the new Security Industry Regulation 
Bill (South African Government 2001) was still in reading and its implementation principles open. 
32
According to the resolution of  The European Parliament and the Council of Europe (2006:Article 16/4), 
The European Commission (2007:15) must assess by December 28 2010 the possibility of presenting a 
vertical harmonisation instrument for the private security services industry. In the CoESS situational 
update presentation by Van Sand (2010) the Industry’s views on this pending matter are presented. 
European Commission has not submitted the assessment or given any explanation for the delay up till 
the fixed date. 
 
Chapter 5 
 
33
The results of this internal CoESS survey analysis are used here primarily to support the other data 
presented in this thesis as the topics and methodology used in it correlate with the pilot study (Hakala 
2007).  
34
This difference becomes obvious if the tasks performed by guards are looked at in a more exact way. 
Private security associations and individual security companies commonly publish summary statistics 
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on guards’ reports. For example, Bevakningsbranchens Yrkes- och Arbetsmiljönämd (2004) has 
occasionally done this in Sweden regarding nationwide the whole branch. When looking at the tasks 
performed (daily) by the guards in Sweden one gets a good understanding of the focus in their work. 
For example over 30.000 controls and clearings of fire exits (doors), over 21.000 closings of other doors 
and windows, over 8.000 call outs concerning burglary and technical alarms, over 33.000 contributions 
concerning pro-active protection of property, but ‘only’ 459 times a connection with police (assistance 
to them or a call for their help).     
35
Survey data (Hakala 2007:12) 
36In his article Day (2007:7) tells of the consequences of a new regulation concerning ‘bouncers’ in the 
State of South Australia. Approximately 3000 of the 8000 doormen in the State parted from their right 
for or failed to renew their license because of the new regulation related requirements imposed on them. 
37The ‘serious’ commercial security companies are aware of the risks and try to manage them in a 
structured way. For example Securitas (2012:44-51) has a special model to manage contractual, 
operational assignment and financial risks connected to their business activities. 
   
Chapter 6 
 
  
38
Examples of such autonomous areas are: Greenland and the Faeroe Islands (DK), Svalbard (NO), Åland 
(FI), and Scotland and Northern Ireland (UK). In these areas with autonomous rights, national private 
security legislation is not automatically in force without the decision of the local council of 
representatives (parliament). 
39
An example of the ‘verticalisation’ is that of Securitas which has listed in its Annual Report (Securitas 
2012:9) twenty specialised customer segments: aviation, construction, cultural, education, energy, 
entertainment, events, financial, healthcare, high-tech, hotel and tourism, industry and manufacturing, 
logistics, maritime, offices, public, public transport, residential, retail ,and small and medium-sized 
enterprises.  
 
Chapter 7 
 
40
The considerable impact that immigration and ethnic diversification have had on security personnel and 
the provision and demand for security services (Ligazette 2008b:6-10) has been left out of this thesis. 
41
Different generally available sources have been utilised: Lindquist 1999; 2000; Lockwood 2005:1-16; 
Queensland Government 2009a; 2009c; Sweden:2009:3. 
42
Different generally  available data sources have been utilised: Welsh 1998; Shaw 2002:110-112; Sparks 
2003; Van Berlo 2005:43-46; Judt 2005:13-17; Siebrits 2001:79-85; Reynebeau 2005:107-112; 
SouthAfrica.info 2009; Geddes 2010:1-16.   
43
. If not otherwise stated, figures are based on United Nations’ (2004, 2007) data.   
44
Source: The Nelson A Rockefeller Institute of Government 2008.   
45
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 2007: June Quarter. 
46
Source: The Times 2000. 
47
Source: About Australia 2009. 
48
Source: US Census Bureau 2008. According to the presented figures, NY had the 3rd highest population 
of the US states (1st California and 2nd Texas). 
49
Annual rate of increase 2001-2007.  
50
Annual rate of increase 2001-2007. Annual growth of the whole Australia was 1.5%.  
51
Average annual rate of increase 2000-2004. 
52
The difference between State counties is huge. For example, the population density in NYC is 
27.309/km² and in Hamilton county 3.3/km², emphasising the differences amongst areas in the 
regulatory regime under study. This is of course the situation in all regulatory regimes in some way, 
affecting the possibility to organise and offer commercial security services profitably. 
53
The GDP and GSP figures are not totally comparable, but they have been used here as the best available 
for comparison. 
54
The presented figures are the ones that were available at the time of the interviews. After that they have 
developed remarkably in Estonia and South Africa. 
55
Source: The Nelson A Rockefeller Institute of Government 2008.  
56
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 2007:June Quarter. 
57
For New York and Queensland the GSP is used. 
58
Source: NationMasters.com 2009c. Listing of 141 countries (the worst is listed n:o1). New York figures 
are the average of the whole of the USA. 
59
Source: Transparency International 2009. Corruption perception index (CPI) relates to perception of the 
degree of corruption as seen by business people and counting analysts. It ranges between 10 (highly 
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clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). Figures are from 2009 summary comparing 180 countries. In the case of 
Australia and the USA, the figures apply to the whole country, not the state.  
60
Source: Global Democracy Ranking 2009. The Democracy Ranking is an annual ranking of 103 
democracies (country-based democracies) in the world, focusing on the Quality of Democracy in an 
international perspective. Maximum figure is 100.  In the case of Australia and the USA, the figures 
apply for the whole country, not the state. 
61
Source: NationMaster.com 2009a. Ranking of 225 nations (the best is listed n:o 1). In the case of 
Australia and the United States, the figures apply to the whole country, not the state. 
62
The ranking is based on the Esping-Andersen categorisation (1998:9-34; 2002:13-17). The regimes 
under study have been placed in the table in one of the three welfare state categories presented by the 
author: 1 = the ‘liberal’ welfare state; 2 = the ‘corporatist’ welfare state; 3 = the ‘social-democratic’ 
welfare state. Estonia and South Africa are difficult to classify because their internal situation and 
wealth do not fulfil the criteria of a welfare state. They have, however, emphasised striving towards a 
‘social democratic’ (Nordic) welfare model. This classification is just one of many and the debate of the 
definitions and categories is on-going.  
63
Source: NationMaster.com 2009b. Figures are from this website if not otherwise announced.  
64
The figures apply to the whole of the USA. 
65
The figures apply to the whole of Australia. 
66
The ranking includes 164 countries. Country with the most prisoners per capita is listed n:o 1.  
67
Source: NationMaster.com 2009b; Wikipedia 2009c. The NationMasters.com ranking includes 62 
countries. Country with the most murders per capita is listed as n:o 1. The figures for Belgium and 
Sweden were not available from the NationMaster.com list and have been taken from Wikipedia list of 
intentional homicide rates.   
68
Source: NationMaster.com 2009b. The ranking includes 32 countries. Country with the most armed 
murders per capita is listed n:o 1. 
69
This figure is from Bagshave’s (2009:48) article where he comments the official crime statistics and it is 
in line with the NationMaster.com figure. This figure is not in line with the total number of murders in 
ZA which shows the problems faced with this kind of statistics. According to the official crime statistics 
of the period 2008/09 more than 100 Police Service members lost their lives on duty during the annual 
period under review in ZA. 
70
Source: South African Police Service 2009. The figures available for comparison are from different 
years (2003-2009). BE, EE & SE figures are taken from CoESS 2008, and checked/compared with 
INHES and CoESS 2008:24-25 and CoESS and ALMEGA 2009:8.   
71
Deviating from the other text some approximations on the number of law enforcement and commercial 
security are presented in this table to give an idea of the size of them in the regulatory regimes under 
study. 
72
Sources: Belgian Government 1990; Judt 2005:21-25; Reynebeau 2005:132-136; CoESS 2008:BE; 
Private Security Regulation.Net 2009; Belgian Police 2009; The Open Door Web Site 2009; Wikipedia 
2009a,b; Wielaard 2010; Fallon 2010; Lenoir 2010; CoESS and APEG/BVBO 2010:22.  
73
Sources: Estonian Government 1993; 2003; Saar 2004; CoESS 2008:EE; Eesti Politsei 2009; CoESS 
and  APEG/BVBO 2010:12-17. 
74
Sources: Gotbaum 2005; Access Control & Security Systems 2006; New York Police Department 2009; 
Nalla 2009; New York Government 2009c. The presented OES figure on NY public police includes 
first-line supervisors and managers of police and detectives, detectives in criminal investigations and 
police and sheriff’s patrol officers. According to official statistics (US Government 2008) the figure 
includes security guards and private detectives but not the supervisory personnel and CIT. In the OES 
statistics, the separately compiled, approximately 9000 crossing guards guiding and controlling 
vehicular or pedestrian traffic, are not included in the figure. These figures are not, however, as such 
comparable with those given by the security associations in other countries because they include also 
non-regulated in-house personnel. There is an Area Police/Private Security Liaison (APPL), headed by 
NYPD. It has anyhow been quite inactive during recent years (Blumenthal 1993; US Government 
2000:7). The difficulty to have figures on security companies and personnel is obvious, as even the 
number of security companies in the USA was estimated to be between 11 000 to 15 000. The largest 
companies were Securitas, Wackenhut (G4S), Allied Burton, Guardsmark, US Security Associates and 
Initial Security. The two first are subsidiaries of European companies, which mean that there need to be 
specific legal arrangements so that they can be accepted as suppliers to US state contracts. Walker 
(2002) as an expert gives a comprehensive picture of the market, the industry and the general security 
business ‘drivers’ in the USA. In his article Zalund (2010:21) approximates the number of guards in the 
USA from 2008 to 2018 and predicts the general growth to be 14% within this ten year period.  
75
Sources: Queensland Government 1989; 2009b; Sarre and Prenzler 2005:8-16; Prenzler 2005b; Prenzler 
and Sarre 2006:178; Guest 2009; Bligh 2009; Queensland Police Service 2009; 2010; Prenzler, et al 
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2009a. If the national figures are broken down according to the population in different states, it gives an 
approximate of 7000 to 8000 security employees in Queensland.  
76The principles of the former public ‘security company’ Australian Protection Services (APS) were 
similar to the ideas in Estonia and Sweden, but the ‘final’ solution model was Australian, resembling 
the one used in the former Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic with its separately regulated ‘guarding’ 
department (Valvekoondis) attached to the police (Australian Federal Police 2006; Wikipedia 2006). 
77
Sources: Masuku 2001; Shearing and Berg 2006:204-205; Berg 2007:16-21; Pharoah 2008; Security 
Focus 2009:4 ; Bagshawe 2009:48; Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2009:27; South 
African Police Service 2010:1-16. 
78
Sources: Söderberg 1979; CoESS 2008:SE; INHES and CoESS 2008:82-83; Polisen 2009a; 2009b; 
CoESS and ALMEGA 2009:8-10; CoESS and APEG/BVBO 2010.  
79
Source: APEG/BVBO 2010:12-17.   
80
Source: CoESS 2008: EE. 
81
Sources: Padwa 2001:3; US Government 2005; Manning 2006:111-112; The Service Employees 
International Union 2009; Access Control & Security Systems 2006; Gotbaum 2005:11. 
82
Source: ASIAL 1999; 2011. 
83
Sources: Ncube 2008b:38-39; Security Association of South Africa 2009; Security Industry Alliance 
(SIA) 2009. In 2006 the main unions representing guards went on strike for 96 days. The strike cost the 
industry some 1 million working days. On top of that, it resulted in widespread looting, damaging of 
property and violent crime. A number of members of rivalling unions (not on strike) were brutally 
attacked and murdered (almost 60) by the strikers. Some were thrown from trains other physically 
attacked, shot and hanged (allAfrica.com 2009; Mail&Guardianonline 2006; Zeilig 2006; Ncube 
2008a:53; Wikipedia 2009b).  The situation is still today turbulent which was noticed when a group of 
guards (crowd controllers) went on strike during the Soccer World Cup 2010 even if there was a general 
governmental agreement in the country to avoid this kind of conflicts during the event (Fihlani 2010; 
CNN 2010).   
84
Sources: ALMEGA 2009:8-10; Svenska Säkerhetsföretag (SWESEC) 2009.    
 
Chapter 8 
 
85
This comment is supported by Judt (2005:27-29). The author points out the mixture of violence, 
corruption, organised crime and state administration in Belgium in the 1980s and ‘90s.  
86
The circumstances have been described by Siemaszko (2005) who analyses the all over crime situation 
in former communist countries arguing that it was very serious after the transition in Estonia. 
87
In his slang dictionary Green (2004:138) has defined bouncer as a large, tough man employed to keep 
order in premises, often a pub, club, concert hall, etc. 
88
In Queensland Government (2006a; 2006b; 2006c) ministerial statements the strategies are outlined to 
rein in the problems of night-life violence caused by drunkenness and rough bouncing in Queensland’s 
urban areas. Another more academic comment on the problem has been published in a University of 
South Australia (2006) press release. In it Sarre comments on the same problems emphasizing the need 
to improve the personal quality and training of bouncers as well as the state control on them.  
89
The CIT robberies occurred during the daytime in urban areas in the middle of normal daytime traffic, 
and they included all kinds of firearms and the exploding of armoured vans. For the first time there was 
a serious public risk, connected to commercial security activities, affecting randomly the common 
citizens. Cash handling activities were not regulated and now the thirty years of idleness in developing 
the legal base of the industry backfired and led to a kind of ‘panic’ regulation. This was not common in 
Sweden. It also led to accusations and tensions between the different interest groups, tensions that were 
unfamiliar for the local culture. The situation also triggered a revision of other parts of the private 
security legislation, not just the CIT part of it. 
90
In a newspaper article by Åkerblad (2005:6-7) the CIT management of commercial security companies 
and the union representatives comment the developments that led to the health and safety legislation 
based ‘emergency’ stop of Securitas CIT operations. The actual background and consequences of the 
Swedish situation are analysed by Eriksson (2007b:26-27) in an article in the aftermath of the new 
regulation. 
91
Action has been taken in Sweden after this interview. The government has imposed new statutory 
instructions on the training, similar uniforms, batches, protective clothing and extra powers of crowd 
controllers (Swedish Government 2010; Åkerblad 2010).  
92For example, the Queensland State’s legal processes include a systematic evaluation, held at regular 
intervals, of all laws, also those on private security (Queensland Government 2006d). 
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Chapter 9 
 
93
All tables (13-22) including regulation information are based on the following main laws/acts and 
bylaws supporting them as amended till the end of 2009, Belgian Government (1990); Estonian 
Government (2003); New York Government (1994); Queensland Government (1993); South African 
Government (2002); Swedish Government (1974).  
94
Investigation is an activity especially prohibited in the law for licensed security companies (Estonian 
Government 2003:16(1)3). 
95
The regulation includes a specific remark of mobile close protection. 
96
In some regulatory regimes monitoring is considered a part of electronic surveillance, not a part of   
manned security. 
97
The rules are included separately in the US Government (2006b) Homeland Security legislation to 
protect companies from exceptional risks related to terrorism.  
 
98The expression ‘codes of conduct’ which is here used of legally binding rules must not be mixed with 
the voluntary rules set by industry associations, standardisation bodies and so on, which are also often 
called ‘codes of conduct’. 
99
Basic training requirement set for a non-armed guard. 
100
 The requirement for security managers is a minimum of 80 hours on top of the guard training. 
101
 Not defined by the law but by an agreement between the Ministry of the Interior and the Branch 
Association ETEL (today ASA). 
102
 Exemptions are granted for present or former state officials like police officers, correction officers, 
peace officers and sheriffs (New York Government 2009a). 
103
 The length depends on the organiser of the training and the approving authority. It usually varies 
between 5 to 10 days. The topics to be included are set by the authorities. See: Queensland 
Government (2008)  
104
 The length depends on the organiser of the training and the approving authority. 
105
 At least 160 hours of guided practical experience (training) is required between the two course 
modules to qualify   as a participant on the second one (Swedish Government 2009:7:§4). The second 
module has to be taken within 4 years from starting the initial training. In practice the total length of compulsory 
basic training is according to collective agreement 302 hours (CoESS 2008:SE).. 
106
 Svenska Stöldskyddsföreningen (2004:135) has summarised in their article all the (special) powers 
granted for different guard categories in Sweden. 
107
 Attacking a guard on duty is punished according to the law (Swedish Government 1974:§7) as a more    
serious offence than the same act against a common citizen.   
108
 There are often exceptions granted for some tasks, for example, close protection and shop surveillance. 
109
 This rule applies only to crowd controllers. 
110
 There is only a prohibition of the use of a headwear resembling that of a police (checkerboard hat). 
111
 A watchman, guard or private patrolman may wear on his outer clothing a rectangular metal or woven 
insignia approved by the Department of State. 
112
 Pocket cards are issued by the licensing authority for those with licence certificates. 
113
 There is a specific exemption concerning the guards working within public transport (railway) 
security. 
114
 Gas sprays are totally banned in private security use. 
115
 In Australia, a (Federal) Government run security firm, Australian Protective Service (APS), was set 
up   by a special law to grant extra powers and to carry out guarding of primarily public objects. APS 
has now been gradually merged with the Australian Federal Police organisation under the name 
Australian Federal Police Protection Service (AFPPS) (Australian Federal Police 2006). In Sweden, a 
similar company, Almänna Bevaknings AB (ABAB), was set up by a special law (Swedish 
Government 1984) which included a monopoly and special powers to primarily protect public objects 
and CNI. ABAB was, however, also active from its start in the open market, which created unfair 
competition. When the political situation changed ABAB was privatised and sold in 1995 to Sodexho. 
The present operations of G4S in Sweden are based historically on this previously state-owned 
company.   
116
 The liability aspect of on duty guns is discussed and commented in Michael’s research (2002:216-
217). 
 
Chapter 10 
 
117
 This is an interview opinion given by Lars Oscarsson (BYA) on the topics of streamlining the 
regulation and its implementation. 
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118
 Another authority, The Division of Criminal Justice Services, Office of Public Safety, which is not the 
actual licensing body provides rules and administrative oversight for commercial security training in 
New York State (New York Government 2009a). 
119
 The Police Administration Department within the Ministry of Justice, which is not the licensing body,    
has an important role in writing the detailed instructions for the security companies and the guards. 
 
 
 
Chapter 11 
 
120
 In this article an interviewee representing the industry comments on licensing timetables: “The 
turnabout time from PSIRA in terms of vetting and screening is far too long and should, in my 
opinion, be reduced to no more than one week.” 
121
 In an official notice South African Government (2009) calls for public comments on the latest draft 
regulation for the training of a security service provider. The process is pending. In Olivier’s 
(2009:23) article PSIRA manager Badenhorst is commenting optimistically on the ongoing process of 
the new statutory training standards. 
122
 The POSLEC SETA (Police, Private Security, Legal, Correctional Services and Justice Sector 
Education and Training Authority) and DIDTETA (Diplomacy, Intelligence, Defence and Trade 
Education and Training Authority) were amalgamated and a new SETA, called SASSETA (Safety and 
Security SETA), was formed on 1 July 2005 (SASSETA 2009). 
123
 This is an interview opinion given by the national chairperson of SANSEA. 
124
 All the answers from The Security Police go through this authority. It is a group of politicians who 
take in principle a stand on every single case and decides if the information can be given out or not. 
They have meetings once a week.  
125
 The argumentation was that many provincial authorities had never got any denial in this context and 
that there was on average less than one negative answer annually. The goal was to smooth out the 
procedure and especially to speed it up. The risk was considered by the controlling authorities to be so 
small that it could be handled in some other ways. However, the politicians and the security industry 
wanted to keep the procedure unchanged. 
126
 The licensing authority interviewee estimated that the handling time of individual licenses could have 
been cut to three days without the statement from the Security Police. Furthermore, proposals and 
attempts to make the process faster have not succeeded.  
 
Appendices 
 
127
 The Shearing, et al (1980:281-306) question lists of the ‘Toronto’ model have been used as a check list 
for this minimal questionnaire model. 
128
 Scale categories: 1= less reliable/valid; 2=quite reliable/valid; 3=very reliable/valid for use in this 
context 
129
 The aim of the question here is to find out what is the percentage of ‘sleeping’ or ‘drawer’ licenses. 
130
 Questions of the last four bullet points should only be answered if the data is readily available. 
131
 Include persons rendering private security services for a fee as individuals or as employees in a 
security company. 
132
 Questions of the four last bullet points should only be answered if the data is readily available. 
133
 Operational hours paid by the customer. 
134
 To have comparable man years the total amount of hours is divided by the full ’normal’ number of 
hours of a working month as it is mandated in the law or the collective agreement. 
135
 The total number of hours including also overtime and other extra work. 
136
 The amount of cash he gets after taxes and other (legal) deductions. 
137
 The ideas and recommendations in the following texts have been taken into consideration when 
writing this list: US Government (1976); Prenzler (1988:9); Pillay (2006); ASIS International (2006); 
Prenzler and Sarre (2008; 2011). (UN) Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice has 
forwarded a proposal for a comprehensive list on regulation (2012). 
138
 The following laws and texts have been used as a base for these comparisons: Belgian Government 
(1990); Estonian Government (2003:§21(2)); New York Government (1994:§89-f); Queensland 
Government (1993:§7); South African Government (2001: chapter 1. (1)); Swedish Government 
(1974: chapter 1(3)); ASIS International (2004b:10; 2008:41); CEN (2008:5). 
139
 In Estonian private security regulation context the term ‘security officer’ is used for a person in 
supervisory position of responsibility who has higher requirements as a security guard. 
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140
 Restrictions referred to here are: having restricted legal capacity, having criminal record, being private 
detective, being bankrupt or other incapability to meet the requirements set in the Security Act. 
141
 Activities referred to here as exceptions are for example: aviation security, security at sea, order of off-
road driving, hunting order, order on fishing and security for socially important facilities. 
142
 Source: ASIS International (2008:41) 
143
 Source: ASIS International (2004b:10)  
144
 Does not apply to members of the executive board (non-operational) or auxiliary personnel or security 
companies. 
145
 Do not simultaneously execute work as a private detective, a weapon or ammunition manufacturer, a 
weapons or ammunition dealer, or execute any other work that, may represent a threat to public order 
or the internal or external security of the State. 
146
 There is a prohibition to be involved or hold a license in an employment agency business. 
147
 Minimum age for managers and board of directors is 21, others 18. 
148
 Minimum age for CIT personnel and crowd controllers (public places) is 21, others 19. 
149
 Minimum age for Bodyguards is 25, for CIT and shop surveillance personnel 23 years.  
150
  Reason to suspect that a person does not meet the set requirements exist when he has resided in the 
country for less than five years. 
151
 Do not apply to members of executive board (non-operational) or companies for security advice or 
training institutions or administrative and logistical personnel. 
152
 There is a compulsory initial training of 16 hours before starting to work. 
153
 The requirement can be compensated by relevant experience not less than three years. 
154
 Previous minimum work experience in other security operations; for bodyguards five years, CIT and 
shop surveillance personnel one year. 
155
 Optional requirement decided by the licensing authority, if checked.  
156
 In case of agency application a specific signed affirmation by five citizens who have known the 
applicant for more than five years confirming that they after reading the application believe every 
statement made therein is true, that such person is honest, of good character and competent, and not 
related or connected to the person so certifying by blood or marriage. 
157
 Do not apply to administrative or logistical personnel of security companies or educational institutions 
nor consultants. 
158
 As above. 
159
 ‘Former employer’ means official military, security, police or intelligence force or service, whether in 
South Africa or elsewhere. 
160
 Do not apply to personnel of educational institutions. 
161
 Not compulsory by the law but included in the collective agreement as a precondition for pay rise. 
162
 Exemptions are given for persons with public law enforcement service. 
163
 Study programme established by the educational (licensed) institution in compliance with the 
Standards of Professions Act, and the study programme has to be approved by Police Board and the 
National Examination and Qualification Centre. 
164
 There are specific comprehensive test instructions for dogs and their handlers. 
165
 Stated in New York Government (2006) Executive Law §841-c. 
